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ABSTRACT 
This study consists of three essays on electoral accountability 
and local public finance. 
‘A comprehensive test of Yardstick Competition in the Italian 
Municipalities’ tests the Yardstick Competition hypotheses on a 
dataset of Italian Municipalities during the period 1995-2004, 
focusing on the local property tax rate on the main dwelling (ICI 
abitazione principale). First, a vote popularity equation is 
estimated with instrumental variables, including an original 
measure of inter-jurisdictional comparison between the domestic 
tax rate and the average neighbors’ tax rate. The findings verify 
popularity concerns of the incumbent, robust to alternative 
definitions of popularity. Then, we estimate a spatial tax setting 
equation detecting interactions driven by the positive spatial lag 
coefficient. Given these evidence, we conclude that Yardstick 
Competition is present in the dataset. 
‘The time dynamics of Yardstick Competition in the Italian 
Municipalities’ investigates the pattern of strategic interaction 
from 1995 to 2004. The literature identifies Yardstick 
Competition with the average interaction in time; we move 
forward, by estimating the spatial tax setting equation on 
subsequent time subsamples of the dataset to capture the 
variation of the interaction due to the introduction of a marginal 
year. The results show a converging trend towards the lowest 
level of spatial correlation. This pattern is especially evident in 
those Regions with a higher density of municipalities, where 
there are more opportunities to make inter-jurisdictional 
comparisons. This evidence suggests that the informational 
spillover generating Yardstick Competition, contrary to the 
assumption in the literature, changes over time. 
 XIX 
‘Do voters learn from past experience? Yardstick Competition 
and political selection’ extends the model of Yardstick 
Competition by assuming that the stock of information available 
to voters accumulates over time. The theoretical results show 
that when past mimicking is observed there is a range of values 
of the weight attached to past experience for which the less 
competent incumbent would not be re-elected. If voters do not 
observe past mimicking, however, successful mimicking is 
always feasible. The predictions of the model are tested on an 
electoral cohort of Italian Municipalities by estimating a probit 
regression where the dependent variable is the dummy for re-
election of the incumbent and the variables of interest are the 
voters’ beliefs on the tax rate computed through dynamic 
Bayesian updating. The results, however, fail to verify the 
predictions of the model as the coefficient associated to the 
updated belief is never statistically significant. 
‘Asymmetric information and Political Budget Cycles: the effect 
of the local diffusion of newspapers’ examines the expenditure 
cycles in the Italian Regions from 1984 to 2008 and their nexus 
with voters’ awareness, proxied with the local diffusion of 
newspapers. We estimate a dynamic expenditure equation with 
Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected (Bruno, 2005) 
accounting for the small size of the dataset. The results, robust to 
different specifications of the econometric model, find cycles in 
total expenditure and in capital expenditure before the electoral 
and fiscal reforms in the mid-90s. During this period the 
diffusion of newspapers constrains the electoral expenditure of 
those same items; the diffusion of generic newspapers is 
associated to a larger effect than the diffusion of  economic 
newspapers, suggesting stronger popularity concerns towards 
the newly informed voters. The analyses does not detect neither 
expenditure cycles nor any effect of the diffusion of newspapers 
 XX 
after 1995, indicating a possible shift from a cycle in the size of 
expenditure to a less visible type of signaling, the cycle in the 
composition of expenditure. 
Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
The subject of this study is the link between electoral 
accountability and local public finance. In particular, we 
investigate the presence and the time dynamics of electoral 
manipulations of fiscal policy in the Italian sub-national 
governments and the effect on them of a variation of voters’ 
awareness. 
This study is rooted in the field of the economic analyses of 
government, following the approach common to Political 
Economics and Public Choice assuming a non benevolent 
government pursuing his own private interests while ruling. 
This environment is well described by political agency models in 
which the principal-agent relationship is characterized by 
citizens that have delegated the governmental authority to 
politicians who enjoy an informational advantage. As pointed 
out by Besley (2003), two problems emerge in this context: 
monitoring the policy makers’ activity and selecting the 
competent politicians. In fact, politicians may implement the 
policies preferred by the voters and be consonant, or do not what 
voters want and be dissonant. In a democratic institutional setting 
in which the government is concerned about electoral 
popularity, strategic policy makers would behave differently 
according to the timing of the legislature. 
This study focuses on two theories that treat the electoral 
manipulations of fiscal policy: the Political Budget Cycle theory 
(Rogoff, 1990) and the Yardstick Competition hypotheses (Besley 
and Case, 1995). 
Both the theories assume a decentralized environment in which 
the incumbent may be one of two types, the less competent 
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(dissonant) one or the most competent (consonant) one. The 
competence level is an individual specific characteristic constant 
in time, and it usually represents the amount of the rent seeking 
activity or inefficiency in transforming tax revenues in public 
goods and services. In this framework the tax rate level of the 
less competent incumbent would be higher than the tax rate level 
set by the most competent incumbent, vice versa the level of 
public provision would be lower. As the cost of public provision 
is partly unobserved by voters, before an election they update 
their beliefs on the incumbents’ competence with the fiscal 
performance they observe. When faced with re-election concerns, 
the less competent incumbent would find it optimal to be 
strategic and take a fiscal decisions that increases his popularity 
by reducing the tax rate or expanding the expenditure level. 
The Political Budget Cycle theory predicts that the distortion 
would occur only in investment expenditure because its 
realization, unlike current expenditure, is observed by voters 
with one period lag. Aidt et al. (2011) proved that this game 
generates only separating equilibria. As the most competent 
incumbent is more efficient in providing public goods and 
services, he would always be able to spend more than the less 
competent incumbent, making the electoral strategy socially 
efficient because the voters observe an informative signal. The 
electoral manipulation thus preserves political selection, as only 
the most competent incumbent will be re-elected. Although the 
average quality of the politicians would improve, the distortion 
implies a cost, namely the deficit that voters would repay during 
the next legislature. 
The Yardstick Competition hypotheses introduces an additional 
assumption to the model: beside the competence level of the 
incumbent, also the shock to the cost of public provision is 
unknown to voters, but it is spatially correlated among the 
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neighbors. This element allows voters to make inter-
jurisdictional comparisons and judge the performance of the 
domestic incumbent by observing the performance of the 
neighbors’ incumbents. The informational spillover generated by 
Yardstick Competition, however, reduces the asymmetric 
information between the incumbent and the voters but it does 
not remove it. Besley and Case (1995) illustrated the possibility 
of a pooling equilibrium in which the less competent incumbent 
exploits a domestic positive cost shock to mimic the performance 
of the neighbors hit by a negative cost shock. In this situation the 
fiscal decision observed is not informative of the competence 
level of the incumbent and under some conditions (derived by 
Bordignon et al., 2003) the mimicking incumbent would be re-
elected because voters update their electoral beliefs with a 
misleading information. As a consequence, political selection is 
threatened and the quality of the politicians does not improve. 
From this brief discussion two key elements emerge. First, the 
incentive to manipulate the fiscal decisions is motivated by the 
electoral concerns of the incumbent. Hence, the electoral 
mechanism introduces accountability between voters and 
politicians but it incentivizes the strategic behavior of the less 
competent incumbents by generating popularity matters. 
Second, the fiscal manipulations are possible because there is 
asymmetric information on the true cost of the public provision. 
Voters in fact observe only the outcome of the decision, either 
the tax rate or the spending level or both, but they do not 
observe the process leading to these decisions. If more 
information is provided to voters, would they be able to judge 
the incumbent without incurring the cost of the fiscal 
manipulation? Would they unmask the mimicking incumbent? 
These are two recurring questions in this work, to which we 
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manage to answer both theoretically (Chapter 3) and empirically 
(Chapter 1, 2 and 4). 
Chapter 1 tests Yardstick Competition on a newly assembled 
dataset of Italian Municipalities. The empirical analyses verifies 
both the responsibility hypotheses and strategic interaction in 
local tax setting during the period 1995-2004.  
While the literature estimates only average effects during the 
period considered, the longitudinal dimension has been 
exploited in Chapter 2 to investigate the pattern of interaction in 
time. The results suggest a decreasing pattern of interaction, 
whose reductions are mainly during the electoral years. This 
result is consistent with the fact that Yardstick Competition 
improves political selection in time and not at once. A possible 
explanation for the observed pattern is the intensification of the 
informational spillover implied in Yardstick Competition. 
This hypotheses is formalized in Chapter 3 by including in the 
model a process of voters’ incremental learning from tax rates.  
The theoretical part of Chapter 3 expands the two-period models 
of the literature and assumes a dynamic update of the voters’ 
beliefs. The results show that when voters observe a past 
mimicking they learn from their experience and reveal the 
electoral strategy of the current incumbent. The empirical part of 
the Chapter computes the dynamically updated beliefs on a sub-
sample of electoral Municipalities and tests the effect of these 
beliefs on the re-election probability of the incumbent. The 
results, however, do not support the theoretical predictions. 
Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes the presence of an expenditure cycle 
in the Italian Regions. The empirical results find a Rogoff cycle 
(Rogoff, 1990) driven by the distortion in investment expenditure 
during the period 1984-2008. The institutional innovations 
introduced in Italy in the mid-90s by the simultaneous fiscal and 
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electoral reforms affected the incentives to generate a cycle in the 
dataset. An analyses of the expenditure cycle in time finds a shift 
from a cycle in size to a possible cycle in the composition of 
expenditure (Drazen and Eslava, 2006). The same Chapter 
investigates the effect of voters’ awareness on the electoral 
manipulation by introducing a variable measuring the local 
diffusion of newspapers. The results verify the prediction of a 
negative relationship between the share of informed voters and 
the cycle in capital expenditure; as expected, this relationship 
weakens as the Rogoff cycle decreases in time. Interestingly, the 
analyses of the effect of the press diffusion distinguishing the 
newspapers according to their news specificity shows that 
generic diffusion is more effective in reducing the cycle than 
economic diffusion, stressing the role of newly informed voters. 
This study, hopefully, could give some contribution to the 
discussion on the link between electoral accountability and local 
public finance. Furthermore, it provides two original datasets to 
be exploited in related projects and it is a starting point for future 
theoretical and empirical investigation of the effect of the 
diffusion of information on the policy decisions and the voting 
behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2. 
A comprehensive test of Yardstick Competition in the 
Italian Municipalities1 
 
1. Introduction 
Do fiscal decisions of incumbent mayors affect their probability 
of being re-elected? Do they consider the fiscal decisions of the 
other mayors when they face an election? 
An affirmative answer to the first question, known in the 
literature as the “responsibility hypothesis” (Lewis-Beck and 
Paldam, 2000), is the logical and necessary presupposition for the 
analysis of the second, known as “Yardstick Competition 
hypothesis” (Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995; Brueckner, 
2003). If voters do not include the incumbent mayors’ fiscal 
choices in their electoral calculus, and these decisions do not 
affect the incumbent mayor’s probability of being re-elected, 
mayors have no reason to look at what the neighboring 
colleagues are doing when they take their fiscal choices. Hence 
there will be no proper Yardstick Competition, at best some 
mimicking behavior that hinges on different motivations. Yet, in 
the empirical literature on Yardstick Competition this 
presupposition is often neglected, as many studies either draw 
conclusions about Yardstick Competition either without 
estimating this link (Elhorst and Frèret, 2008) or failing to find 
any empirical support for it (Bordignon et al., 2003). 
                                                 
1
 This Chapter has been published in the CREM-CNRS, Condorcet Center 
Working Paper ‘From Taxes to Politics, from Politics to Taxes: Evidence of 
Yardstick Competition in the Italian Municipalities’ (2011), coauthored with 
Prof. Fabio Padovano. 
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Here, we exploit a unique “natural experiment” offered by the 
Italian sample. In Italy, in 1993 the almost simultaneous 
introduction of the possibility for voters to directly elect their 
mayor and for mayors to decide the tax rate on property to 
finance municipal expenditures have created, for the first time, 
an institutional setting where inter-jurisdictional comparisons of 
fiscal performances became possible2. The analysis of the pattern 
of strategic interactions among municipalities in the years 
following this reform allows to verify how Yardstick 
Competition evolves in time from its very beginning. 
This work contributes to this field of research by testing both the 
responsibility and the Yardstick Competition hypotheses on a 
newly assembled dataset of Italian municipalities for the 1995-
2004 sample period. The time dimension allows us to relax the 
assumption that all variables are on their long-run equilibrium 
steady state, controlling for transitory departures from the 
equilibrium path. 
The empirical strategy is organized in two steps. First, we 
estimate the correlation between the popularity of the mayor and 
his main fiscal decision. The voting decisions are modeled in a 
way consistent with Yardstick Competition theory, introducing 
the domestic tax rate, the spatial lag of the tax rate and a newly 
conceived variable that represents the tax difference between the 
domestic jurisdiction and its neighbors. By that we verify 
whether the responsibility hypothesis and the Yardstick 
Competition hypothesis represent the same process of voting 
decisions, which makes the two analyses directly comparable. In 
this respect, the new tax difference variable is especially 
                                                 
2
 Before 1993 in Italy mayors were selected by the national parties and local 
revenues consisted almost entirely of transfers from the central government. It 
is no accident that research on Yardstick Competition in Italy began after this 
reform (Brosio et al., 2007). 
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important, as it allows us to capture not only if two jurisdictions 
are becoming more or less different from each other, but also by 
how much. Some previous studies failed to find a link between 
responsibility and Yardstick Competition hypotheses because 
the inter-jurisdictional differences were too small to play a 
significant role in voters’ electoral calculus. Second, we estimate 
a tax setting equation that distinguishes between the reaction of 
the domestic tax rates to the neighbors’ tax rates (‘spatial lag’) 
and the spatial correlation of the unobservable variables in the 
error term (‘spatial error’). Although the majority of the 
literature uses the spatial lag to estimate the spatial interaction of 
the tax rates, Bordignon et al. (2003) interpreted a positive spatial 
error coefficient as evidence of Yardstick Competition. We 
believe that the spatial error is a misleading indicator of tax 
competition because it is a compound of several unobserved 
factors. It includes variables relevant for Yardstick Competition, 
such as the mayor’s competence level and the municipal cost 
shock, but also other unobserved, spatially correlated 
phenomena, such as government policies in favor of certain 
areas, the influence of local lobbies and so on, which affect the 
tax setting autonomy of the incumbent mayor. In the real world, 
moreover, it is more reasonable to believe that voters observe the 
tax rate levels and update their beliefs about the mayor’s 
competence using observable rather than unobservable 
information. As a consequence, the proximity of the tax rates in 
the neighborhood is the relevant indicator of strategic 
interaction. 
To anticipate the results, the analysis of the Italian municipalities 
shows that differences in fiscal performances among 
jurisdictions do affect the incumbent mayor’s probability of 
being re-elected. These electoral concerns enable to interpret the 
main finding of the second step of the analysis, a statistically 
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significant strategic interaction among the fiscal decisions of 
neighboring municipalities, as proper Yardstick Competition. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews 
the economic literature on the responsibility and the Yardstick 
Competition hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the empirical 
analyses, describing the methodologies adopted and the dataset. 
The estimation results of the vote popularity function and of the 
tax setting equation are presented respectively in Section 4 and 
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Review of the literature  
Yardstick Competition has been proposed in the literature as a 
solution to the agency problem that arises when voters and 
incumbent officials have asymmetric information regarding the 
cost of public provision of goods and services (Besley and Case, 
1995). When the cost shocks for the provision of a service are 
spatially correlated, voters may compare the fiscal performance 
in their jurisdiction with those in the neighborhood and draw 
information about the relative competence of their administrator. 
The decision to re-elect the incumbent depends on the outcome 
of this comparison; the fiscal decision of the incumbent in 
jurisdiction i represents the best reaction to the strategy played in 
the neighboring (or similar) jurisdictions –i. Formally, the 
incumbent in i maximizes an objective function that depends on 
the decisions taken in jurisdictions -i (Brueckner, 2003). 
The Yardstick Competition model, however, supports a pooling 
equilibrium in fiscal decisions. There is a range of values of the 
cost shock for which the bad incumbent has an incentive to 
reduce the amount of his rent seeking activity to signal good 
competence to the voters. Bordignon et al. (2003) solved this 
signaling problem and derived the formal conditions for 
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successful mimicking to occur. Under equilibrium mimicking the 
fiscal instrument is no longer an informative signal of 
competence and the agency problem is not solved. In such case, 
the appeal of Yardstick Competition lies in limiting the rent 
appropriation by a bad incumbent during electoral year, rather 
than in the revelation of information. 
The empirical literature on Yardstick Competition tested the 
prediction of a pooling equilibrium in tax rates in US (Besley and 
Case, 1995), Switzerland (Feld and Reulier, 2005), France (Dubois 
and Paty, 2008), Spain (Solé Ollé, 2003), Netherlands (Allers and 
Elhorst, 2004), Belgium (Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998), Norway 
(Revelli and Tovmo, 2007), Sweden (Edmark and Agren, 2006) 
and Italy (Bordignon et al., 2003). Most of the empirical results, 
however, mix Yardstick Competition with tax competition à la 
Tiebout (1956). Both phenomena predict a reduction of tax rates 
for a given level of provision of public goods, but with two 
important differences. First, when the tax base is mobile, voters 
may simply relocate to jurisdictions with a better tax/services 
mix, thus taking advantage of the exit option (Hirschman, 1970). 
In this case, tax competition is predominant. Conversely, when 
the tax base is immobile, as is the case of the house tax rate, 
voters are basically left only with the voice option (Caplan, 2010). 
This situation reinforces the link between fiscal policy and voting 
decisions and the relevance of the Yardstick Competition model. 
Some empirical studies have also examined the strategic 
interactions between fiscal decisions and electoral results in 
samples where the fiscal instrument is rather mobile, such as the 
income tax rate or the business property tax (Bordignon at al., 
2003;  Padovano, 2008; Ermini and Santolini, 2007; Case and 
Rosen, 1992; Dubois et al., 2007; Buttner, 2001; Depalo and 
Messina, 2011), finding mostly interaction in the spatial error. 
The second difference is that Yardstick Competition is motivated 
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by popularity concerns of the incumbent, rather than by the 
maximization of the tax base, as in tax competition. As such, 
Yardstick Competition occurs in connection with electoral events 
and provided that voters do make inter-jurisdictional 
comparisons. Nonetheless, only in the last decade have scholars 
attempted to verify whether Yardstick Competition is supported 
by electoral popularity concerns3 (Bordignon et al., 2003). 
Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2007) and 
Dubois and Paty (2010) find a significant impact of fiscal 
decisions on the electoral concerns of the incumbent, while 
Bordignon et al. (2003), in the context of the municipalities of the 
province of Milan, Italy, do not find evidence of a link of 
responsibility. 
Another problem plaguing the literature is that all empirical 
analyses measure the popularity of the incumbent with the share 
of votes obtained at the elections. The same share of votes, 
however, can be obtained at different win margin levels; the 
confidence in re-election of the incumbent is therefore mis-
specified and the estimates of the VPE are likely not to be robust 
to alternative measures of popularity. As for the impact of fiscal 
decisions on the incumbent’s popularity, the empirical tests 
found that the electorally-induced incentives to mimic are 
stronger when the incumbent is allowed to run for re-election 
(Besley and Case, 1995; Bordignon et al., 2003), when the 
executive is backed by a large majority or enjoys a large electoral 
win margin (Solé-Ollé, 2007) and when the degree of local fiscal 
                                                 
3
 The early empirical literature estimated the effect of fiscal decisions on the re-
election probability of the incumbent (Besley and Case, 1995). This variable is 
more generic than popularity because it does not specify the variation of the 
electoral support caused by a variation of the tax rate in case of re-election of 
the incumbent. 
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autonomy and electoral accountability is not higher than a fixed 
threshold (Schaltegger and Küttel, 2002). 
The size of the datasets is another interesting variable, since 
scholars often choose samples of sub-national jurisdictions in an 
almost discretionally fashion: Bordignon et al., (2003) use 143 
municipalities  of the province of Milan; Ermini and Santolini 
(2007) consider the municipalities within the Marche Region in 
Italy; Solé Ollé, (2003) examines the Spanish municipalities with 
a population greater than 5000 inhabitants in the region 
surrounding Barcelona; and so on. As the Yardstick Competition 
is essentially a spatial phenomenon, borders of the subsample 
that do not coincide with the limits of the possibility for voters to 
make comparisons (as it may be the case when the sample is 
limited by national borders) may undermine the validity of the 
results, because some out-of-sample comparison are actually 
being made but are not accounted for. 
Finally, the empirical literature on Yardstick Competition is 
heterogeneous also with respect to the econometric methods 
implemented. The spatial lag of the dependent variable 
introduces endogeneity in the tax setting equation and makes the 
OLS estimators biased and inconsistent and the estimate 
inefficient. Stemming from the work of Anselin (1988), the 
Yardstick Competition literature benefited from the 
development of the spatial econometrics research. The main 
innovation is the use of the simultaneous autoregressive (SAR) 
model, which introduces a spatially lagged dependent variable 
and the spatial correlation of the errors, both weighted by a 
matrix describing the neighborhood network among the 
observations. The weight matrix usually refers to geographical 
proximity, but it can be applied to any type of relationship, such 
as the socio-economic or demographic similarities. The 
regression models have been traditionally estimated through 
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Maximum Likelihood (Cliff and Ord, 1981), as in the papers of 
Besley and Case (1995), Revelli (2002), Bordignon et al. (2003), 
Delgado et al. (2011). In recent times the introduction of GMM 
estimation (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; 2007) proved to be more 
efficient than ML, especially in large samples and more 
appropriate when the assumption of normality of the errors does 
not hold (Bartolini and Santolini, 2009). This is the model that we 
are going to mostly rely on in the second step of the analysis. 
 
3. The data and the Italian municipalities’ institutional 
setting 
This work exploits an newly assembled database including all 
the 8101 Italian municipalities. The database is the outcome of a 
research project on ‘Tax Competition among Italian 
municipalities’ (Padovano, 2007), which aimed at collecting a 
comprehensive database of local jurisdictions in Italy. This 
database is an essential tool because the format of the original 
series has been harmonized for the first time so that they can be 
directly compared4. The time span of the dataset covers the years 
from 1995 to 2004. Data availability, broken down at the level of 
municipalities, conditions the time span for some electoral 
variables (before 1994) and some economic ones (beyond 2004). 
Moreover, as we shall see, the dependent variable was 
                                                 
4 The original data, coming from different institutional sources, are highly 
heterogeneous: for example, the Italian Ministry of Interior (which provides the 
electoral and political data) and the National Statistic Institute (which collects 
most of the remaining information) use different numerical codifications for the 
municipalities, which made it extremely difficult, and sometimes altogether 
impossible,  to compare data coming from the two sources as the sample size 
became large. That is the likely reason why empirical analyses about Italian 
municipalities rarely go beyond cross sectional analyses of a limited sample 
size. 
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introduced in 1995. Appendix A.1 provides a complete 
description of the dataset. 
The municipalities that belong to the five special statute regions 
(‘Regioni a Statuto Speciale’) do not show a suitable degree of 
homogeneity with those of the remaining 15 regions, because of 
their different institutional and fiscal setting. In order to avoid 
comparing incomparable observation they have been excluded 
from the estimates5. The total number of cross sections is then 
6695, 83% of the total of the Italian municipalities. 
Italian municipalities represent a suitable environment for a joint 
test of the responsibility and the Yardstick Competition 
hypotheses. Municipalities are the lowest tier of local 
government in Italy, and the institutional reforms in the 1990s 
established a strong link of accountability between voters and 
local governments, especially in the domain of fiscal decisions. In 
1993 the central government endowed the municipalities with 
the possibility to decide the house tax rate and, at the same time, 
allowed voters to directly elect the Mayor. In particular, fiscal 
decentralization at the municipal level has been implemented 
mainly through the introduction in 1993 of the local property tax 
rate (ICI, Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili), a tax that features a 
level b of fiscal autonomy according to the OECD tax autonomy 
scale6, which ranges from a (the highest) to e (OECD, 1999). The 
prerequisite of the ICI is property in the form of buildings, 
building land, agricultural land located inside the municipal 
                                                 
5 For the accuracy of the analyses also seven municipalities that do not 
border with anyone else (six single-municipality islands and Campione d’Italia, 
an enclave within Swiss territory) have also been removed from the estimations. 
However, running the regressions with their inclusion does not affect the 
results. 
6
 The previous arrangement of Italian local finances was classified as a 
level e, as all fiscal decisions were taken by the central government. 
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area, regardless of their destination use. The tax base is the value 
of the property, set by national laws that are uniform across all 
jurisdictions. The Municipal Council sets the ICI tax rate with a 
resolution taken before the approbation of the yearly provisional 
budget. Each jurisdiction is free to choose the tax rate in range 
between 4‰ and 7‰. Although the choice range of the tax rate 
appears small, the large value of the tax base ensures that a 
marginal variation of the rate determines a consistent variation 
in the tax paid by the individual voter, as well as in the overall 
revenue. Since the tax base is fixed and the reassessment of the 
property value is a decision of the central government, the 
discretion of the mayor is reduced to one single dimension. This 
makes it quite easy for voters to include this information in their 
electoral preferences. On average, the revenues from ICI 
represent more than 50% of the total revenues of the 
municipalities revenue and cover more than 25% of local 
expenditures (ANCI). 
In 1995 the central government has been introduced the 
possibility to differentiate the ICI tax rate between the ‘house’ tax 
rate, applied to the main living property of the family, and the 
‘business’ tax rate, applied to holiday houses, offices, shops, and 
so on. The house ICI tax has been abolished in 2008 (Law 
126/2008). In the period 1993-2007 the ICI house tax rate 
represented the most visible fiscal decision of Italian mayors 
because it is a cost that voters can directly link to the house and 
more than 80% of the residents in Italy are home-owner 
(ISTAT)7. As a consequence, the ICI tax rate can be considered a 
                                                 
7 In 2008 70,2% of the population owned the house in which they lived, 
18,3% lived in a rental and 11,5% retained the usufruct of the house or lived 
rent-free. Source: ISTAT, L’abitazione delle famiglie residenti in Italia - Anno 2008, 
published in Spring 2010. 
 16 
relevant yardstick to compare the fiscal performance and the 
competence of the mayors.  
The following figures illustrate the dynamics of the house ICI tax 
rate during the period 1995-2004. Table 1 reports the descriptive 
statistics for the house ICI tax rate in the period 1995-2004. The 
average tax rate is 5.2‰, with the highest average tax rates in the 
central regions of the country and the lowest in the north-eastern 
area. The standard deviation, on the contrary, is lower in the 
central area but higher in the south8. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, house ICI tax rate 1995-2004 
 Obs Mean (*1000) Std Min (*1000) Max (*1000) 
Italy 66950 5.255 0.647 3.5 7 
North-east 9220 5.192 0.622 4 7 
North-west 29860 5.243 0.627 3.5 7 
Centre  9990 5.369 0.590 4 7 
South  17880 5.244 0.712 3.5 7 
Note. Italy: all the Ordinary Regions included in the following macro-areas; North-
east: Veneto, Emilia Romagna; North-west: Piemonte, Lombardia, Liguria; Centre: 
Toscana, Marche, Lazio, Umbria; South: Abruzzo, Campania, Molise, Basilicata, 
Puglia, Calabria. 
 
                                                 
8 Some municipalities in the North West and the South set a tax rate lower 
than the legal minimum, as they apply the provisions of a special law. These 
observations are only 16 (0.002% of the total dataset), referring to 7 
municipalities. Their exclusion does not alter the estimates; yet, as the decision 
to apply a very low tax rate is a policy decision as well, we have kept them in 
the analysis. 
 17 
The analysis of the dynamics of the house ICI tax rate, reported 
in Table 2, shows an increasing but not monotonic trend in time 
characterized by decreasing averages in 1999 and in 2001. The 
maximum average value is reached in 2004, which is also 
associated with the highest standard deviation. 
 
Table 2. House ICI tax rates by year, 1995-2004 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1995 6695 5.136 0.648 4 7 
1996 6695 5.226 0.623 4 7 
1997 6695 5.248 0.628 4 7 
1998 6695 5.280 0.628 4 7 
1999 6695 5.259 0.633 4 7 
2000 6695 5.276 0.643 4 7 
2001 6695 5.262 0.650 3.5 7 
2002 6695 5.271 0.661 3.5 7 
2003 6695 5.291 0.667 3.5 7 
2004 6695 5.304 0.675 3.5 7 
 
Graph 1 shows a positive mean-standard deviation relationship, 
which indicates a tendency toward greater homogeneity during 
the years when the tax rate is lower and to an increase in the 
volatility during the years in which the tax rate is higher. The 
initial year 1995 is an anomaly, as it likely reflects the lack of 
coordination of the mayors when choosing the tax rate for the 
first time: the mean is lower than in other years but the volatility 
among the municipalities is not. 
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Graph 1. Yearly mean-standard deviation, ICI tax rate, 1995-2004 
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Since mimicking is driven by popularity concerns, it is 
interesting to match the fiscal data with electoral and political 
factors. The Italian electoral system for local elections has been 
reformed in 1993 from proportional to majoritarian, with the 
explicit aim to increasing the government’s accountability to 
voters. Since 1993 the mayor is directly elected by plurality rule 
in municipalities with less than 15000 inhabitants (less than 10% 
of the total number) and by majority rule with runoff elections in 
municipalities with more than 15000 inhabitants. The legislature 
lasts five years and the term limit is fixed to two mandates. In 
case of motion of no confidence both the mayor and the council 
must resign and new elections are held. This provision has 
produced a significant dispersion of the years when Italian 
municipalities hold elections. Table 3 shows a concentration of 
local elections in 1995, 1999 and 2004. In the rest of the paper 
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these three years are called ‘first order electoral years’, while 
1997 and 2001 are called ‘second order electoral years’. 
 
Table 3. Number of electoral Municipalities by year 
 Obs. % Electoral Obs. 
1995 4667 69.7 
1996 246 3.7 
1997 1243 18.6 
1998 535 8.0 
1999 4308 64.3 
2000 315 4.7 
2001 1062 15.9 
2002 680 10.2 
2003 300 4.5 
2004 4054 60.5 
 
According to rational political budget cycle models (Rogoff, 
1990), when an election approaches the mayor wishes to signal 
its competence to the voters by either increasing the public 
expenditure or decreasing the tax rate. Graph 2 confirms that in 
1999, the second ‘first order’ electoral year in the dataset, the 
variation of the local property tax rate is negative. A negative 
variation is registered in 2001 also, which is a ‘second order’ 
electoral year, and although in 1997 the variation is positive its 
magnitude is less than half than in 1996. The positive variation in 
2004 is unexpected: although it is a local minimum point the 
magnitude is positive and not significantly different from the 
variation in 2003. 
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Graph 2. Average yearly ICI tax rate, 1995-2004. 
 
 
The expenditure of the municipalities finances goods and 
services for the local community, mainly administrative costs, 
public transportation, services for the youngsters and the elderly, 
police. In 1999 the budget design has been constrained by the 
introduction of the Domestic Stability Pact, which reduced local 
expenditure and imposes a balanced budget (Bartolini and 
Santolini, 2009). Local tax rates and local expenditures levels are 
set simultaneously, so that the introduction of the local 
expenditure in the tax setting equation would create an obvious 
endogeneity problem. Furthermore, data on the local budget 
sheets are not available before 1999; henceforth the differences in 
observed expenditure levels are mainly driven by differences in 
the amount of grants per capita received (correlation = 0.71). 
Their consideration ensures that the level of expenditure is 
controlled for in the estimates9.  
                                                 
9 The quality of the public expenditures, which provide another dimension 
to identify the good from the bad incumbents cannot be used in empirical 
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4. The empirical strategy and the first stage of the analysis: 
the vote popularity equation 
4.1. Empirical strategy. 
A complete test of Yardstick Competition must detect strategic 
interaction in local tax setting once political consequences of tax 
setting have already been confirmed. In other words, the 
responsibility hypothesis must be confirmed to hold in the 
sample, before one can test for Yardstick Competition in the 
same sample. We thus organize the empirical strategy in the 
following two steps: 
1. We estimate a vote popularity function to test the 
responsibility hypotheses; 
2. We estimates a local tax setting equation to analyze the 
determinants of tax decisions and the presence of 
strategic interaction in the data. 
 
4.2. The vote-popularity equation 
The VPE estimated in this work takes the form: 
[1] Pit = βXit + vit 
The dependent variable Pit represents the electoral popularity of 
the mayor measured as the local win margin in jurisdiction i at 
time t. The choice between levels or differences is crucial in the 
estimation when the constant term and the trend change over 
                                                                                                           
analysis first because the available data cannot properly identify it; second, 
even distinguishing between a ‘responsive’ and an ‘excessive’ share of 
expenditures would make the signal related to the tax rate uninformative 
(Bordignon and Minelli, 2001). Hence the model assumes homogeneity in the 
quality of public goods and services provided.  
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time (Paldam and Nannestad, 1994). Since we deal with a panel 
dataset, we choose the specification in differences to control for 
the unobserved heterogeneity. The robustness of the results is 
tested in a subsequent set of regressions that adopts the share of 
votes obtained by the winner as an alternative measure of vote 
popularity. 
The covariates included in the vector X represent both political 
and fiscal controls. The time lag of the share of votes 
(popularity_lag) controls for an eventual persistent shock or the 
presence of an autoregressive process in the popularity of the 
elected mayors. A dummy for the mayor re-running for election 
(rerun) is introduced in the empirical specification to test the fit 
of the ‘cost of ruling’ hypotheses (Paldam and Nannestad, 1994) 
versus the ‘incumbency advantage’ (Lowry et al., 1998). An 
incumbent running for a second term has in fact an advantage in 
terms of efficiency in office, but he may experience an erosion of 
the electoral popularity in case of unpopular decisions taken 
during the first term of office that lead voters to prefer a 
challenger to the incumbent. Because of these contrasting 
hypotheses, the expected sign of the rerun coefficient is 
uncertain. During the period 1995-2004 left wing and right wing 
coalitions have been alternately in and out of power at the 
national level in Italy, and a dummy for the ideological 
alignment of the local executive with the central government 
partnership (alignment) is included to control for the ‘alignment 
effect’ (Arulampalam et al., 2009). 
As it is standard in the literature, we control for indicators of the 
state of the economy, chiefly the (provincial) rate of 
unemployment, which is commonly used in the literature for this 
purpose (Paldam and Nannestad, 1994). Inflation, being a 
national phenomenon, has been left out of the analysis. 
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The coefficient associated to the house property tax rate (HICI), 
which is one of the key variables in the equation, is expected to 
show a negative sign: an increase in the tax rate lowers the utility 
of the voters and reduces the electoral support of the mayor. This 
variable poses the main methodological issue in the estimation of 
the VPE. The tax rate is suspected to suffer from endogeneity 
caused by the reverse causality between the policy decisions and 
the vote decisions (Paldam, 1997): while voters choose a 
candidate on the basis of his economic performance, the 
incumbent takes fiscal decisions on the basis of his popularity. 
Following this reasoning, the incumbent decreases the tax rate to 
seek for votes when he feels unsecure about his re-election. This 
methodological problem has been solved in the literature 
through a instrumental variable estimation. Revelli (2002) 
proposed an alternative solution by estimating a Arellano and 
Bond (1991) type of GMM regression of the VPE, which uses as 
instruments the tax rate with the values of the endogenous tax 
variables lagged at least two periods. The most recent 
contribution comes from Aidt et al. (2011); they use a system of 
two simultaneous equations, a local expenditure and a VPE, 
estimated through GMM. 
The structure of the electoral dataset used does not allow to 
calculate a sufficient number of lags for all the units, therefore 
the endogeneity problem has been tackled by a 2SLS regression. 
Specifically, the local tax rate has been instrumented with the 
fitted values and the residuals from an OLS tax setting equation. 
The tax setting equation is specified as in Equation 2: 
[2] taxit = β’Zit + uit 
The fitted values of the tax setting equation are the linear 
combination of the variables correlated with the tax rate but not 
with popularity (e.g. population). The residuals include 
unobserved factors, like the combination of the cost shock and 
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the competency level, which are likely to be uncorrelated with 
the popularity, since the cost shock is random and the 
competency level is specific to the incumbent. 
To verify the coherence between the responsibility hypothesis 
and the Yardstick Competition hypothesis it is important to 
check that the popularity of the incumbent major is affected by 
the process of inter-jurisdictional comparisons that the Yardstick 
Competition model describes. The VPE must therefore include 
the variables foreseen by the Yardstick Competition model. This 
assumes, first, that the neighboring tax rate (HICI_neighbors) 
should affect popularity. This variable is the spatial lag of the 
house tax rates; in the literature, a positive coefficient has been 
taken as evidence of comparison among jurisdictions 
performances. Here an increase in the tax rate of the neighbors is 
assumed to increase the popularity of the domestic incumbent. 
This fiscal variable may be endogenous, although it proved to be 
exogenous in other studies (Bosch and Solé Ollé, 2007). In the 
empirical analyses the fitted values and the residuals of a 
neighboring tax setting equation are used as instruments for it. 
Finally, this work introduces a new variable, the difference from 
the tax rate in the neighbors (tax difference). The tax difference is 
the difference between the house tax rate in the domestic 
jurisdiction and the average house tax rate in the neighboring 
jurisdictions. The reasons to introduce this new variable are 
twofold. First, in the literature the domestic and the neighbors’ 
tax rates are introduced separately and are therefore associated 
with two different coefficients. In the real world, however, it is 
reasonable to believe that voters do not consider the variation of 
the single tax rates separately, but they evaluate the outcome of 
both variations. An increase of the domestic tax rate is associated 
to a decrease of the electoral popularity only if the average tax 
rate in the neighborhood remains constant or decreases, 
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increasing the gap between the tax rate levels. Similarly, an 
increase of the neighbors’ tax rate is associated to an increase of 
the electoral popularity of the domestic incumbent only if he 
does not increase the tax rate of the same proportion. Second, the 
separate variations of the domestic and the neighboring tax rates 
may result in a quantitatively small difference, too small to be 
relevant for the voters’ electoral calculus. This might be a reason 
why some studies fail to find a correlation between inter-
jurisdictional comparisons and mayors’ probabilities of being 
reelected. The explicit consideration of the tax difference variable 
in the VPE allows to verify whether comparisons become 
electorally relevant only beyond a certain threshold. For these 
reasons the tax difference variable is consistent with the theory 
of Yardstick Competition and is more appropriate to estimate the 
inter-jurisdictional fiscal comparisons of the voters. The expected 
sign of this coefficient is negative, because the larger the tax 
difference, the lower the popularity of the incumbent. 
The VPE is estimated on the subset of electoral observations 
extracted by the dataset on the Italian municipalities. The dataset 
for the VPE includes observations referring to the years 1996-
2004. The year 1995 has been dropped to obtain the lagged value 
of the dependent variable. Unobserved heterogeneity is 
controlled by including the first differences of the variables. 
Table A.2 in the Appendix shows the descriptive statistics of the 
explanatory variables and table A.3 reports the correlation 
matrix of the explanatory variables; the pair wise correlation of 
the covariates is never too large, ruling out collinearity concerns. 
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Table 4. Vote popularity equation, expected signs of the coefficients 
Variable Definition Expected sign 
Popularity lag Lagged share of popularity (ln) ? 
Rerun Incumbent running for re-election dummy ? 
Alignment Alignment with central government dummy + 
Unemployment Provincial unemployment rate (ln) - 
HICI Domestic house ICI tax rate (ln) - 
HICI_neighbors Spatial lag of house ICI tax rate (ln) + 
Tax difference 
Difference between domestic house tax rate 
and neighbors’ house tax rate + 
 
4.3. Vote popularity estimation: the results 
Table 5 shows the results of the second stage of the vote 
popularity estimation10. Five models have been estimated, 
differing among each other with respect of the specification of 
the endogenous variable and the instrument used to correct 
endogeneity. Specifically, Model 1 and Model 3 assume only the 
domestic tax rate as endogenous, but in Model 1 the domestic tax 
rate is instrumented with its own domestic fitted and residual 
values, while in Model 3 it is instrumented with the fitted and 
residual values of both the own and the neighbors’ tax rates. 
Model 2 assumes also the neighbors’ tax rate as endogenous, and 
implements the whole set of instruments. To improve the 
specification of the VPE, models 4-5 introduce the tax difference 
variable, instrumented, respectively, with only the domestic 
instruments and all the available instruments
                                                 
10
 The first stage regression is reported in Appendix A.4. 
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Table 5. Vote popularity function, instrumental variable estimation 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4  Model 5   
 Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
Δ popularity lag -0.195 *** -0.195 *** -0.194 *** -0.194 *** -0.193 *** 
Δ rerun 0.445 *** 0.444 *** 0.444 *** 0.448 *** 0.449 *** 
Δ alignment 0.059 ** 0.059 ** 0.059 ** 0.068 ** 0.068 ** 
Δ HICI -0.470 ** -0.467 ** -0.469 **     
Δ HICI_neighbors -0.899 ** -0.944 * -0.899 **     
Δ unemployment -0.194 *** -0.194 *** -0.193 *** -0.182 ** -0.183 ** 
Δ tax difference       -0.549 ** -0.240  
Constant 0.009  0.009  0.009  0.004  0.004  
Obs 5793   5793   5793   5793   5793   
R2 0.138   0.138   0.138   0.136   0.137   
Anderson canon. Corr. LR statistic 70000 *** 5314 *** 70000 *** 8943 *** 71000 *** 
Hansen J statistic 0.901   0.901   0.913   0.924   9.445 ** 
Endogenous regressors HICI  HICI, HICI_neigh  HICI  Tax difference  Tax difference   
IV domestic  All  All  All  All   
Notes: dependent variable first difference of natural log of local win margin. Significance levels: *10%, **5%,***1%.
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The dependent variable is the local win margin, computed as the 
difference between the share of votes obtained by the winner 
and the share of votes obtained by his/her first opponent. The 
win margin is considered a more appropriate measure of 
popularity than the share of votes obtained by the mayor, the 
variable commonly used in the literature. The larger the win 
margin, the larger the confidence in re-election of the incumbent. 
In the first step both the Anderson and the Cragg-Donald tests 
reject under-identification in all the models. However, the 
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions rejects a correct 
specification of Model 5. Moreover, in Model 2 and Model 3 
some excluded instruments are not statistically significant. The 
Pagan- Hall test rejects homoskedasticity in all the regressions, 
suggesting to use the GMM efficient option of the IV estimation. 
The Hansen J statistic in Table 5 confirms the results from the 
Sargan test in the first stage regressions. In fact, Model 5 is over-
identified. The fit of the models is about 0.14, and the coefficients 
of the non fiscal variables are stable over the models and verify 
the theoretical predictions. The negative coefficient of the lagged 
share of votes can be taken as evidence of an increase of the 
electoral competition in time, since the share of votes obtained 
by the winners are reduced. The dummy variable rerun estimates 
the impact on popularity of running for re-election. The results 
are in favor of the ‘incumbency advantage’, since the incumbent 
who runs for re-election gains about 4.4% of the popularity. The 
alignment effect is always positive and significant, confirming 
the electoral advantage of belonging to the same party of the 
central government. The unemployment rate is negative as 
expected, consistent with the hypotheses that voters punish the 
government for bad economic outcomes. 
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Modes 1-3 confirm the negative impact of a variation of the 
domestic tax rate, but the signs of the spatial lag of the tax rate 
are unexpectedly negative and significant, showing coefficients 
almost double than the domestic tax rate coefficients. This over-
reaction of the incumbents’ popularity to the neighbors’ fiscal 
decisions – measured according to the standard practices in the 
literature - is difficult to interpret and is at odds with the 
theoretical prediction. On the contrary, when the tax difference is 
introduced (Model 4), the coefficient is negative and significant 
as expected, suggesting that a marginal increase in the difference 
generates a 54.9% decrease in the local win margin. 
We have checked the robustness of these results by estimating a 
second set of VPEs, using as dependent variable the share of 
votes obtained by the winner candidate. The results from the 
first stage regression, presented in Appendix A.5, mirror the 
results obtained with the previous definition of popularity. The 
R2 show very high fit of the models, always above 0.6, and a 
highly significant F statistic. Both the Anderson and the Cragg-
Donald tests reject under-identification in all the models, and the 
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions rejects a correct 
specification of Model 5. In Model 2 and Model 3 some excluded 
instruments are still not statistically significant. However, the 
Pagan-Hall test fails to reject homoskedasticity in all the 
regressions. 
The results of the second stage regression, presented in Table 6, 
are very similar to the results of Table 5, both in terms of test 
significance and the signs of the coefficients obtained. However, 
the fit of the models increases to about 0.24, and the 
unemployment variable loses significance. The spatial lag of the 
tax rate is still negative but shows coefficients similar to the 
domestic tax rate coefficients. The coefficient associated to the 
tax difference in Model 4, finally, is negative and significant as 
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expected, suggesting that a marginal increase in the tax 
difference generates a 9.5% decrease in the share of votes 
obtained by the incumbent. 
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Table 6. Vote popularity function, robustness check, instrumental variable estimation 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  
 Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
Δ popularity lag -0.437 *** -0.437 *** -0.437 *** -0.437 *** -0.436 *** 
Δ rerun 0.043 *** 0.043 *** 0.043 *** 0.044 *** 0.044 *** 
Δ alignment 0.005 * 0.005 * 0.005 * 0.006 * 0.006 * 
Δ HICI -0.085 *** -0.085 *** -0.085 ***         
Δ HICI_neighbors -0.085 ** -0.075  -0.085 **     
Δ unemployment -0.006  -0.006  -0.006  -0.005  -0.005  
Δ tax difference       -0.095 *** -0.056 *** 
Constant 0.002   0.002   0.002   0.001   0.003   
Obs 6355   6355   6355   6355   6355   
R2 0.245   0.245   0.245   0.243   0.244   
Anderson canon. Corr. LR statistic 15000 *** 5919 *** 15000 *** 8293 *** 16000 *** 
Hansen J statistic 0.434   0.433   0.508   0.408   13.006 *** 
Endogenous regressors HICI  HICI, HICI_neigh  HICI  Tax difference  Tax difference   
IV domestic  all  All  domestic  All  
Notes: dependent variable first difference of natural log of share of votes. Significance levels: *10%, **5%,***1%.
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As a general conclusion to the VPE estimation, the predictions of 
the theory are verified in the sample of the Italian municipalities. 
The findings show the expected correlation between the electoral 
popularity and the fiscal decisions of the mayor. Even more 
important for our purposes, the comparison of the neighboring 
jurisdictions’ performances and not simply the levels of the 
domestic tax rates affect the voters’ decisions whether to reelect 
the incumbent. In particular, an increase of the domestic tax rate 
significantly reduces the popularity of the incumbent, but an 
increase in the spatial lag of the tax rate does not increase his/her 
popularity, because the domestic tax rate may still be above the 
average level in the neighborhood. All in all, the responsibility 
hypothesis holds and voters seem to apply the electoral strategy 
described in the Yardstick Competition hypothesis. It is to its 
verification that we now turn. 
 
5. The second stage of the analysis: the tax setting equation 
5.1. Model specification 
The spatial estimation follows the linear regression panel data 
model of Kapoor, Kelejian and Prucha (2007). Each observation 
i=1,…,N is observed for t=1,…,T periods. Data are generated 
according to the following process: 
[3] taxit = β’Zit + uit 
where taxit denotes the Nx1 vector of observations on the 
dependent variable in period t, Zit denotes the NxK matrix of 
observations on exogenous regressors in period t, β’ is the 
corresponding Kx1 vector of regression parameters, and uit 
denotes the Nx1 vector of disturbance terms. The intercept is 
assumed to be included in the Zs. The disturbances are assumed 
to be both correlated over time and across spatial units, as well 
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as heteroskedastic; moreover, they follow a Cliff and Ord first 
order spatial autoregressive process (Cliff and Ord, 1981): 
[4] uit = ρ Wi uit + εt 
where 0<ρ<1 is the spatial autoregressive coefficient, Wi is an 
NxN weighting matrix of known time independent constants 
whose diagonal elements are zero and the matrix (I- ρ Wi) is 
assumed to be non singular. Finally, ε is an Nx1 vector of 
innovations following a one-way error component model 
grouped by time periods: 
[5] εit,N =  μi,N + νit,N 
where μi,N  is the vector of unit specific error components and νit,N  
is the vector of error components varying over both the cross-
sectional units and the time periods. By assumption the error 
components are independent and identically distributed with 
mean zero and constant variance and they are independent to 
each other. In the proposed methodology ρ and the variance 
components terms μi,N  and νit,N are estimated through GMM, 
then the vector of parameters is estimated through GLS. The 
theoretical contribution of Kapoor, Kelejian and Prucha (2007) 
applies to random effects panel models, but the same procedure 
has been applied to fixed effects panel models by estimating an 
OLS on the within transformation and subsequently performing 
GMM on the OLS residuals. This approach allows the 
introduction of a lagged dependent variable on the right hand 
side of the tax equation, which has been introduced to test for the 
significance of the spatial lag source of correlation. 
Neighborhood is here specified as geographical proximity: the 
matrix of contiguity defines two jurisdictions as neighbors if they 
share at least one border. This specification presupposes that it is 
easier to share information with near jurisdictions than further 
ones. For example, the spread of news through local social 
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networks as families, workers commuting in the region, political 
groups, and action of the local press stimulate an intense but 
short-range information spillover. Many alternative 
specifications of the weight matrix to identify the yardstick 
competitors have been suggested by the literature, based on 
income, population, or other socio-economic indicators. Previous 
works (Bordignon et al., 2003; Solé Ollé, 2003) verify the 
universal suitability of the contiguity matrix, while the 
performance of alternative matrices has been proved to be 
specific to the tax rate analyzed. As a robustness check, we will 
use also a geographical distance weight matrix. 
 
5.2. Independent variables 
The vector of covariates Z includes fiscal, socio-demographic, 
political and electoral variables. Intergovernmental transfers are 
one of the main sources of revenues for Italian municipalities 
(about 45% of total revenue). This variable measures nominal 
values of transfers coming from the five funds created with 
D.Lgs.504/92, divided into current and investment grants. An 
increase in the amount of per capita transfers from the central 
government (grants) may be followed by a tax reduction or by an 
increase in the total expenditure, known in the literature as the 
‘flypaper effect’ (Hines and Thaler, 1995). The rate of substitution 
between autonomous and non autonomous resources is not 
clear, therefore there is no prior on the sign of this coefficient. 
In 1999 a normative instrument was introduced to constrain the 
municipal budget deficits, the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP). The 
entry requirements are modified on a yearly basis according to 
population size, and the Municipalities included in the Pact must 
follow its guidelines. This budget constraint are supposed to 
reduce local expenditures (Bartolini and Santolini, 2009) with a 
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consequent reduction of the revenues needed to finance 
expenditures. Other things being equal, the correlation between 
the DSP dummy and the dependent variable should be negative. 
GDP per capita proxies the citizen’s ability to pay, and it is 
expected to be positively correlated with the dependent variable. 
It refers to the provincial GDP real per capita in millions of euro. 
GDP data are expressed at ‘market prices’, adding the VAT 
revenue and other indirect production taxes revenue (net of 
central government grants) to the value added. 
The demand for public provision is dependent on the size of the 
population (pop) and the size of the jurisdiction’s territory 
(area)11. The composition of the population is a relevant issue in 
the tax setting decision because local governments are usually 
responsible for most of the services designed for youngsters and 
elderly people, like childcare and leisure centers. To capture this 
we use the dependency ratio (depratio), the ratio between 
youngsters and elderly over adult population. These geo-
demographic variables have been included among the 
covariates, although the predicted sign of their coefficients is 
ambiguous, since it depends on the extent to which they show 
economies of scale (negative sign) or not (positive sign). 
A qualitative binary variable has been included to control for the 
demand for public services coming from the non-resident 
population, the tourists (touristic). Data come from the ACI-
CENSIS report of 2001, where touristic municipalities are defined 
as such by the presence of sea, mountain or artistic and cultural 
amenities. Touristic municipalities are 3123 (38% of the total). 
The predicted effect on the dependent variable is negative, 
                                                 
11 Surface area is measured in hm2. Data are available until 2001 by the 
census; from 2002 on, data have been adjourned with yearly territorial changes. 
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because the demand for holidays houses in many Italian touristic 
destinations may be quite price inelastic. In such a case demand 
for houses expressed by outsiders increases even though the 
business tax rate is relatively high, which gives the mayor the 
possibility to compensate residents with a lower house tax rate. 
The provincial capital dummy (provcap) has also been included 
to control for the effect of being a provincial capital jurisdiction. 
Provincial capitals are usually richer than other cities, and 
although the correlation coefficient between this dummy and 
GDP per capita is very low and negative (-0.01), a positive sign is 
expected since they can, in principle, count on a larger tax base. 
The number of neighbors (n_neighbors) should directly capture 
interactions in fiscal decisions: the higher the number of 
neighbors, the greater the flow of inter-jurisdictional information 
and the stronger the constraint on the incumbent’s tax setting 
decision. Following this reasoning, the expected sign of this 
coefficient is negative. Special attention is paid to the 
jurisdictions on the coast. First, given the geography of the 
Italian peninsula, many municipalities border with the sea. As 
the sea is an useless neighbor in terms of comparisons of fiscal 
performance, the information flow may slow down in coastal 
municipalities, supporting the expectation of a positive 
coefficient associated to the coast dummy. The coefficient of the 
local union dummy (union) is included in the estimation to 
control for the effect of agglomerations of jurisdictions (Ermini 
and Santolini, 2007). The members of a local union may exploit 
inter-jurisdictional economies of scale (a negative correlation) 
but they may also collude reducing the variance of the tax rate in 
the neighborhood (a positive correlation). The five macro-area 
dummies defined by ISTAT (named north-west, north-east, center, 
south and islands) have been included to control for the regional 
heterogeneity due to geographical affiliation of the local 
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governments. Finally, time dummies control for the effect of 
yearly shocks to the dependent variable. 
The introduction of a binary variable, elec_year, captures the 
electoral cycle in tax setting. The expected sign decisions is 
negative, as incumbents are expected to reduce tax rates when 
elections are approaching (Rogoff, 1990). It is assumed that year 
is assumed to be an electoral one if the first ballot takes place in 
the last six months of the year or the first six months of the 
following year. In other words, value ‘1’ signals that a local 
executive election has taken place between 01/07 and 31/12 of the 
current year, or between the 1/01 and 30/06 of the following year. 
The timeline of the approval of the municipal budget motivates 
this specification of the electoral dummy variable, which takes 
place at the very end of the year and may last until the first three 
months of the following year. This process may influence the 
citizen’s beliefs in case they are called to vote in a early months 
of the year. Of course, the election date is exogenously given and 
decided before the tax rate is chosen. 
The electoral status of the mayor is a relevant factor in 
determining the tax setting because, if the incumbent is term 
limited, he will not find it worthwhile mimic the “good neighbor 
incumbent” (Besley and Case, 1995; Bordignon et al., 2003). To 
account for that, we introduce a dummy (term limit) that takes 
the value of 1 if the mayor is elected for the second consecutive 
term, with a predicted positive sign. The interaction term 
between the electoral dummy and the term limit dummy (elec_tl) 
captures the fiscal behavior of the incumbent during the electoral 
year. Yardstick Competition predicts that term limited 
incumbents set higher tax rates than non term limited 
incumbents; the coefficient associated to the interaction term is 
again positive. 
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Several dummies referring to the partisanship of the executive 
have been included to control for the ideological affiliation of the 
incumbent. Since left-wing mayors (left wing) allegedly should 
spend more for redistributive policies than their right parties 
colleagues (right wing), the coefficient of this variable is expected 
to be positive (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995); and vice versa, for 
right mayors. The local lists (local list) are generally ideologically 
neutral, and are usually municipality-specific. They focus their 
policy platforms on a single dimension, such as the utmost 
importance of municipal issues or the support to the electoral 
program of a local charismatic leader. They are a quantitatively 
relevant phenomenon, as 37% of the observations in the panel 
dataset are governed by a civic list executive. Previous studies 
either did not include this variable or handled this problem 
poorly, either by associating all local lists with left wing parties 
or by splitting them evenly between the two coalitions. We treat 
them as they are, i.e., as separate lists from those associated with 
the national parties. 
Table A.6 in the Appendix shows the descriptive statistics and 
table A.7 reports the correlation matrix of the explanatory 
variables; the pair wise correlation of the covariates is never too 
large, ruling out collinearity issues. Table 7 below reassumes the 
expected signs of the coefficients. 
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Table 7. Tax setting equation, expected signs of the coefficients 
Variable Definition Expected sign 
BICI lag ICI business tax rate lagged one period + 
Grants Transfers from the central government ? 
Area Surface area ? 
Pop  Population ? 
Depratio  Dependency ratio ? 
Touristic Touristic dummy - 
GDP per capita GDP per capita + 
Right wing Partisanship of executive dummies - 
Left wing Partisanship of executive dummies + 
Center wing Partisanship of executive dummies ? 
Local list Partisanship of executive dummies ? 
Elec_year Electoral year dummy - 
Term limit Term limit dummy + 
Elec_tl Elec_year * Term limit + 
Union Union dummy ? 
DSP Domestic Stability Pact dummy - 
N_neighbors  Number of neighbors - 
Provcap Province capital dummy + 
Coast Coast dummy + 
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5.3. Tax setting equation: results 
The spatial correlation among the observed units is inherent to 
the theoretical model of Yardstick Competition, where the 
mimicking behavior of the bad incumbent during the electoral 
year increases the correlation among the tax rates of the 
neighboring jurisdictions. The presence of spatial correlation in 
the data has been tested through the Lagrange Multiplier tests 
for panel datasets (Elhorst, 2010)12. The four LM statistics test the 
null hypotheses of a non significant spatial lag (spatial error), 
both unconditional and conditional on the presence of the other 
source of spatial correlation. The results are presented in Table 
813. 
As a robustness check, the Italian dataset has been splitted into 
the five macro-areas and the LM tests have been computed on 
each macro-area. The smaller dimension of these dataset allow 
the implementation of a geographic distance matrix, to verify the 
robustness of the results on different geographical areas of the 
country14. Specifically, while the contiguity matrix considers all 
the bordering jurisdictions as neighbors, the distance weight 
matrix used here considers only the 5 closest jurisdictions 
estimated at the level of the respective centers15. The results from 
                                                 
12
 The LM tests have been computed using Matlab, version 2007b. The 
author thanks Prof. Elhorst for the code’s correction for the large sample size. 
13 The spatial correlation is usually tested by means of the cross-sectional 
Moran test (Moran, 1950). Since the Moran test is a cross-sectional statistics and 
it does not distinguish the spatial lag from the spatial error correlation, it is not 
appropriate as a foundation of this analyses. Nonetheless the Moran I has been 
computed as a robustness check and the results, presented in Appendix A.8, 
are consistent with the LM test results. 
14 The weight matrices have been built using the software R, version 2.11.  
15 The choice of the 5 k-nearest neighbors is motivated by the fact that the 
average number of neighbors in Italy is between 5 and 6. 
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Table 8 suggest that in the Italian dataset the absence of spatial 
error correlation cannot be rejected and a spatial regression 
analyses is appropriate. The results, as the disaggregation in 
macro-areas suggest, are sensible to the definition of 
neighborhood used. 
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Table 8. LM tests of spatial correlation on the panel dataset 
Contiguity weight matrix 
 Null Hypotheses ITALY  N-West  N-Eeast Center  South  
LM spatial lag spatial lag coeff not significant 2890.48 *** 569.29 *** 326.18 *** 338.42 *** 320.28 *** 
LM spatial error spatial error coeff not significant 2874.83 *** 563.77 *** 318.15 *** 335.27 *** 317.86 *** 
robust LM spatial lag 
spatial lag coeff not significant  
conditional on spatial lag 
27.97 *** 15.48 *** 18.18 *** 5.75 ** 4.70 ** 
robust LM spatial error 
spatial error coeff not significant  
conditional on spatial error 
12.32 *** 9.96 *** 10.15 *** 2.60 ns 2.28 ns 
Distance weight matrix 
 Null Hypotheses ITALY  N-West  N-East Center  South  
LM spatial lag spatial lag coeff not significant na  204.38 *** 167.87 *** 327.28 *** 251.57 *** 
LM spatial error spatial error coeff not significant na  203.37 *** 179.88 *** 322.90 *** 247.30 *** 
robust LM spatial lag 
spatial lag coeff not significant  
conditional on spatial lag 
na  3.05 * 1.83  10.84 *** 12.88 *** 
robust LM spatial error 
spatial error coeff not significant  
conditional on spatial error 
na  2.05  13.84 *** 6.47 ** 8.61 *** 
Note: test based on space-time fixed effects  regression on the panel 1996-2004 
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Table 9 shows the results of the tax setting estimations16. The 
models presented are different in terms of the distinction 
between non spatial estimations (Model 1-3) and spatial 
estimations (Model 4 and 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Regressions are run using R version 2.11, package splm. 
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Table 9. Estimation of the tax setting equation 
Model: 1: OLS 2: Random Effects 3: Fixed Effects 4: Spatial Random Eff. 5: Spatial Fixed Eff. 
BICI lag 0.584 *** 0.298 *** 0.219 *** 0.286 *** 0.226 *** 
Grants 0.001 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0003 *** 
Area 0.001  0.0002  0.017 *** 0.004 ** -0.003  
Pop -0.014 *** -0.015 *** 0.003  -0.014 *** -0.003  
Depratio 0.025 *** 0.009 ** -0.006  0.005 . -0.0003  
Tur -0.010 *** -0.004    -0.005 *   
GDP per capita -0.019 *** 0.008 ** -0.024 *** -0.026 *** 0.006 . 
Left wing -0.003 ** 0.002  0.003 * 0.001  0.001  
Right wing -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.009 *** -0.012 *** -0.007 *** 
Local list 0.003 * 0.003 ** 0.001  -0.002  0.002 . 
Elec_year -0.008 *** -0.006 *** -0.004 *** -0.005 *** -0.006 *** 
Term limit -0.001  -0.003 *** -0.004 *** -0.005 *** -0.004 *** 
Elec*tl 0.005  0.003 * -0.0003  -0.0002  0.003 * 
Union 0.012 *** 0.005 *** 0.001  0.0001  0.003 * 
Dsp -0.027 *** -0.024 *** -0.009 *** -0.011 *** -0.021 *** 
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Table 9. Estimation of the tax setting equation (continued) 
N_neighbors 0.0004  0.001    -0.001    
Provcap 0.003  0.012    0.012    
Coast -0.034 *** -0.017 ***   -0.023 ***   
North-west -0.009 *** -0.017 ***       
Nort-east -0.009 ** -0.013 ***       
Center -0.010 *** 0.002        
Time dummies yes  yes  no  no  no  
Constant -1.880 *** -3.639 *** -4.042 *** -2.979 ***     
Spatial lag       0.083 *** 0.280 *** 
Spatial error       0.225  -0.160  
Observations 60255  60255  60255  60255  60255  
R-squared 0.377          
within    0.081  0.080      
between   0.443  0.201      
overall     0.350   0.171           
Hausman test p-value     0.000      
Notes: dependent variable natural log of ICI house tax rate, continuous variables in log. 6695 observations per year. Robust estimations. Significance levels: *10%, **5%,***1%.
Model 1 is obtained through an OLS estimation, Model 2 and 3 
are the results from static non spatial panel estimations, and 
Model 4 and 5 are the results from static spatial estimations. 
Among them only Model 5 considers both the unobserved 
heterogeneity in the error term and the endogeneity caused by 
the spatial correlation of the observations. However, Model 1 has 
been used to test for the presence of heteroskedasticity and the 
normality of the residuals (post-estimation tests reject both 
homoskedasticity17 and the normality of the residuals18). The 
Hausman test comparing Model 2 and Model 3 gives mixed 
results19 consistent with the presence of a non linear relationship 
between the error variances and the covariates, as the pattern of 
spatial dependence suspected in the data. Models 4 and 5 give 
unbiased and consistent coefficients. The choice between fixed 
and random effect is based upon the considerations that the 
Italian dataset includes observations belonging to a closed 
geographical area, a case in which the fixed effect approach is 
suggested by the spatial literature (see Arbia et al., 2005). The 
econometric specification, moreover, includes both time fixed 
and space fixed effects, for example the region-based dummies 
for macro-areas, province capital, coast, and so on. The 
coefficients of Model 4 are therefore less reliable than those of 
Model 5, but they have included in Table 9 for the sake of 
completeness. 
The results of the estimation of Model 5 verify the theoretical 
predictions. The socio-demographic variables are not significant, 
probably because of their limited variance in time, while the 
GDP per capita is associated with the expected significant and 
                                                 
17
 Breusch-Pagan studentized test value =4569.438, df = 29, p=0. 
18 Jarque-Bera X2 = 12236.44, df = 2, p=0. 
19 Hausman test: Χ2=3547.16, Prob>Χ2=0; Breusch-Pagan test Χ2 (1) =  92509.95, 
Prob > Χ2 = 0. 
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positive sign. The coefficient for right wing government is 
significantly negative; also the other political variables show the 
expected sign. In particular, the interaction term elec*tl confirms 
that term limited ones set higher taxes than non term limited 
incumbents before elections. This result is one of the main 
predictions of Yardstick Competition theory because incumbents 
allowed to run for re-election are associated with lower tax rates. 
This result reinforces the verification of the responsibility 
hypotheses, showing that tax decisions are consistent with the 
prediction of the vote popularity estimation. 
Although the spatial coefficients from Model 5 show 
opposite signs, their interpretation does not contradict the 
Yardstick Competition hypotheses. First, the positive and 
significant spatial lag coefficient is in line with the literature 
(Brueckner, 2003). Secondly, the coefficients associated to the 
electoral dummy and the interaction term elec*tl are consistent 
with a pattern of Yardstick Competition. Third, as already 
explained in the literature review, the error coefficient includes 
unobserved variables that go beyond the Yardstick Competition 
theory and cannot be disentangled from the cost shock and the 
competence of the incumbent. The negative coefficient (spatial 
error = -0.16), thus, may be driven by factors impossible to 
measure that determine unpredictable effects. Some examples 
include regulatory interventions of the central government or the 
regional government, as special law provisions to face the risk of 
bailing out frequent in the Italian dataset (Bordignon and Turati, 
2003), or the power of the system of local political patronage 
(Golden, 2000)20. The asymmetric information problem in the 
                                                 
20 Being the spatial error coefficient an average effect over the whole dataset, 
the role of the outliers in determining the negative sign of the coefficient cannot 
be excluded but unfortunately they cannot be empirically detected and 
excluded from the analyses. 
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dataset is therefore more complex and severe than the economic 
model predicts. 
The results of the analyses show that the domestic tax 
rate is positively correlated with the average tax rate in the 
neighborhood. The positive coefficient (spatial lag = 0.28) 
suggests that an increase of the average tax rate in the bordering 
municipalities is associated with a one-third increase of the 
domestic tax rate. This coefficient does not give insights on the 
variation of the tax difference, as it that depends on the sign of 
the difference. If difference was positive, a positive spatial lag 
increases it; if difference is negative, a positive spatial lag 
decreases it. 
A set of spatial panel regressions have been estimated on 
the subsamples of the five macro-areas to control for the 
dynamics of the spatial coefficients in different geographical 
areas, using alternatively the contiguity and the distance weight 
matrix. Table 10 reports the results; they roughly confirm the 
pattern of interaction already found at the national level. The 
spatial lag is always positive and significant in the Northwest, in 
the Northeast when using the contiguity matrix and in the South 
when using the distance matrix is used. The spatial error 
coefficient is negative and significant when using the contiguity 
matrix and the South dataset associated to the distance weight 
matrix21; it is positive in north-eastern and central subsamples 
when the distance matrix is used. As a conclusion, these 
estimates suggest that the average national pattern of spatial 
correlation in the whole time period is determined mainly by the 
interaction among the Northern Municipalities. 
 
                                                 
21
 The significance of the spatial error coefficient refers to the p-value of the LM 
robust spatial error coefficient in Table 8. 
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Table 10. Tax setting equation, robustness check, spatial panel regression with time and space fixed effects 
  Northwest Northeast Center South 
  Cont   Dist   Cont   Dist   Cont   Dist   Cont   Dist   
BICI lag 0.163 *** 0.174 *** 0.156 *** 0.161 *** 0.193 *** 0.194 *** 0.346 *** 0.346 *** 
Grants 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.001  0.001  0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.000 . 0.000 . 
Area -0.009  -0.010  0.004  0.004  0.038  0.032  0.008  0.006  
Population 0.002  0.003  -0.005  -0.006  -0.029  -0.029  -0.081 *** -0.080 *** 
Depratio -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.002  -0.035 ** -0.035 ** 
GDP 0.044 *** 0.056 *** 0.002  0.001  -0.005  0.001  0.016  0.018  
Left wing 0.002  0.002  -0.004  -0.005  0.006 . 0.006  -0.002  -0.002  
Right wing -0.007 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 * -0.008 * -0.006  -0.006  -0.007 ** -0.008 ** 
Local list  0.003 ** 0.003 * -0.002  -0.003  0.003  0.003  -0.006 * -0.006 * 
Elec_year -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.009 *** -0.009 *** -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** 
Term limit  -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 * -0.003 . -0.003 . -0.003 . -0.004 * -0.004 * 
Elec*tl 0.005 ** 0.005 * 0.003  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.002  
Union 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.003  0.004  0.003  0.004  -0.011 ** -0.011 *** 
DSP -0.020 *** -0.021 *** -0.009 *** -0.009 *** -0.020 *** -0.020 *** -0.025 *** -0.025 *** 
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Table 10. Tax setting equation, robustness check, spatial panel regression with time and space fixed effects 
(continued) 
Spatial lag 0.427 *** 0.322 *** 0.356 * 0.192  0.032  0.036  0.208 ** 0.213  
Spatial error -0.412   -0.220   -0.134   0.024   0.073   0.072   -0.162   -0.182   
Obs 2986   2986   922   922   999   999   1788   1788   
Notes: dependent variable natural log of ICI house tax rate, continuous variables in log. 6695 observations per year. Cont=contiguity 
spatial weights matrix; Dist= distance spatial weight matrix. Significance levels: *10%, **5%,***1
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6. Conclusions 
This Chapter analyzed strategic interactions in tax 
competition on a comprehensive dataset of Italian Municipalities 
during the period 1995-2004. 
The dataset represents a ‘natural experiment’, and it has 
never been considered in a comprehensive way before. The time 
dimension, moreover, allow us to relax the assumption that all 
the observations are observed at they steady state equilibrium. 
The results of the vote popularity estimation confirm that 
differences in fiscal performances among jurisdictions do affect 
the incumbent mayor’s probability of being re-elected. The 
findings are robust to the alternative definition of popularity, 
and they confirm that an increase of the domestic tax rate 
significantly reduces the popularity of the incumbent. An 
increase in the spatial lag of the tax rate, however, does not 
increase his popularity. This result is motivated with a domestic 
tax rate still above the average in the neighborhood, as the tax 
difference does affect the incumbents’ popularity in the expected 
negative way. This result highlights the role of the comparison of 
the neighboring jurisdictions’ performances and it is consistent 
with the theory of Yardstick Competition. 
At the same time the spatial tax setting equation finds 
significant strategic interaction among the fiscal decisions of 
neighboring municipalities. Although the unobserved variables 
are negatively correlated among neighbors, similar tax rates are 
observed in the neighborhood. 
These results taken together verify both the responsibility 
hypotheses and the presence of strategic interactions in local tax 
setting, allowing us to classify strategic interaction in the dataset 
as proper Yardstick Competition. 
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7. Appendix 
A.1. Dataset description 
Variable Definition Source 
HICI Domestic house ICI tax rate  IFEL, Institute for Local Public Finance and Economics 
HICI_neighbors Spatial lag of house ICI tax rate  Own calculations on IFEL data 
Tax difference Difference between domestic house tax rate 
and neighbors’ house tax rate 
Own calculations on IFEL data 
BICI ICI business tax rate one period IFEL, Institute for Local Public Finance and Economics 
Grants Transfers from the central government Italian Ministry of the Interiors 
Area Surface area ISTAT, Italian Institute of Statistics 
Pop  Population ISTAT, Italian Institute of Statistics 
Depratio  Dependency ratio Own calculation on ISTAT data 
Touristic Touristic dummy ACI  - Censis 2001 survey 
GDP per capita GDP per capita Institute G.Tagliacarne 
Unemployment Provincial unemployment rate  Institute G.Tagliacarne 
Union Union dummy ISTAT, Italian Institute of Statistics 
DSP Domestic Stability Pact dummy Own calculations on ISTAT data 
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A.1. Dataset description (continued) 
N_neighbors  Number of neighbors ISTAT, Italian Institute of Statistics 
Provcap Province capital dummy ISTAT, Italian Institute of Statistics 
Coast Coast dummy ISTAT, Italian Institute of Statistics 
Mayor Name and Surname of the winner candidate Italian Ministry of the Interiors 
Share votes 1 Share of votes of the local winner candidate Italian Ministry of the Interiors 
Share votes 2 Share of votes of the first main opponent  Italian Ministry of the Interiors 
Win margin Difference between the share of the votes of the local 
winner and the share of the votes of his first opponent 
Italian Ministry of the Interiors 
Rerun Incumbent running for re-election dummy Italian Ministry of the Interiors 
Right wing, Left 
wing, Center wing, 
Local list 
Partisanship of executive dummies Italian Ministry of the Interiors 
Alignment Alignment with central government dummy Italian Ministry of the Interiors 
Elec_year Electoral year dummy Italian Ministry of the Interiors 
Term limit Re-elected incumbent dummy Italian Ministry of the Interiors 
 54 
Table A.2. Descriptive statistics, 12743 electoral observations, 1996-
2004  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Δ popularity (share of votes) 6355 -0.018 0.191 -0.710 0.714 
Δ popularity ( win margin) 6298 -0.135 1.572 -8.455 6.908 
Δ rerun 6355 -0.293 0.857 -1.000 1.000 
Δ unemployment  6355 -0.022 0.033 -0.169 0.163 
Δ alignment 6355 0.362 0.648 -1.000 1.000 
Δ tax difference 6355 0.000 0.104 -2.245 0.635 
Δ domestic tse fitted 6355 0.017 0.060 -0.255 0.482 
Δ domestic tse residuals 6355 -0.013 0.088 -0.523 0.488 
Δ neighbors tse fitted 6355 0.016 0.031 -0.120 0.182 
Δ neighbors tse residuals 6355 -0.012 0.046 -0.362 0.268 
Δ HICI 6355 0.003 0.099 -2.303 0.559 
Δ HICI_neighbors 6355 0.004 0.047 -0.371 0.405 
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Table A.3. Correlation among the explanatory variables, vote popularity equation 
  Perc. Votes* Wm* % Votes lag* Wm lag* Rerun Unemp* Align 
Perc. Votes* 1.00       
Wm* 0.67 1.00      
% Votes lag* -0.44 -0.31 1.00     
Wm lag * -0.15 -0.26 0.41 1.00    
Rerun  0.25 0.24 -0.11 0.01 1.00   
Unemp* 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 1.00  
Alignment  0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.01 1.00 
Tax difference -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.00 
Domestic Fitted -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.15 
Domestic Residuals -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 
Neighbors Fitted -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.19 
Neighbors Residuals -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.03 
HICI -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 
HICI_neighbors -0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.10 
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Table A.3. Correlation among the explanatory variables, vote popularity equation (continued) 
  
Tax 
difference 
Dom. fitted Dom. residuals 
Neigh. fitted 
Neigh. residuals HICI HICI_neigh 
Perc. Votes*        
Wm*        
% Votes lag*        
Wm lag *        
Rerun         
Unemp*        
Alignment         
Tax difference 1.00       
Domestic Fitted 0.35 1.00      
Domestic Residuals 0.70 -0.25 1.00     
Neighbors Fitted -0.12 0.18 -0.06 1.00    
Neighbors Residuals -0.28 -0.06 0.13 -0.31 1.00   
HICI 0.89 0.41 0.78 0.06 0.08 1.00  
HICI_neighbors -0.35 0.06 0.08 0.37 0.77 0.12 1.00 
Note: all variables are in first-differences; the asterisk indicates that it is the variation in the log (Δlog) of the variable. 
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Table A.4. Vote popularity function (win margin),  first stage regression 
  Model 1-IV   Model 2-IV Model 3-IV   Model 4-IV   Model 5-IV   
  Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
Dep-Var. HICI   HICI   
HICI 
neigh   HICI   
Tax  
distance   
Tax  
distance   
Δ popularity lag 0.000002  0.000002  0.0002  0.000002  0.0001  0.000002  
Δ rerun -0.000005  -0.000005  -0.0003  -0.000005  0.003 *** -0.000005  
Δ alignment -0.000003  -0.000003  -0.008 *** -0.000003  0.006 *** -0.000003  
Δ ICI_neighbors 0.000068      0.000041      
Δ unemployment -0.000009  -0.00001  -0.005 *** -0.000009  0.008 *** -0.000009  
Δ domestic TSE 
fitted 0.999 *** 0.999 *** 0.075 *** 0.999 *** 0.941 *** 0.999 *** 
Δ domestic TSE 
residuals 0.999 *** 0.999 *** 0.007  0.999 *** 0.945 *** 0.999 *** 
Δ neigh TSE 
fitted   0.0001  0.79 *** 0    -1 *** 
Δ neigh TSE resid           -1 *** 
Constant 0 *** -0.00001 *** 0.014 *** -0.00001 *** -0.004 *** -0.00001 *** 
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Table A.4. Vote popularity function (win margin),  first stage regression (continued) 
Obs 5793   5793   5793   5793   5793   5793   
R2 1  1  0.615  1  0.787  1  
F (all 
instruments) 72*106 *** 72*106 *** 725 *** 63*106 *** 8943 *** 91*106 *** 
F (excluded 
variables) 25*107 *** 17*107 *** 1667 *** 17*107 *** 21331 *** 18*107 *** 
Pagan-Hall  
heteroskedasticity 
test 2.435  2.365    2.435  2.138  2.147  
Anderson  69908.36 *** 5314.29 ***   69908.49 *** 8943.13 *** 70712.29 *** 
Cragg-Donald 109 *** 8705.05 ***   1010 *** 21331.36 *** 12*108 *** 
Sargan N*R-sq 
test 0.941   0.94       0.957   0.925   12.623  ***  
Endogenous 
regressors HICI  
HICI, 
HICI_neigh   HICI    
Tax 
difference  
Tax  
Difference  
IV domestic   all   All       domestic   All   
Notes: popularity specified as the local win margin. Significance levels: *10%, **5%,***1%. TSE=tax setting equation. 
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Table A.5. Vote popularity function (share of votes), first stage regression 
  Model 1-IV  Model 2-IV Model 3-IV  Model 4-IV  
Model 5-
IV  
  Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
Dep-Var. Δ HICI  Δ HICI  
Δ HICI 
neigh  Δ HICI  
Δ tax 
 distance  
Δ tax 
 distance  
Δ popularity lag 0.001   0.001   -0.001   0.001   0.002   0.001   
Δ rerun -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0005  -0.0001  0.003 *** -0.0001  
Δ alignment 0.001  0.001  -0.007 *** 0.001  0.007 *** 0.001  
Δ HICI_neighbors 0.012      0.015      
Δ unemployment 0.001  0.001  -0.007 *** 0.001  0.009 *** 0.001  
Δ domestic 
TSE fitted 1.002 *** 1.003 *** 0.075 *** 1.002 *** 0.944 *** 1.002 *** 
Δ domestic 
TSE residuals 0.998 *** 0.998 *** 0.002  0.998 *** 0.944 *** 0.998 *** 
Δ neighbors 
TSE fitted   0.008  0.801 *** -0.004    -0.985 *** 
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Table A.5. Vote popularity function (share of votes), first stage regression (continued) 
Δ neighbors 
TSE residuals           -0.989 *** 
Constant -0.001   -0.001   0.013 *** -0.001   -0.004 *** -0.001   
Obs 6355   6355   6355   6355   6355   6355   
R2 0.914  0.914  0.630  0.914  0.729  0.930  
F (all instruments) 5600000 *** 7000000 *** 783 *** 4800000 *** 2832 *** 5000000 *** 
F (excluded 
variables) 19*106 *** 16*105 *** 1812 *** 12*106 *** 8484 *** 95*105 *** 
Pagan-Hall 
heteroskedasticity 
test 12.949 *** 12.093 ***   12.951 *** 11.641 *** 10.079 *** 
Anderson 15486.68 *** 5918.51 ***   15486.76 *** 8292.59 *** 16278.80 *** 
Cragg-Donald 6632.56 *** 9773.02 ***   66333.48 *** 17077.75 *** 75981.02 *** 
Sargan N*R-sq test 0.394   0.393       0.466   0.371   12.881 *** 
Endogenous 
regressor HICI  
HICI, 
HICI_neigh    HICI       
Tax 
distance  
Tax 
difference   
IV domestic  All    All        domestic all  
Notes: popularity specified as the winner’s share of votes. Significance levels: *10%, **5%,***1%. TSE=tax setting equation.
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Table A.6. Tax setting equation dataset, descriptive statistics, 66950 
observations, 1995-2004 
 Mean Minimum Maximum 
Grants per capita 118695.2 0 439000000 
BICI 0.0056 0.004 0.007 
HICI 0.00525 0.0035 0.007 
GDP 18407.8 6964.22 35865.3 
Population 7235.26 30 2653253 
Depratio 0.540 0.002 17.634 
Area 3388.813 10 130771 
Left wing 0.286 0 1 
Center wing 0.136 0 1 
Right wing 0.205 0 1 
Local list 0.373 0 1 
Elec_year 0.208 0 1 
Term limit 0.314 0 1 
N_neighbors 5.832 1 30 
Touristic 0.352 0 1 
Union 0.045 0 1 
North-west 0.446 0 1 
North-east 0.138 0 1 
Center 0.149 0 1 
South 0.267 0 1 
Provcap 0.013 0 1 
Coast 0.065 0 1 
DSP 0.317 0 1 
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Table A.7. Correlation among the explanatory variables, tax setting 
equation 
 BICI 
lag 
Grants Area pop depratio Tur GDP Left 
wing 
BICI lag 1        
Grants -0.03 1       
Area 0.07 -0.28 1      
Pop 0.08 -0.12 0.39 1     
Depratio 0.02 -0.20 0.19 -0.44 1    
Tur 0.10 -0.13 0.41 0.11 0.13 1   
GDP 0.18 0.24 -0.15 -0.03 -0.14 -0.16 1  
Left wing -0.02 -0.11 0.18 0.23 -0.04 0.06 -0.15 1 
Right wing 0.09 -0.01 0.05 0.16 -0.04 0.04 0.08 -0.32 
Local list 0.03 0.10 -0.13 -0.27 0.08 -0.07 0.19 -0.49 
Elec 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 
DSP 0.19 -0.07 0.11 0.30 -0.09 0.05 0.10 0.01 
Term limit 0.14 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.15 -0.03 
Union 0.09 -0.01 -0.08 -0.07 0.06 -0.06 0.09 -0.08 
N_neigh 0.06 0.00 0.42 0.30 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.05 
Provcap 0.05 -0.03 0.21 0.32 -0.04 0.12 -0.01 0.06 
Coast 0.12 -0.16 0.12 0.25 -0.05 0.34 -0.21 0.06 
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Table A.7. Correlation among the explanatory variables, tax setting 
equation (continued) 
 Right 
wing 
Local 
list 
Elec DSP Term 
limit 
Union N 
neigh 
Prov 
Cap 
Coast 
BICI lag          
Grants          
Area          
Pop          
Depratio          
Tur          
GDP          
Left wing          
Right wing 1         
Local list -0.39 1        
Elec -0.10 0.00 1       
DSP 0.05 0.06 -0.10 1      
Term limit -0.03 0.15 -0.02 0.26 1     
Union 0.06 0.08 0.01 -0.03 0.06 1    
N_neigh 0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 1   
Provcap 0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.30 1  
Coast 0.07 -0.10 0.01 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15 0.12 1 
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Table A.8. Spatial correlation tests: Moran I 
Panel a: test based on raw HICI, contiguity spatial weights matrix 
  Italy    North West    North East   Centre    South    
1995 0.199 *** 0.178 *** 0.244 *** 0.158 *** 0.159 *** 
1996 0.19 *** 0.179 *** 0.261 *** 0.146 *** 0.162 *** 
1997 0.179 *** 0.173 *** 0.282 *** 0.176 *** 0.145 *** 
1998 0.187 *** 0.178 *** 0.303 *** 0.205 *** 0.139 *** 
1999 0.19 *** 0.19 *** 0.322 *** 0.226 *** 0.121 *** 
2000 0.194 *** 0.2 *** 0.315 *** 0.232 *** 0.105 *** 
2001 0.209 *** 0.216 *** 0.334 *** 0.228 *** 0.122 *** 
2002 0.214 *** 0.216 *** 0.368 *** 0.232 *** 0.123 *** 
2003 0.216 *** 0.225 *** 0.396 *** 0.212 *** 0.117 *** 
2004 0.223 *** 0.234 *** 0.398 *** 0.177 *** 0.142 *** 
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Panel b: test based on raw HICI, distance spatial weights matrix 
  
 North West    North East   Centre   South   
1995 0.194 *** 0.255 *** 0.132 *** 0.155 *** 
1996 0.187 *** 0.28 *** 0.132 *** 0.161 *** 
1997 0.181 *** 0.303 *** 0.156 *** 0.148 *** 
1998 0.184 *** 0.331 *** 0.199 *** 0.149 *** 
1999 0.196 *** 0.35 *** 0.212 *** 0.134 *** 
2000 0.202 *** 0.34 *** 0.218 *** 0.116 *** 
2001 0.214 *** 0.357 *** 0.207 *** 0.122 *** 
2002 0.219 *** 0.369 *** 0.216 *** 0.13 *** 
2003 0.232 *** 0.393 *** 0.198 *** 0.126 *** 
2004 0.24 *** 0.391 *** 0.171 *** 0.144 *** 
Note: Distance weight matrix computed with the 5knn criterion of neighborhood.
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Panel c: test based on residual from OLS HICI equation, contiguity spatial weights matrix 
  Italy    North West    North East   Centre    South    
1996 0.122 *** 0.089 *** 0.146 *** 0.066 *** 0.139 *** 
1997 0.106 *** 0.095 *** 0.184 *** 0.131 *** 0.081 *** 
1998 0.121 *** 0.108 *** 0.2 *** 0.133 *** 0.088 *** 
1999 0.129 *** 0.135 *** 0.218 *** 0.165 *** 0.065 *** 
2000 0.122 *** 0.13 *** 0.219 *** 0.161 *** 0.039 *** 
2001 0.146 *** 0.154 *** 0.251 *** 0.157 *** 0.068 *** 
2002 0.152 *** 0.158 *** 0.281 *** 0.169 *** 0.062 *** 
2003 0.163 *** 0.168 *** 0.318 *** 0.173 *** 0.064 *** 
2004 0.171 *** 0.173 *** 0.304 *** 0.165 *** 0.094 *** 
Note: OLS regression includes as covariates: lagged Business Tax Rate,Grants,Area,Pop,Depratio,Tur,GDP,Left wing,Right wing,Local list,Elec,Term 
limit,Elec*term limit,Union,Dsp,N_neighbors,Provcap, Coast, Time dummies, macro-area dummies.
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Panel d: test based on residual from OLS HICI equation, distance spatial weights matrix 
  North West    North East   Centre   South   
1996 0.085 *** 0.157 *** 0.054 *** 0.144 *** 
1997 0.106 *** 0.189 *** 0.112 *** 0.092 *** 
1998 0.121 *** 0.201 *** 0.14 *** 0.09 *** 
1999 0.142 *** 0.212 *** 0.151 *** 0.068 *** 
2000 0.129 *** 0.204 *** 0.153 *** 0.035 ** 
2001 0.154 *** 0.233 *** 0.146 *** 0.063 *** 
2002 0.163 *** 0.25 *** 0.156 *** 0.068 *** 
2003 0.178 *** 0.288 *** 0.154 *** 0.068 *** 
2004 0.183 *** 0.275 *** 0.153 *** 0.085 *** 
Note: OLS regression includes as covariates: lagged Business Tax Rate,Grants,Area,Pop,Depratio,Tur,GDP,Left wing,Right wing,Local list,Elec,Term 
limit,Elec*term limit,Union,Dsp,N_neighbors,Provcap, Coast, Time dummies, macro-area dummies. Distance weight matrix computed with the 5knn 
criterion of neighborhood.
Chapter 3. 
The time dynamics of Yardstick Competition in the 
Italian Municipalities22 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous Chapter tested the Yardstick Competition 
hypotheses (Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995; Brueckner, 
2003) in local public finance in Italy, finding evidence of strategic 
interactions in local tax setting driven by the incumbent’s 
popularity concerns. 
The longitudinal dimension of the dataset allows us to 
investigate the dynamics of strategic interaction during the 
period 1995-2004. A number of factors may change the pattern of 
strategic interactions among jurisdictions as time goes by, like 
the improvements in the diffusion of information, changes in the 
number of municipalities and therefore of the possibilities for 
voters to make comparisons, learning processes of the voters to 
adopt a comparative strategies and by incumbents to resort to 
mimicking strategies. 
All the empirical studies in the literature, on the contrary, 
assume that interaction remains constant election after election, 
even those studies using long time series. The informational 
spillover generating Yardstick Competition and mimicking, in 
particular, has always been implicitly assumed to expire after the 
election and every time voters repeat the process from scratch. If 
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Prof. Fabio Padovano. 
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this assumption holds, we should observe spatial coefficients of 
the tax setting equation that remain stable over time. 
In this Chapter, on the contrary, we relax this potentially 
implausible assumption and we investigate the dynamics of 
strategic interaction in the ten years considered, looking for a 
pattern in the data. The research question we aim at answering 
is: do strategic interactions in local tax setting remain stable over 
time, or do voters become more/less alert of, and incumbent 
mayors more/less reactive to, the decisions taken in nearby 
jurisdictions in successive electoral rounds? 
The question arises from the comparative static structure of 
theories that underlie both the responsibility and the Yardstick 
Competition hypotheses. In these models agents are supposed to 
implement their best response to other agents’ actions and to 
react to exogenous shocks so to immediately attain the new 
equilibrium. Real world situations, instead, are characterized by 
dynamic adjustments to equilibrium values whose time 
dimension may be relevant and variable. For instance, the cost 
for voters to extract information about the quality of their mayor 
from the performance of other jurisdictions may increase if 
“bad” mayors become more effective at mimicking the “good” 
type behavior (Bordignon et al., 2003), or if they obfuscate voters’ 
possibilities to make comparisons by progressively 
implementing collusive behaviors (Charlot and Paty, 2010). 
Alternatively, Yardstick Competition may become more intense 
and widespread, as the circulation of information about mayors’ 
fiscal performance improves (Franzese, 2001), or as voters 
“learn” how to implement the comparative electoral strategy 
envisaged in Yardstick Competition models (Meseguer, 2009). 
So far the literature has never investigated the dynamics of 
strategic interactions among jurisdictions through time. Previous 
panel studies have usually estimated the average panel 
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correlation; yet, this can be a poor indicator of strategic 
interaction if the assumption that all observations reflect 
equilibrium values is in fact not verified. Here, we exploit a 
unique “natural experiment” offered by the Italian sample. The 
analysis of the pattern of strategic interactions among 
municipalities in the years following the fiscal and the electoral 
reforms allows to verify how Yardstick Competition evolves in 
time from its very beginning. The time dimension of the Italian 
dataset, moreover, allows us to relax the assumption that all 
variables are on their long-run equilibrium steady state. By that 
we can control for transitory departures from the equilibrium 
path and investigate the dynamics of strategic interaction. 
The empirical strategy estimates the spatial correlation in local 
tax setting among the Municipalities on subsequent time 
subsamples. This empirical design allows us to capture the 
variation of the interaction due to the introduction of a marginal 
year. 
The analyses is presented for the whole Italian dataset and for 
the subsamples of the four macro-areas and of the 15 Regions 
considered. This close examination allows us to describe the 
evolution of the time dynamics of strategic interaction in 
different geographical areas, characterized by different levels of 
electoral competition and efficiency of the political market. 
The results show that both the spatial lag and the spatial error 
coefficients change in time, converging towards the lowest level 
of correlation. This evidence suggests that the probability of 
observing pooling equilibrium decreases as time goes by, for 
example because the disciplining force of Yardstick Competition 
wanes off; yet, as the spatial errors become more similar, 
Yardstick Competition seems to have selected a pool of better 
mayors through time. This pattern is especially evident in 
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Regions with a higher density of municipalities, i.e., where there 
are more opportunities to make inter-jurisdictional comparisons. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
the empirical specification adopted and the data, Section 3 
presents the results and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology and data 
The evolution in time of Yardstick Competition is tested 
analyzing the time dynamics of spatial interactions. The 
methodology adopted is the estimation of a spatial tax setting 
equation on subsequent time datasets. Starting from the period 
1996-1998, we have introduced one year at a time until 2004, 
estimating seven regressions. The choice of the subsample 1996-
1998 as the initial dataset is motivated by the fact that at least 
three years are needed to build the instruments for the GMM 
model that we apply. 
This incremental approach is usually adopted in the analyses of 
the pattern of growth convergence (Arbia et al., 2005), and it is 
able to capture the variation of the dynamics before and after a 
break. We use a yearly specification of the breaks because a priori 
there are not evident breaks in the Yardstick Competition theory 
to control for and because we are interested in exploiting the 
whole information that the dataset provides us. 
For the purpose of being consistent with the analyses in the 
previous Chapter, the spatial estimation follows the linear 
regression panel data model of Kapoor, Kelejian and Prucha 
(2007). In particular, we apply the time and space fixed effects 
specification of Model 5 in Table 9 in Chapter 2. Each 
observation i=1,…,N is observed for t=1,…,T periods. Data are 
generated according to the following process: 
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[3] taxit = β’Zit + uit 
where taxit denotes the Nx1 vector of observations on the 
dependent variable in period t, Zit denotes the NxK matrix of 
observations on exogenous regressors in period t, β’ is the 
corresponding Kx1 vector of regression parameters, and uit 
denotes the Nx1 vector of disturbance terms. The intercept is 
assumed to be included in the Zs. The disturbances are assumed 
to be both correlated over time and across spatial units, as well 
as heteroskedastic; moreover, they follow a Cliff and Ord first 
order spatial autoregressive process (Cliff and Ord, 1981): 
[4] uit = ρ Wi uit + εt 
where 0<ρ<1 is the spatial autoregressive coefficient, Wi is an 
NxN weighting matrix of known time independent constants 
whose diagonal elements are zero and the matrix (I- ρ Wi) is 
assumed to be non singular. Finally, ε is an Nx1 vector of 
innovations following a one-way error component model 
grouped by time periods: 
[5] εit,N =  μi,N + νit,N 
where μi,N  is the vector of unit specific error components and νit,N  
is the vector of error components varying over both the cross-
sectional units and the time periods. By assumption the error 
components are independent and identically distributed with 
mean zero and constant variance and they are independent to 
each other. In the proposed methodology estimates ρ and the 
variance components terms μi,N  and νit,N are estimated through 
GMM, then the vector of parameters is estimated through GLS. 
The estimated regressions consider unobserved fixed effects and 
include the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of 
the tax equation. Neighborhood is here specified as geographical 
proximity: the matrix of contiguity defines two jurisdictions as 
neighbors if they share at least one border. 
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The vector of covariates Z includes fiscal, socio-demographic, 
political and electoral variables. Intergovernmental transfers are 
one of the main sources of revenues for Italian municipalities 
(about 45% of total revenue). This variable measures nominal 
values of transfers coming from the five funds created with 
D.Lgs.504/92, divided into current and investment grants. An 
increase in the amount of per capita transfers from the central 
government (grants) may be followed by a tax reduction or by an 
increase in the total expenditure, known in the literature as the 
‘flypaper effect’ (Hines and Thaler, 1995). The rate of substitution 
between autonomous and non autonomous resources is not 
clear, therefore there is no prior on the sign of this coefficient. 
In 1999 a normative instrument was introduced to constrain the 
municipal budget deficits, the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP). The 
entry requirements are modified on a yearly basis according to 
population size, and the Municipalities included in the Pact must 
follow its guidelines. This budget constraint are supposed to 
reduce local expenditures (Bartolini and Santolini, 2009) with a 
consequent reduction of the revenues needed to finance 
expenditures. Other things being equal, the correlation between 
the DSP dummy and the dependent variable should be negative. 
GDP per capita proxies the citizen’s ability to pay, and it is 
expected to be positively correlated with the dependent variable. 
It refers to the provincial GDP real per capita in millions of euro. 
GDP data are expressed at ‘market prices’, adding the VAT 
revenue and other indirect production taxes revenue (net of 
central government grants) to the value added. 
The demand for public provision is dependent on the size of the 
population (pop) and the size of the jurisdiction’s territory 
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(area)23. The composition of the population is a relevant issue in 
the tax setting decision because local governments are usually 
responsible for most of the services designed for youngsters and 
elderly people, like childcare and leisure centers. To capture this 
we use the dependency ratio (depratio), the ratio between 
youngsters and elderly over adult population. These geo-
demographic variables have been included among the 
covariates, although the predicted sign of their coefficients is 
ambiguous, since it depends on the extent to which they show 
economies of scale (negative sign) or not (positive sign). 
A qualitative binary variable has been included to control for the 
demand for public services coming from the non-resident 
population, the tourists (touristic). Data come from the ACI-
CENSIS report of 2001, where touristic municipalities are defined 
as such by the presence of sea, mountain or artistic and cultural 
amenities. Touristic municipalities are 3123 (38% of the total). 
The predicted effect on the dependent variable is negative, 
because the demand for holidays houses in many Italian touristic 
destinations may be quite price inelastic. In such a case demand 
for houses expressed by outsiders increases even though the 
business tax rate is relatively high, which gives the mayor the 
possibility to compensate residents with a lower house tax rate. 
The provincial capital dummy (provcap) has also been included 
to control for the effect of being a provincial capital jurisdiction. 
Provincial capitals are usually richer than other cities, and 
although the correlation coefficient between this dummy and 
GDP per capita is very low and negative (-0.01), a positive sign is 
expected since they can, in principle, count on a larger tax base. 
                                                 
23 Surface area is measured in hm2. For the years in which a census has not 
been conducted, data have been adjourned with the yearly territorial changes 
calculated by ISTAT. 
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The number of neighbors (n_neighbors) should directly capture 
interactions in fiscal decisions: the higher the number of 
neighbors, the greater the flow of inter-jurisdictional information 
and the stronger the constraint on the incumbent’s tax setting 
decision. Following this reasoning, the expected sign of this 
coefficient is negative. Special attention is paid to the 
jurisdictions on the coast. First, given the geography of the 
Italian peninsula, many municipalities border with the sea. As 
the sea is an useless neighbor in terms of comparisons of fiscal 
performance, the information flow may slow down in coastal 
municipalities, supporting the expectation of a positive 
coefficient associated to the coast dummy. The coefficient of the 
local union dummy (union) is included in the estimation to 
control for the effect of agglomerations of jurisdictions (Ermini 
and Santolini, 2007). The members of a local union may exploit 
inter-jurisdictional economies of scale (a negative correlation) 
but they may also collude reducing the variance of the tax rate in 
the neighborhood (a positive correlation). The five macro-area 
dummies defined by ISTAT (named north-west, north-east, center, 
south and islands) have been included to control for the regional 
heterogeneity due to geographical affiliation of the local 
governments. Finally, time dummies control for the effect of 
yearly shocks to the dependent variable. 
The introduction of a binary variable, elec_year, captures the 
electoral cycle in tax setting. The expected sign decisions is 
negative, as incumbents are expected to reduce tax rates when 
elections are approaching (Rogoff, 1990). It is assumed that year 
is assumed to be an electoral one if the first ballot takes place in 
the last six months of the year or the first six months of the 
following year. In other words, value ‘1’ signals that a local 
executive election has taken place between 01/07 and 31/12 of the 
current year, or between the 1/01 and 30/06 of the following year. 
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The timeline of the approval of the municipal budget motivates 
this specification of the electoral dummy variable, which takes 
place at the very end of the year and may last until the first three 
months of the following year. This process may influence the 
citizen’s beliefs in case they are called to vote in a early months 
of the year. Of course, the election date is exogenously given and 
decided before the tax rate is chosen. 
The electoral status of the mayor is a relevant factor in 
determining the tax setting because, if the incumbent is term 
limited, he/she will not find it worthwhile mimic the “good 
neighbor incumbent” (Besley and Case, 1995; Bordignon et al., 
2003). To account for that, we introduce a dummy (term limit) 
that takes the value of 1 if the mayor is elected for the second 
consecutive term, with a predicted positive sign. The interaction 
term between the electoral dummy and the term limit dummy 
(elec_tl) captures the fiscal behavior of the incumbent during the 
electoral year. Yardstick Competition predicts that term limited 
incumbents set higher tax rates than non term limited 
incumbents; the coefficient associated to the interaction term is 
again positive. 
Several dummies referring to the partisanship of the executive 
have been included to control for the ideological affiliation of the 
incumbent. Since left-wing mayors (left wing) allegedly should 
spend more for redistributive policies than their right parties 
colleagues (right wing), the coefficient of this variable is expected 
to be positive (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995); and vice versa, for 
right mayors. The local lists (local list) are generally ideologically 
neutral, and are usually municipality-specific. They focus their 
policy platforms on a single dimension, such as the utmost 
importance of municipal issues or the support to the electoral 
program of a local charismatic leader. They are a quantitatively 
relevant phenomenon, as 37% of the observations in the panel 
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dataset are governed by a civic list executive. Previous studies 
either did not include this variable or handled this problem 
poorly, either by associating all local lists with left wing parties 
or by splitting them evenly between the two coalitions. We treat 
them as they are, i.e., as separate lists from those associated with 
the national parties. 
Table 1 below reassumes the expected signs of the coefficients. 
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Table 1. Tax setting equation, expected signs of the coefficients 
Variable Definition Expected sign 
BICI lag ICI business tax rate lagged one period + 
Grants Transfers from the central government ? 
Area Surface area ? 
Pop  Population ? 
Depratio  Dependency ratio ? 
Touristic Touristic dummy - 
GDP per capita GDP per capita + 
Right wing Partisanship of executive dummies - 
Left wing Partisanship of executive dummies + 
Center wing Partisanship of executive dummies ? 
Local list Partisanship of executive dummies ? 
Elec_year Electoral year dummy - 
Term limit Term limit dummy + 
Elec_tl Elec_year * Term limit + 
Union Union dummy ? 
DSP Domestic Stability Pact dummy - 
N_neighbors  Number of neighbors - 
Provcap Province capital dummy + 
Coast Coast dummy + 
 
3. The time dynamics of strategic interaction: the results 
This Section presents the spatial correlation coefficients 
resulting from the spatial panel regressions on subsequent time 
datasets. A progressive increase of the coefficients reveals an 
increase in strategic interaction; on the contrary, a decrease of the 
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spatial coefficients over time is interpreted as a reduction of 
strategic interaction. 
Table 2 shows the results of these set of estimates on the Italian 
dataset.  
 
Table 2. Estimation results of the spatial correlations coefficients in 
time, Italian dataset 
  Spatial lag  Spatial error  
 Coef. p-value Coef. LM test p-value 
1995-1998 0.799 *** -0.783 
*** 
1995-1999 0.479 *** -0.354 
*** 
1995-2000 0.414  -0.317 
*** 
1995-2001 0.471 *** -0.351 
*** 
1995-2002 0.459 *** -0.337 
*** 
1995-2003 0.431 *** -0.307 
*** 
1995-2004 0.280 *** -0.160 
*** 
Notes: Spatial panel regression with time and space fixed effects. Dependent variable 
natural log of ICI house tax rate, continuous variables in log. 6695 observations per 
year. Years before 1997 have been dropped to build instruments for the regression. 
Significance levels: *10%, **5%,***1%.  
 
The spatial coefficients obtained are always statistically 
significant, safe for the spatial lag coefficient estimated on the 
sample 1995-2000. This result, apparently contradictory, is due to 
the consideration of the year 2000, a post-electoral year. In fact in 
2000 less than 5% of the Municipalities held elections while in 
1999 64.3% of the Municipalities did (Source: Electoral Database 
of the Ministry of the Interiors). As the year 2000 is the furthest 
away from the next election, the incentive for the incumbent to 
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mimic in 2000 is lowest. As a consequence, the lack of 
significance of the coefficients is not in contrast with the theory. 
The signs of the coefficients are robust to the time length of the 
dataset used, confirming the general pattern of interaction in the 
outcome and not in the residuals. The absolute value of the 
coefficients decreases as the time length increases. Graph 1 
depicts the spatial coefficients of Table 1. The resulting pattern 
reveals that strategic interaction among municipalities decreases 
over time. Within such pattern especially remarkable are the 
drop of the coefficients when we move from the sample 1995-
1998 to the sample 1995-1999, and from the sample 1995-2003 to 
the sample 1995-2004. 
 
Graph 1. The dynamics of the spatial correlations coefficients in time 
 
This dynamics is consistent with the hypothesis of a progressive 
reduction of spatial interaction caused by reduced incentives to 
mimic. The reduction of the spatial lag coefficients indicates that 
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a lower share of the domestic tax rate is determined by the 
neighbors’ tax rate. Municipalities with high (low) tax rates are 
still observed near Municipalities with high (low) tax rates, but 
these similarities become less evident. It is interesting to note 
that both 1999 and 2004 are ‘first order’ electoral years24; the large 
reductions are likely to be due to the behavior of the incumbents 
governing the municipalities that face an election in those two 
years (more than 60% of the dataset). These years, therefore, 
emerge as structural breaks in the dataset, suggesting that 
interaction decreases as a consequence of the election. This 
evidence is consistent with the Yardstick Competition theory as 
it is the electoral mechanism that both creates incentives for the 
incumbent to mimic and for the voters to gather information and 
monitor the incumbent’s decisions. 
On the other hand, the result on the spatial error coefficient is 
more complex to explain. The absolute value is always negative, 
but it decreases over time, especially in the first order electoral 
years 1999 and 2004. Assuming that the residuals include only 
the cost shock and the competence level of the incumbents, the 
increasing pattern of the spatial error coefficient could be 
explained either by increased economic integration (more similar 
cost shocks) or by increased spatial correlation of the competence 
levels, or both. As it is quite unlikely that economic integration 
changes especially in electoral years, the pattern must be driven 
by greater similarities in the behavior of the mayors. In other 
words, election after election we still observe incumbents of 
bordering Municipalities characterized by different competence 
levels, but these differences decrease. In principle this result is 
consistent with the selection effect of Yardstick Competition 
predicted by the theory; but once more it highlights the limit of a 
static model, since selection occurs gradually and slowly in time. 
                                                 
24
 For the definition, see Chapter 1, Section 3. 
 82 
The effect on political selection, however, is not conclusive and 
must be treated with caution, since the residuals may include 
also other unobserved variables whose dynamics are not known 
a priori. 
Overall the results suggest the presence of a decreasing pattern 
of mimicking over time and an increasing effectiveness of 
political selection. The reduction of the strategic interaction, in 
fact, generates more and more separating equilibria at the 
municipal level and determines the re-election of good 
incumbents only. 
The robustness and generality of the results of Table 1 has been 
tested by estimating the dynamics of the spatial coefficients on 
the geographic subsamples of the four macro-areas and the 15 
Italian Ordinary Regions. 
 
3.1 The time dynamics in the macro-areas 
The macroares are agglomerations of Regions defined by ISTAT 
(Italian Institute of Statistics). Table 3 presents the spatial 
coefficients estimated on the four macro-areas on dataset 
including subsequent time periods; panel a-d of Graph 2 depict 
the coefficients. 
Among the macro-areas in the Central and Southern Regions it is 
found a pattern similar to the national one. In these subsamples 
the reduction of strategic interaction is evident and easy to 
interpret. In the Northern Regions, on the other hand, the 
decrease of strategic interaction is not clear. In the North East the 
quasi monotonic decrease of the spatial lag coefficient suggests 
lower strategic interaction, converging to negative values close to 
zero. The spatial error coefficient, however, shows a quasi 
monotonic increase and it outstrips the spatial lag coefficient 
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reaching high values (0.4). This results is interpreted as an 
increase of the efficiency of the political market, but the 
unobservable content of the residuals entails the risk of 
underestimating other determinants of the error term. 
In the North Western macro-area, on the other hand, the 
reduction of the absolute value of the coefficients resulting from 
the introduction of the ‘first order’ electoral year 1999 in the 
dataset is followed by an increase of the coefficients in the 
subsequent time periods. The absolute values remain quite stable 
over time around 0.4, and they do not decrease introducing the 
2004 data, suggesting that they reached their equilibrium values. 
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Table 3. Estimation results of the spatial correlations coefficients in time by macro-areas 
  Northwest Northeast Center South 
  
spatial 
lag   
spatial 
error   
spatial 
lag   
spatial 
error   
spatial 
lag   
spatial 
error   
spatial 
lag   
spatial 
error   
1995-1998 0.451  -0.315  -1.093  0.187  0.363  -0.167  0.931 ** -0.76  
1995-1999 0.246  -0.128  -0.381  0.165  0.272  -0.124  0.345  -0.208  
1995-2000 0.245  -0.145  -0.015  0.174  0.352  -0.217  0.588 *** -0.494  
1995-2001 0.38 ** -0.346  -0.123  0.174  0.19  0.051  0.489 *** -0.406  
1995-2002 0.479 *** -0.439  0.219  0.199  0.253 * -0.095  0.362 *** -0.293  
1995-2003 0.467 *** -0.444  0.419 * 0.213  0.148  -0.015  0.283 *** -0.226  
1995-2004 0.427 *** -0.412   0.356 * 0.215   0.032  0.073   0.208 *** -0.162   
Notes: Spatial Fixed effects with time and space fixed effects, contiguity neighborhood criterion. Dependent variable natural log of ICI 
house tax rate, continuous variables in log. Years before 1997 have been dropped to build instruments for the regression. North-east: 
Veneto, Emilia Romagna; North-west: Piemonte, Lombardia, Liguria; Centre: Toscana, Marche, Lazio, Umbria; South: Abruzzo, 
Campania, Molise, Basilicata, Puglia, Calabria. Significance levels: *10%, **5%,***1%. 
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Graph 2. The dynamics of the spatial correlations coefficients in time by 
macro-area 
a. North West 
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d. South 
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3.2 The time dynamics in the Regions 
Table 4 presents the results of the regional regressions on the 
dataset including subsequent time periods25. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 The Region Umbria has not been included since it is the smallest Region of 
the dataset and the matrix of spatial weights, once cut, showed more than one 
Municipality without any neighbor. 
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Table 4. Estimation results of the spatial correlations coefficients in time by Region 
 1995-1998 1995-1999 1995-2000 1995-2001 
Region Spatial lag Spatial error Spatial lag Spatial error Spatial lag Spatial error Spatial lag Spatial error 
Piemonte 0.531 -0.464 0.758 -0.713 0.640 -0.555 0.341 -0.272 
Lombardia 0.289 -0.146 -0.298 0.214 -0.185 0.178 0.148 -0.056 
Veneto -0.037 0.095 -0.164 0.171 0.062 0.033 0.261 -0.089 
Liguria 0.287 -0.103 0.461 -0.248 0.383 -0.188 0.753 -0.556 
Emilia Romagna 1.159 -1.105 0.742 -0.301 0.783 -0.349 0.166 0.018 
Toscana -0.564 0.311 0.555 -0.296 0.448 -0.206 0.419 -0.211 
Marche 0.387 -0.204 0.403 -0.194 0.420 -0.215 0.105 -0.004 
Lazio 0.092 0.056 -0.001 0.057 0.193 -0.080 0.545 -0.359 
Abruzzo 0.636 -0.310 0.486 -0.240 0.557 -0.417 0.379 -0.307 
Molise 0.916 -0.459 0.380 -0.255 -0.014 0.076 0.421 -0.149 
Campania 0.427 -0.230 0.336 -0.159 0.584 -0.445 0.154 -0.067 
Puglia 1.183 -0.957 0.943 -0.767 0.773 -0.545 0.645 -0.553 
Basilicata 1.057 -0.768 0.705 -0.508 0.561 -0.298 0.905 -0.469 
Calabria 0.652 -0.497 -0.348 0.174 0.401 -0.317 0.270 -0.223 
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Table 4. Estimation results of the spatial correlations coefficients in time by Region (continued) 
 1995-2002 1995-2003 1995-2004 
Region Spatial lag Spatial error Spatial lag Spatial error Spatial lag Spatial error 
Piemonte 0.294 -0.226 0.225 -0.117 0.210 -0.085 
Lombardia 0.451 -0.345 0.453 -0.382 0.328 -0.284 
Veneto 0.609 -0.350 0.796 -0.563 0.702 -0.507 
Liguria 0.791 -0.624 0.668 -0.484 0.426 -0.235 
Emilia Romagna 0.318 -0.096 0.474 -0.226 0.358 -0.143 
Toscana 0.469 -0.260 0.350 -0.146 0.280 -0.094 
Marche -0.070 0.092 -0.211 0.179 -0.287 0.208 
Lazio -0.643 -0.462 0.574 -0.407 0.503 -0.353 
Abruzzo 0.263 -0.238 0.271 -0.284 0.289 -0.294 
Molise -0.347 0.213 0.650 -0.016 -0.152 0.069 
Campania 0.140 -0.072 0.133 -0.072 0.086 -0.032 
Puglia 0.464 -0.434 0.370 -0.361 0.356 -0.351 
Basilicata 0.834 -0.636 0.771 -0.579 0.813 -0.594 
Calabria 0.219 -0.163 0.207 -0.153 0.178 -0.146 
Notes: Spatial Fixed effects with time and space fixed effects, contiguity neighborhood criterion. Significance levels: *10%, **5%,***1%
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The spatial coefficients of the regional estimations illustrated in 
panel from a to n of Graph 3. 
 
Graph 3. The dynamics of the spatial correlations coefficients in time by 
Region 
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c. Veneto 
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e. Emilia Romagna 
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g. Marche 
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i. Abruzzo 
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k. Campania 
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m. Basilicata 
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Most of the Regions follow the national pattern (Piemonte, 
Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Abruzzo, Campania, Puglia). Among 
them, there are the Regions with the largest density of 
Municipalities26 (Piemonte) and the highest average of neighbors 
(Piemonte, Emilia Romagna). 
A large density of Municipalities in a Region is associated to a 
decrease of interaction. While in Piemonte the  trend is 
monotonic after 1999, in Lombardia the decrease is in the ‘first 
order’ electoral years only. The Regions with the lowest density 
of Municipalities (Toscana, Basilicata and Puglia), on the 
contrary, show a much slower decrease of interaction. This 
evidence suggests that the density of Municipalities intensifies 
the informational spillover, reducing mimicking and stimulating 
political selection. 
The exceptions to this pattern are Regions Molise, Liguria and 
Basilicata that follow an unclear patter. The spatial coefficients 
obtained with the full time period (1995-2004) in those Regions 
are similar to those obtained with the initial time period (1994-
1998) after a temporary variation in the middle of the time 
period analyzed. The spatial coefficients estimated in the Region 
Marche, on the other hand, do not converge to lower absolute 
values. The same unexpected pattern, however, is found in the 
Lazio Region that takes a median position with respect the 
density of municipalities and the average number of neighbors 
per Municipality. The presence of Rome in the Region Lazio, that 
is Italian’s largest Municipality and the national capital, 
surrounded by much smaller Municipalities, may explain this 
rather odd result. 
                                                 
26
 Measured as the number of Municipalities per square kilometers. Tables A.1, 
A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix reports the classification of Regions by number 
and density of municipalities and by the average number of neighbors per 
Municipality. 
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All in all, we illustrated that the pattern of strategic interaction, 
contrary to  what the literature says, changes over time. 
Consistent with the theory, Regions in which the potential 
informational spillover is larger are associated to a decreasing 
pattern of Yardstick Competition in time. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
This Chapter analyzed the time dynamic of strategic 
interactions in tax competition on the dataset of the Italian 
municipalities from 1995 to 2004, looking for a pattern in the 
data. The Italian sample is an appropriate environment to 
conduct this analyses as it constitutes a unique “natural 
experiment”, allowing us to observe the effect of Yardstick 
Competition since its introduction. 
The main findings is that interactions in local tax setting do 
not remain stable over time. The regression analyses verified that 
the common assumption in the literature of an informational 
spillover expiring after each election is not plausible, suggesting 
a development of the theory in this direction. 
The empirical strategy adopted uncovered the evolution of 
strategic interaction through time drawing a pattern of 
convergence of the spatial correlation coefficients towards the 
lowest levels of interaction. At the national level the spatial lag is 
always positive and the spatial error is always negative, but their 
absolute values decrease in the ‘first order’ electoral years 1999 
and 2004. Those years emerge as structural breaks in the dataset, 
and they are the years in which more than 60% of the 
Municipalities held elections, and reasonably drove the national 
pattern of interaction. This reasoning is consistent with the view 
of Yardstick Competition as a mechanism to overcome the 
informational spillover between voters and politicians in time: 
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election after election, the information flow intensifies and 
strategic behavior becomes less likely. 
Finally, the results on the geographical subsamples associate a 
larger effectiveness of Yardstick Competition with those Regions 
with the larger density of Municipalities, that is with the larger 
potential to create more intense informational spillovers. A 
rigorous analyses of this correlation and of the determinants of 
the decreasing pattern of interaction is an issue left for future 
research. 
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5. Appendix 
 
Table A.1 Classification of Regions by number of Municipalities 
Rank Region Number of municipalities 
1 Lombardia 1545 
2 Piemonte 1206 
3 Veneto 581 
4 Campania 550 
5 Calabria 409 
6 Lazio 376 
7 Emilia-Romagna 341 
8 Abruzzo 305 
9 Toscana 285 
10 Puglia 257 
11 Marche 246 
12 Liguria 235 
13 Molise 136 
14 Basilicata 131 
15 Umbria 92 
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Table A.2 Classification of Regions by density of Municipalities 
Rank Region 
Density of municipalities 
(number of Municipalities/regional area in hm2) 
1 Lombardia 0.065 
2 Piemonte 0.047 
3 Liguria 0.043 
4 Campania 0.040 
5 Veneto 0.032 
6 Molise 0.031 
7 Abruzzo 0.028 
8 Calabria 0.027 
9 Marche 0.026 
10 Lazio 0.022 
11 Emilia-Romagna 0.015 
12 Puglia 0.013 
13 Basilicata 0.013 
14 Toscana 0.012 
15 Umbria 0.011 
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Table A.3 Classification of Regions by the average number of neighbors 
per Municipality 
Rank Region Average number of neighbors per Municipality 
1 Basilicata 6.115 
2 Umbria 5.989 
3 Emilia-Romagna 5.988 
4 Molise 5.971 
5 Piemonte 5.949 
6 Marche 5.947 
7 Abruzzo 5.944 
8 Veneto 5.907 
9 Lazio 5.891 
10 Lombardia 5.860 
11 Toscana 5.811 
12 Campania 5.685 
13 Puglia 5.533 
14 Calabria 5.472 
15 Liguria 5.336 
Chapter 4. 
Do voters learn from past experience? Yardstick 
Competition and political selection 
 
1. Introduction 
Yardstick Competition in local public finance is one of the 
proposed solutions to the agency problem between voters and 
politicians (Besley and Case, 1995). Yardstick Competition works 
as a mechanism of informational spillover in which voters 
benchmark the fiscal performance of their incumbent with the 
fiscal performance of the other incumbents in the region. When 
the cost of public provision is correlated among neighbors, in 
fact, the comparison of the tax rates set in the domestic 
jurisdiction and in the neighborhood reveals information about 
the incumbent’s competence level. 
In the theoretical literature, however, asymmetric information is 
not fully removed because the less competent incumbent still has 
the possibility to mimic the good incumbents’ decision and be re-
elected. The existence of a pooling equilibrium has been either 
theoretically proved (Besley and Case, 1995; Bordignon et al., 
2003) and empirically tested (for a comprehensive survey see 
Delgado et. al, 2011). The literature emphasizes the advantage of 
Yardstick Competition as a constraint to the incumbents’ rent 
during the electoral year, focusing on the incumbents’ incentives 
to mimic (Bordignon et al., 2003; Solè Ollè, 2008; Shaltegger and 
Kuttel, 2002) and disregarding the effect of Yardstick 
Competition on voter’s selection powers. 
The present work contributes to the literature by calling into 
question asymmetric information again, investigating its 
persistence. Specifically, this Chapter poses the question: when 
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Yardstick Competition is repeated over time, is mimicking 
always efficient for the incumbents? 
The answer is provided by considering the evolution of the 
informational spillover in time. The literature on Yardstick 
Competition assumes that the informational capital perishes 
every time the game is repeated and voters update their beliefs 
with the current fiscal information only. This setting allows the 
mimicking strategy to be optimal during every electoral period. 
In this chapter, on the contrary, we assume that the stock of 
information accumulates over time and the learning process of 
the voters is modeled as a dynamic updating of their electoral 
beliefs. The introduction of the longitudinal dimension of the 
information is crucial because it makes it possible for voters to 
observe the true competence level of the past incumbent, the 
realization of the past cost shocks and compute the correlation of 
the shocks among the neighbors. Once obtained these 
information, voters are able to infer the electoral strategy of the 
current incumbent. 
The learning process proposed is determined by three factors: an 
exogenous possibility to learn, an endogenous willingness to 
gather information and the weight attached to past experience. 
This chapter shows that when past mimicking is observed and 
voters learn from the past, there is a range of values of the 
weight attached to past experience for which the less competent 
incumbent would not be re-elected. If voters do not observe past 
mimicking, on the contrary, voters do not learn and successful 
mimicking is always possible. 
The predictions of the model are tested empirically on a dataset 
of Italian Municipalities. The comparative analyses of the beliefs 
correctly supports the hypotheses of a dynamic learning from tax 
rates when the updating process uses as priors the average 
experience and its variability in the neighborhood. When we 
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estimate the effect of the dynamically updated beliefs on the 
probability of re-election of the incumbent, however, the 
expected negative coefficient associated to the updated belief on 
the average tax rate is never statistically significant. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews 
the contributions in the literature that refer to Yardstick 
Competition and learning. Section 3 describes the timing, the 
object and the exogenous conditions for learning to occur. The 
model is presented in Section 4, providing formal results of the 
effect of the dynamic learning process on selection powers. 
Section 5 describes the methodology, the data and the results of 
the empirical analyses. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
Learning from tax rates has been mainly studied by the literature 
on local public finance. The baseline model of Yardstick 
Competition developed by Besley and Case (1995) shares the 
common view in economics that decentralized jurisdictions are 
‘local laboratories’ in which policies are experimented and the 
observed outcomes determine the citizens’ judgment of the 
policy makers (Salmon, 1987). Yardstick Competition is a 
mechanism of informational spillover exploited by voters to 
overcome the agency problem between citizens and politicians 
regarding the cost of public provision. Since the cost is correlated 
among neighbors, the relative performance of the incumbent in 
the region reveals information about the size of his rent seeking 
activity. Voters learn the true type of the incumbent only if a 
separating equilibrium in tax rates is observed, because the good 
incumbent will always set a lower tax rate level than the bad 
incumbent. The baseline model of Yardstick Competition, 
however, proves the existence of a pooling equilibrium in tax 
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rates when a bad incumbent observes lower tax rates in nearby 
jurisdictions and he experiences a positive cost shock. In such a 
situation the bad incumbent mimics the neighbors by setting 
their same tax rate, renouncing to a share of his ego rent to seek 
for re-election. 
When mimicking occurs voters receive a deceiving signal of 
good competence, they update their electoral preferences with a 
misleading information and the incumbent’s probability of being 
re-elected is distorted upwards. As a consequence tax mimicking 
advantages the bad incumbent to the detriment of voters’ 
selection powers. The re-elected less competent incumbent, in 
fact, will set a tax rate higher than voters’ expected tax rate 
conditional on good competence. The increase of voters’ utility 
coming from the reduction of the incumbents’ rent during the 
electoral year is offset by the decrease of voters’ utility coming 
from the increase of the tax rate during the following term of 
office. 
The assumptions of the model, however, are quite stringent. The 
prerequisite for static learning from Yardstick Competition to 
work is that voters gather and exploit information on the fiscal 
performance only during the current electoral year. This 
assumption is not trivial and should not be underestimated since 
voters’ incentives to be informed are small. The change of 
regime, in fact, is a pure public good and the probability of being 
pivotal is reasonably close to zero, generating free riding 
concerns that discourage voters from acquiring information 
(Schnellenbach, 2005). 
Assuming that voters obtain enough information, there is a set of 
exogenous conditions that make it possible a successful 
mimicking behavior of the bad incumbent. Bordignon et al. 
(2003) derived these conditions, referred to the probability of a 
negative cost shock q, the ratio s=(1-σ)q/(1-q) where σ is the 
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degree of correlation of the cost shocks between the neighbors, 
the share of resources diverted into rents k, and the pooling tax 
rate level t*+Δ. Proposition 1 in Bordignon et al. (2003) states: 
<<Suppose q<1/2, s>1/2 and k<k*. Then for θ[θ*, 1) and δ[δ*, 1) there 
exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies where 
bad type's first period choices in both economies upon observing a 
positive shock are t*+Δ.">>. 
Similar results have been obtained in the industrial organization 
literature studying learning from prices (Benabou and Gertner, 
1992). Assuming strategic competition in a market with two 
sellers of different types selling a homogeneous good to a 
customer, the price is a performance indicator revealing the true 
type of the seller. The scholars obtained the same theoretical 
results as Besley and Case (1993) as the bad seller mimics the 
good seller by reducing the markup. What is interesting in this 
strand of the literature is that, contrary to the Yardstick 
Competition literature, it developed dynamic models of learning. 
Bar-Isaac (2003) proved that when learning from prices occurs in 
the dynamic game, only the good seller survives in the market. 
By similarity, in the Yardstick Competition setting only the good 
incumbent should find it optimal to run for re-election. 
The analytical policy literature predicts that the same selection of 
the good type in time occurs when looking at the diffusion of 
policy decisions. In particular, if several policy makers face a 
decision and they are exposed to the same stock of information, 
their beliefs on the performance of the policy converge and they 
will select the best performing policy among the feasible set of 
alternatives. The contribution of this strand of the literature is the 
introduction of empirical methodologies to test the presence of a 
learning process. Meseguer (2009), in particular, developed a 
model that can easily be adapted to the Yardstick Competition 
framework. In her model a government faces a decision between 
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two alternative policies; he learns in light of experience and then 
makes rational choices. Beliefs are updated with the information 
about own and neighboring past experiences according to the 
Bayes’ rule. Since every agent in the model is exposed to the 
same information, the performance of each policy decision is 
common knowledge and the learning process is stimulated. 
Meseguer (2009) tests the model to a sample of south-American 
countries during the 90s, finding that the implementation of 
institutional and economic reforms has been driven by a learning 
process consistent with her theory. 
 
3. The dynamics of the incremental learning process 
This Section expands the two-period model of Yardstick 
Competition developed by Bordignon et al. (2003), showing how 
do voters solve the problem of asymmetric information when the 
game is repeated. 
Consider a world made of two jurisdictions. Jurisdiction i is 
assumed to be a neighbor of –i and vice versa. The game lasts for 
N periods, (t=1, 2, …, N). Each period an election is held between 
the incumbent and a challenger. 
The utility of the voters in each jurisdiction during the period t 
depends on the consumption of both private (C) and public 
goods (g): 
[1] 
v
it it itu C g= +                             
where private consumption is the amount of income (y) net of 
taxes (T): 
[2] it it itC y T= −     
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The tax rate proxies the cost of the public provision of goods and 
services, T: 
[3] it t it iT p θ ε= + −       
where i refers to the jurisdiction and t refers to time. Tit is 
determined by the observed national price of the public 
provision (pt), and by two factors that are observed by the 
incumbent but not by the voters: a random cost shock (θit) and 
the competence level of the incumbent (εi). The competence of 
the incumbent is an individual specific characteristic, constant in 
time, representing a measure of efficiency in providing public 
goods. The incumbent in each jurisdiction may be competent 
(good type) or not (bad type) where competence is inversely 
related with the undertaken rent-seeking activity: 
[4] 
' '
' '
H
i
L
if good
if bad
ε
ε
ε

= 
               
such that εH  >εL > 0 and Prob (εi =εH)= ϕ. 
Substituting Equation 2 and Equation 3 in Equation 1 we obtain: 
[5] 
it
V
it it t it iu g y p θ ε= + − − +               
Esquation 5 establishes the positive relation between the 
electoral decision of the voters and the voters’ utility. 
Voters are rational agents who choose between re-electing or not 
the incumbent with the purpose to maximize their expected 
utility. Information is costly, this is why the existing models 
assume that voters gather information about the performance of 
the incumbent only before elections. Furthermore, information is 
now assumed to entirely depreciate every period and before the 
next election voters begin the process from scratch. The 
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performance indicator considered by voters is the domestic local 
tax rate applied on a non mobile tax base (the house, as an 
example), which is benchmarked with the neighbors’ tax rate. 
The incumbent is aware of this inter-jurisdictional comparison, 
and he chooses the tax rate as a best response to the performance 
of his neighbors. 
The good incumbent does not extract any ego rent from being in 
office and his tax rate depends on the cost shock realization. 
When a negative shock occurs (θit>0), an additional amount of 
resources (Δ>0) is needed to finance the public provision. The 
good incumbent thus sets Tit = T+Δ when the shock is negative 
and Tit = T otherwise. 
The bad incumbent, on the contrary, sets the tax rate to finance 
both the public provision of goods and services and his private 
rent seeking activity. As a consequence, he will always – ceteris 
paribus - set a higher tax rate than the good incumbent does. Let 
us define the bad incumbents’ tax rate as Tit = T+kΔ, where k is 
the share of additional resources diverted to rents. When the 
shock is positive, k=1; when the shock is negative 1<k≤R, 
assuming some finite upper bound to the rent extraction R, 
which is determined by technology constraints or the fact that 
the size of the rent is so high that the incumbent is unmasked27. 
The tax rate level Tit = T+Δ is an alternative for both the types of 
incumbents, the so called pooling tax rate level. When this tax 
rate is chosen, voters cannot infer the incumbent’s competence 
level by observing only the current performances in the 
neighborhood. 
                                                 
27
 Assuming a Laffer curve for the rent extraction of the type L=kΔ+ kΔ2, the 
value R that maximizes L is R=1/2Δ. For k>R as the share of the revenue 
diverted to rents increases the effective rent received by the incumbent 
decreases. 
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The timing of the game is set as follows: 
1. At the beginning of period t Nature selects a 
competence level of the incumbent (εi ) and a cost shock level 
(θit); 
2. The incumbent in i observes his competence level and 
his cost shock realization and sets a tax rate; 
3. Voters in i observe the tax rates (Tit) and (T-it), the 
realized tax rates (Tit-1) and (T-it-1) conditional on the past electoral 
decisions, then they update their beliefs on the relative 
competence level of the incumbent in the neighborhood; 
4. At the end of period t an election is held between the 
incumbent and a challenger with a majoritarian electoral rule; 
5. At the beginning of period t+1 Nature selects a cost 
shock and the game restarts; if the challenger has been elected 
his competence level is randomly selected by Nature. 
Assume that during period t-2 the incumbent set a pooling tax 
rate was and was re-elected. If the conditions for a successful 
mimicking hold during the period t of the game, the bad 
incumbent in jurisdiction i sets Tit  = Tit-2 = T+Δ. The information 
on the tax rates set in both i and -i during both t-1 and t-2 are 
now available to voters. This information triggers the 
incremental learning process. 
As a first step, by comparing the tax rates set at t-1 with the tax 
rate set at t-2 voters learn about their past incumbent’s true type 
and the past neighbor’s true type. Tax rates in the non electoral 
period t-1 are not strategic, therefore the bad incumbent will set 
Tit-1 =T+kΔ regardless of the cost shock realization while the good 
incumbent will set Tit-1 =T+Δ if the shock is negative and Tit-1 =T if 
the shock is positive. The tax rate decisions in period t-1 are 
shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. The incumbent’s tax rate strategies during period t-1 (non 
electoral) 
 Bad i; Good –i Bad i; Bad -i Good i; Good -i 
Ni; N-i T+kΔ, T+Δ T+kΔ, T+kΔ T+Δ, T+Δ 
Ni; P-i T+kΔ, T T+kΔ, T+kΔ T+Δ, T 
Pi; P-i T+kΔ, T T+kΔ, T+kΔ T, T 
Pi; N-i T+kΔ, T+Δ T+kΔ, T+kΔ T, T+Δ 
Note: N=negative cost shock, P=positive cost shock; i refers to the domestic jurisdiction, 
-i to the neighbor(s). 
 
If voters in i observed an increase of the tax rate from the past 
electoral to the past non electoral year, Tit-1 > Tit-2, they know for 
sure that the incumbent mimicked at t-2 and he is the bad type 
(εi = εL). Otherwise, if they observe Tit-1 < Tit-2 they infer that the 
past incumbent’s true type is good (εi = εH). 
Voters know that the cost shock is spatially correlated in the 
region, according to the socio-economic interdependence of the 
jurisdictions28. The degree of correlation among neighbors is 
allowed to change over time but slowly and monotonically, that 
is either increasing or decreasing, but keeping the same sign. 
This assumption is reasonable because the technological 
interdependence between neighboring economies is based on the 
geographical nearness, common natural resources, possible joint 
                                                 
28
 As an example, the cost of streets maintenance depends on weather 
conditions which are similar among neighbors, but the cost is unknown to 
laymen because the extent of the damage is difficult to gauge without expertise. 
Moreover, while the local government controls the whole territory of the 
jurisdiction, voters reasonably have not enough information on every street 
condition. 
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public provision and other factors which are unlikely to 
unexpectedly change the correlation. 
The cost shock is specified as: 
[6] it itθ σθ−=                                          
where σ is a correlation parameter, σ=(-1,1). 
Given this setting, during the period t-2 voters ignore θit-2 and εi. 
In period t-1 the tax rates set reveal the strategy played by of the 
incumbent, the past cost shocks θit-2 and θ-it-2, and voters infer σ. 
The true type of the incumbent is correctly observed during 
period t-1 only if a pooling equilibrium occurred at t-2 and the 
good incumbent experiences a positive cost shocks during 
period t-2. In fact, this is the only situation in which all the three 
tax rates are observed: T+Δ at t-2, T and T+kΔ at t-1. Hence, 
voters recognize the true type of the incumbent with no doubt. 
The conditions for the disclosure of σ  are stated in Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1: “Voters infer the value of θit and θ-it  and the spatial 
correlation parameter σ only if mimicking occurred during period t-2 
and the good incumbent experienced a positive shock during period t-1” 
As shown in Table 2, Lemma 1 holds in five cases over twelve. 
 
Table 2. The tax rates in period t-1 and Proposition 1. 
 Bad-Good Bad-Bad Good-Good 
NN Does not hold Does not hold Does not hold 
NP Holds * Does not hold Holds * 
PP Holds * Does not hold Holds * 
PN Does not hold Does not hold Holds * 
N=negative cost shock, P=positive cost shock; the first letter (or word) refers to i, the 
second to –i; starred cells indicate the cases in which Lemma 1 holds. 
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During the next electoral period, t, voters know the cost shock 
correlation between the economies. If they observe a pooling 
equilibrium again, they are now able to infer the electoral 
strategy of the pooling incumbent. If the correlation is positive, 
in fact, the similar fiscal decision is explained with a similar cost 
shock. Vice versa, if the correlation is negative the incumbent is 
behaving strategically. This mechanism of learning is stated in 
Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1. If σ is positive both the neighbors incumbents are 
competent and faced a negative cost shock, and the pooling incumbent 
is competent; otherwise, the neighbors incumbents face opposite cost 
shocks and the pooling incumbent is mimicking. 
When Lemma 1 holds, the bad incumbent would not find it 
optimal to mimic the good incumbent behavior not anymore 
because he would be unmasked and his strategic behavior 
would not increase his probability of being re-elected. As a 
consequence, a separating equilibrium would be observed. 
Eventually, the bad incumbent would not run for re-election and 
renounce to his future ego rent. On the contrary, if the bad 
incumbent is not aware of the voters’ learning process he would 
mimic the good neighbors, but this time he will be unmasked 
and turned down. In both cases, the electoral competition would 
select only competent incumbents in time and entail an 
improvement in the quality of the political class. 
The incremental learning entails an improvement of political 
selection with respect to the baseline model of static learning 
from tax rates. Graph 1 illustrates this result by depicting the 
graphical solution of the model by Besley and Case (1995). The 
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cost shock level is measured on the horizontal axis while the tax 
rate level is measured on the vertical axis29. 
When the cost shock assumes values too low or too high a 
separating equilibrium arises because the bad incumbent can 
either signal good competence while maximizing his ego rent 
(low cost), or he finds it too costly to seek for votes and he sets 
the highest tax rate no matter the electoral consequences (high 
cost). The tax function in this situation is a positive sloping line 
depending on the cost shock level and the amount of rent 
diverted R. When the cost shock takes intermediate values, the 
bad incumbent faces a trade off between vote seeking and rent 
seeking. The horizontal dotted segment of the tax function 
represents the mimicking tax level set to signal good competence 
to voters. 
When the incremental learning process occurs, on the contrary, 
successful mimicking becomes much more difficult to implement 
because voters learn the degree of economic integration with the 
neighbors and they infer the incumbents’ strategy. The bad 
incumbent running for re-election would not find it optimal to 
behave strategically because he would renounce to a share of 
rent without increasing the probability of re-election. As a 
consequence a separating equilibrium will be observed also for 
intermediate values of the cost shock. In the Graph below, this 
result is represented by the bold continuous segment of the tax 
function. The same segment indicates the interval of values for 
                                                 
29
 The model of Besley and Case (1995) assumes a positive cost shock taking 
different values, while the model of Bordignon et al. (2003) assumes a 
positive/negative cost shock of given magnitude. Both the models lead to 
similar results regarding the spatial interaction of the fiscal decisions and the 
electoral concerns underlying the mimicking strategy. The notation in this 
paper refers to Bordignon et al. (2003), but since the most popular illustration of 
Yardstick Competition is the one by Besley and Case (1995), we decided to 
present this Graph. 
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which selection powers are enhanced and Yardstick Competition 
is effective in improving accountability at the local level. 
 
Graph 1. Dynamic learning and bad incumbent’s tax rate decision 
Note: tau_hat: highest tax rate still granting re-election; R=ego rent; ρ=share of ego rent to which 
the incumbent renounces. 
 
4. A model of incremental learning from tax rates 
4.1 The learning function 
Voters are rational agents that during the electoral period 
maximize the following inter-temporal utility function: 
[7] 
( )( )1 1 1
( )
max ( ) * ( ) (1 )* ( ) ; ( ) ( )
t i
V VI VI V VC
t t L t t L t t t t tj
V
u T I V I V u T V
ε
β ω µ β+ + +
=
+ + − +
The present utility of the voters Vtu depends on the tax rate Tt, as 
already stated in Equation 5. The future utility is discounted 
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according to the factor 0<β<1, and it depends on the politician in 
office during the next period. Specifically, 1
VI
tV +  is the expected 
utility from re-electing the incumbent while 1
VC
tV +  is the expected 
utility from electing the challenger. The expected performance of 
the incumbent is updated according to his observed fiscal 
performance. When the incremental learning occurs the updated 
beliefs consider both the present and the past performance ( tω ); 
otherwise, they consider only the present information ( tµ ). 
The mechanism of updating  of the voters’ beliefs depends on 
the completion of the incremental learning process. For this 
purpose the indicator function IL has been introduced. When IL = 
1 the incremental learning function has been maximized and 
voters learn from past experience. For IL = 0, on the contrary, 
incremental learning does nor occur and the static updating of 
the existing model of Yardstick Competition is restored. Given a 
pooling equilibrium during period t, this means that the bad 
incumbent will be re-elected as long as successful pooling is 
feasible. 
The incremental learning is modeled as a function L assumed to 
be bounded between zero and a maximum value L , and it 
depends on both the feasibility of learning (1 - qt-1) and the 
probability of gathering enough information (π). These two 
factors represent respectively the rational ignorance (Downs, 
1957) and the rational irrationality (Caplan, 2007) hypotheses on 
voters’ behavior. The two factors are independent from each 
other, e.g. a variation in the propensity to learn does not affect 
the realization of the cost shock and vice versa. Hence, L can be 
expressed as a product function: 
[8] 1(1 )t tL q pi−= −                                             
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The feasibility of the incremental learning refers to the conditions 
stated in Lemma 1: if they do not hold, any information is useful 
in inferring the incumbent’s strategy. As a pooling equilibrium is 
observed during the first period of the game, the respect of 
Lemma 1 relies on the realization of a positive cost shock in the 
neighborhood at t-1. Defining 0 ≤ qt-1 ≤1 as the probability of the 
realization of a negative cost shock at t-1 in the jurisdiction 
governed by the good incumbent, incremental learning is a 
decreasing function of qt-1. As it shows, the feasibility of the 
incremental learning is a factor exogenous to the model because 
voters’ decisions cannot affect it. However, as pointed out, it is a 
necessary condition for the process to work. 
The probability that voters gather enough information to learn, 
π, is indeed an endogenous factor shaping L. Incremental 
learning requires a stock of information P* including the tax rates 
set in the neighborhood during each period and the probability π 
depends on the propensity to gather the sufficient information. 
Voters are rational agents and they acquire new information 
when costs are no larger than benefits. The costs of obtaining 
information are represented by the marginal cost of obtaining 
both the domestic and the neighbors’ tax rate information. The 
marginal cost of observing the domestic tax rate is assumed to be 
small and constant, since a tax rate is a piece of information that 
the government must periodically release and make visible to 
claim its payment. The marginal cost of observing the neighbors’ 
tax rate, on the contrary, is supposed to increase depending on 
the size of the neighborhood. The information spillover created 
by the inter-jurisdictional comparison of citizens, however, may 
generate economies of scale in the diffusion of the information. 
Following this alternative reasoning the marginal cost of the 
information decreases as the number of neighbors increase. 
Finally, there is a cost attached to the action of retaining 
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information, implying the effort of storing information in 
memory and being able to recall it when an election is 
approaching. The marginal information needs a larger memory 
capacity, therefore its cost increases with the size of the 
information stock retained. 
The marginal benefit of being informed, on the contrary, is 
determined by the difference between the realized fiscal 
performance of the past incumbent during his second period of 
office, Tt-1, and the updated belief of the fiscal performance 
before his re-election, E(Tt-1). To understand the reason for this 
specification, assume that the realization of the tax rate set by the 
past incumbent is higher than its expectation. Voters infer if the 
incumbent was strategic (bad) during the first period and they 
attach a larger marginal benefit to new information if compared 
with a situation in which the incumbent was non strategic 
(good). In other words, voters find it more convenient to 
improve their monitoring powers when they realize that their 
past beliefs have been mistaken and they become more prone to 
obtaining new information to correct them in time. The slope of 
the marginal benefit curve is assumed to be negative because 
voters may come out with a clear idea about the incumbent after 
having acquired the first pieces of information. In such a 
situation, the utility from the marginal information decreases. 
Graph 2 depicts information (quantitatively measured) as a 
function of the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of 
gathering information. When the cost is larger than the benefit, 
voters do not to search for new information. When the benefit is 
larger than the cost voters find it profitable to gather new 
information up to the critical level Pt pinned down by the 
intersection of the two curves. The quantity Pt represents the 
maximum amount of information that voters would gather given 
the shape of the cost and benefit curves. The probability that 
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voters obtain enough information to learn is the probability that 
Pt is at least as large as a critical value P*, π = Pr (Pt ≥ P*). 
 
Graph 2. Costs and benefit of gathering information 
 
 
The function L is maximized when the conditions π=1 and qt-1=0 
jointly hold. On the contrary, if π=0 or q2=1, that is if voters do 
not want or they cannot learn, incremental learning does not 
occur. 
 
4.2 Voting decision and mimicking 
Voters’ expectations about the fiscal performance of the 
incumbent at t+1 are: 
[9]  
1 1 1( ) ( ) (1 )t t t tE T E T Tρ ρ+ + −= + −            
The electoral belief, updated with both present and past 
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[10] 1 (1 )t t tω ρµ ρ µ−= + −                                     
Where 0<ρ<1 is the weight attached to past experience, μt-1 is the 
updated belief at time t-1 and μt is the updated belief at time t. 
The mimicking incumbent is re-elected if the pooling tax rate 
successfully signals good competence to voters and the updated 
belief about his competence level is larger or equal the prior 
belief ϕ: 
[11] 1 (1 )t tρµ ρ µ ϕ− + − ≥      
The belief μt-1 reveals the past incumbents’ true type and it is 
computed as the statically updated belief at t-1: μt-1 = f(ϕ t-1, T i,t-1, 
T -1,t-1). 
Define: 
[12] 1
G
t B
if the past incumbent was good
if the past incumbent was bad
ϕ µµ
ϕ µ−
≥ →
= 
< →
 
with G Btµ µ µ> > . This condition reflects the fact that voters 
know the past incumbents’ true type with certainty, while they 
cannot be sure of the correctness of their present belief, therefore 
they never consider the extreme values of the scale of 
competence. 
If the updated beliefs during period t are the same as in period t-
1 (μt-1 = μt ≡ μ), Equation 10 states that the dynamically updated 
beliefs equal the statically updated beliefs ( t tω µ= ) and the 
model comes back to the baseline static signaling model. 
Following the literature, successful mimicking is possible only 
under the conditions stated by Bordignon et al. (2003). In fact, 
Equation 11 would lead to the condition: 
[13] tµ ϕ≥         
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If the updated beliefs during period t are different from the 
updated beliefs at period t-1 (μt-1≠μt), the parameter ρ becomes 
crucial. 
In particular, if the past incumbent was the good type, 
substituting 1
G
tµ µ− =  in equation 11 and solving it, we get: 
[14] ( )
t
G
t
ϕ µρ
µ µ
−
≥
−
        
The right hand side of Equation 14 is negative. The numerator is 
negative since the pooling tax rate observed during period t 
signals good competence and tµ ϕ≥  indicates that successful 
mimicking is feasible if voters update their beliefs statically; the 
denominator is positive because G tµ µ>  by definition. Since ρ is 
bounded between zero and unity, the inequality in [14] always 
holds. Following the same reasoning we obtain the condition for 
the pooling incumbent not to be re-elected at time t conditional 
on a good incumbent at time t-1: 
[15] ( )
t
G
t
ϕ µρ
µ µ
−
<
−
              
Equation 15 never holds for the same motivations explained 
above. As a consequence, when the past incumbent was good 
successful mimicking at time t can always occur because voters 
are faced with a history of efficient signaling. 
On the other hand, if the past incumbent was the bad type and 
he mimicked, substituting 1
B
tµ µ− =  in Equation 12 we get the 
condition: 
[16] ( )
t
B
t
ϕ µρ
µ µ
−
≤
−
      
 122 
The pooling incumbent at time t, conditional on a good 
incumbent at time t-1, is not re-elected if: 
[17] ( )
t
B
t
ϕ µρ
µ µ
−
>
−
                          
The right hand side of Equation 16 and Equation 17 is positive 
because B tµ µ<  by definition and also the denominator of the 
ratio is negative. Being ρ bounded between zero and unity, the 
weight attached to past experience plays now a crucial role in 
determining the electoral success of the mimicking strategy. 
Table 3 illustrates all the possible outcomes of the dynamic 
game. 
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Table 3. Conditions for successful mimicking in the dynamic game 
Period: t-2 Period: t-1 Period: t 
Incumbent/ 
Challenger 
electoral competition 
Challenger/ 
Challenger 
electoral competition 
Incumbent/ 
Challenger 
electoral competition 
- Pooling tax rates observed 
- Beliefs statically updated 
-Term limited incumbent 
-Competence level is revealed 
 
Incumbent reelected if: ( )
t
G
t
ϕ µρ
µ µ
−
≥
−
 
Good incumbent: 2
Gµ µ=  
Incumbent reelected if: ( )
t
G
t
ϕ µρ
µ µ
−
<
−
 (Condition not feasible) 
Incumbent reelected if: ( )
t
B
t
ϕ µρ
µ µ
−
≤
−
 
- 1µ ϕ≥  
the incumbent is re-elected 
 
 
Bad incumbent: 2
Bµ µ=  
Incumbent not reelected if: ( )
t
B
t
ϕ µρ
µ µ
−
>
−
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The formal conditions for successful mimicking in the dynamic 
game are summarized in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2. “When mimicking was not observed in the past, the 
contribution of past experience on voters’ updated beliefs does not affect 
the conditions for a successful mimicking in the present. When 
mimicking was observed in the past, successful mimicking in the 
present is feasible only if, in addition to the conditions for a successful 
mimicking with statically updated beliefs, the inequality 
( )
t
B
t
ϕ µρ
µ µ
−
≤
−
 holds.” 
As a conclusion, the theory suggests that when Yardstick 
Competition is repeated over time and voters consider past 
experience in forming their electoral beliefs, the probability that 
a bad incumbent mimics the good incumbent and he is re-elected 
decreases as the weight attached to the past mimicking 
experience increases. 
 
5. An empirical test of the dynamic learning from tax rates 
5.1 Italian Municipalities: institutional setting, accountability system 
and Yardstick Competition 
Municipalities are the lowest tier of government in Italy, and 
they are a suitable framework for an empirical test of dynamic 
learning from tax rates. In the early 1990s, in fact, an institutional 
reform introduced a link of local accountability by implementing 
tax decentralization and by reforming the electoral rule. This 
newly established setting represents a favorable framework for 
Yardstick Competition to arise. 
The local property tax rate (ICI, Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili), 
introduced in 1993, increased the tax autonomy of local 
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governments and in the period 1993-2007 it accounted for more 
than 55% of total Municipality revenue and more than 25% of 
local expenditure. ICI is a highly autonomous tax rate, 
specifically a level ‘b’ in the OECD tax autonomy scale ranging 
from ´a´ to ´e´ (OECD, 1999). The previous setting was 
characterized by the lowest degree of tax autonomy, the level e, 
being the tax rate and the tax base both set by the central 
government. In 1995 the tax rate has been differentiated between 
the house tax rate applied to the main living property and the 
business tax rate applied to holiday houses, offices, shops, and so 
on. Local house property taxation accounts only for 6% of local 
tax revenues, but it is a cost that voters directly link to the house 
and makes it clear to the citizens the relationship between the 
costs and the benefits of local public services in a certain 
jurisdiction. In addition to this, more than 80% of the residents in 
Italy are home-owner30, making the local house tax rate the main 
indicator of jurisdictional performance. Since the tax base is fixed 
and property value reassessments are nationally implemented, 
local autonomy is restricted to only one dimension, the tax rate 
level. The tax rate can be set in a range between 4‰ and 7‰. 
Although the tax interval is small, a marginal variation of the tax 
rate determines a consistent variation in the per capita tax paid 
by the citizen and in the overall tax revenue31. Moreover, the 
single dimension of the decision makes it easier for the voters to 
exploit this information when forming their voting preferences. 
                                                 
30
 Source: ISTAT, L’abitazione delle famiglie residenti in Italia - Anno 2008, 
published in Spring 2010. 
31 The average value of the house properties in Italy was 182000 euro in 2008 
(source: Dipartimento delle Finanze and Agenzia del Territorio, Gli Immobili in 
Italia, published in 2010). Using this value as a proxy for the tax base of ICI, a 
marginal variation in the tax rate leads to a variation of 182 euro of the 
individual tax burden. In turn, this amount accounts for a 7‰ of the he average 
yearly income of an employee in 2009 (ISTAT). 
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Regarding election, the Italian local electoral rule has been 
reformed in 1993 from proportional to majoritarian, introducing 
the direct election of the mayor according to the plurality rule in 
Municipalities with less than 15000 inhabitants (9% of the total 
number of Municipalities) and according to the majority rule 
with runoff elections in the others. The local legislature has been 
extended in 1999 from four to five years, and a two term 
limitation has been introduced. In case of motion of no 
confidence both the mayor and the council must resign and new 
elections are held. Because of the early fall of many executives in 
the past Italian Municipalities hold elections in different years. 
There is, however, a concentration of local elections in 1995, 1999 
and 2004, when more than 60% of the jurisdictions are called to 
the ballot. 
The data used for the empirical estimation come from a 
comprehensive dataset of Italian Municipalities (Padovano, 
2007). The considered observations are those 227 Municipalities 
meeting the following requirements: 
• They are members of the cohort of Municipalities that 
held local elections in 1995, 1999 and 2004; 
• The local house tax rate set in 1995 was at most equal 
than the average tax rate set by its neighbors (defined as a 
‘pooling’ tax rate); 
• The local house tax rate set in 1999 was higher than the 
average tax rate set by its neighbors (defined as ‘non 
pooling’ tax rate); 
• The incumbent ran for re-election in 2004; 
• The local house tax rate set in 2004 was at most equal 
than the average tax rate set by its neighbors (‘pooling’ 
tax rate). 
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As the following graph shows, the selected observations in 2004 
are in their third electoral year since the fiscal and electoral local 
system has been reformed, and they belong to a cohort of 
jurisdictions experiencing two full local legislatures (1995-1999, 
1999-2004). Among them, in 2004 the incumbent was defeated in 
33 Municipalities (about the 15% of the sub-sample) while in the 
remaining 194 Municipalities he was re-elected. 
There is evidence of strategic tax setting among Italian 
Municipalities, as studied by Bordignon et al. (2003), Padovano 
(2008), Santolini (2007), Bartolini and Santolini (2009). The model 
in Section 4 predicts that, election after election, voters learn the 
incumbents’ strategy and they can correctly update their voting 
preferences. As a consequence, Yardstick Competition decreases 
over time. The next paragraph tests this hypothesis. 
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Graph 3. Electoral dynamics of the 227 Municipalities in the dataset 
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5.2 Empirical methodology 
The methodology applied stems from the model of learning from 
economic policies by Meseguer (2009). This section adapts the 
original cross-countries economic policy decision setting to the 
sub-national electoral decision setting. 
The analyses includes three-steps: 
1. calculation of the posterior beliefs using dynamic 
Bayesian updating; 
2. comparison of posterior beliefs conditional on the voting 
decision; 
3. regression estimation using the voting decision as 
dependent variable and the updated beliefs as 
independent variables. 
For a clear presentation of the analyses and its results, the 
following sub-paragraphs deal with the three steps separately. 
 
5.2.1 First step: posterior beliefs 
During the electoral period voters observe both the past and 
present fiscal performance of the incumbent in the domestic and 
the neighboring jurisdiction, and they update their electoral 
beliefs according to this information.  
The dynamic update of the beliefs implies the following setting. 
Assume the fiscal performance T to be a random variable 
normally distributed with an unknown mean M and an 
unknown variance V. M and V are random variables, and voters 
learn them by observing the performance of other incumbents 
under alternative past voting decisions j. The conditional 
distribution of the mean is Normal while the conditional 
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distribution of the variance is scaled-Inverse Х2. The decision of 
these distributions is a classical assumption in Bayesian updating 
and allows the mean and the variance to be interdependent. 
Formally, 
[18]  
2
2 2
( , )
( , / )
( , )
j j j
j j j j
j j j
T N M V
M N m
V ScaledInv v
σ τ
χ σ
=
=
= −
            
Where m is the location of the mean, 
2 /j jσ τ  is the variation of 
the mean, v are the degrees of freedom and 
2
jσ  is the scale of the 
variance, τ is the factor that relates the prior variance of the 
mean to the sampling variance. 
During the period t the information available to voters is |jtT j , 
the performance of the incumbent under alternative voting 
decisions for all the jurisdiction that re-elected (jt =1) or did not 
re-elect (jt =0) the incumbent during the period t-2. The 
information is assumed to be a random variable independent 
and identically distributed. Hence, the sample mean and the 
sample sum of squares are sufficient statistics to summarize the 
information in the sample of countries under each of the 
alternative voting decisions. When prior beliefs are combined 
with new information, by applying the Bayes’ rule the posterior 
belief about the mean of the tax difference is32: 
[19] 1 (1 )t t txω ρω ρ−= + −               
                                                 
32
 For a detailed description of how to obtain this result, see Meseguer (2009), 
Appendix to Chapter 2. 
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where 0<ρ<1, ω2 is the updated belief on the performance of the 
past incumbent at the end of t-1, 3x  is the current observed 
performance of the incumbent and ω t-1=μt-1  if t-1 is the first year 
for which data are observed in the dataset. 
The posterior belief about the variation of the tax difference is: 
[20] 2 33
3
S
s
v
=                                      
where S3 is the posterior for the sum of squares, and v3 is the 
posterior for the degrees of freedom. 
As Equation 19 shows, although extreme values of ρ are ruled 
out, when that parameter is close to zero the past experience has 
a negligible influence on the updating process and voters hardly 
learn the determinants of the public cost function; vice versa, 
when ρ tends to one the belief hardly takes into account new 
information. 
When the electoral rule prescribes a term limitation, the past 
incumbent is a different person than the current incumbent and 
voters may find it useless to gather information. Competence is 
in fact an individual specific characteristic, and if voters believe 
that the electoral strategy of the past incumbent does not affect 
the electoral strategy of the current incumbent in any possible 
way, ρ is close to zero. The probability that the current 
incumbent is strategic, however, is not independent from the 
probability that past incumbents have been strategic. If a bad 
incumbent knows that his predecessor mimicked and he was re-
elected (incumbents know the performance of the past 
incumbents), it is likely that he would play the same strategy, 
especially if the correlation between the economies does not 
change significantly in the short period. As a consequence, 
voters always gain positive utility from the marginal information 
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since that is the only way to come out with a distribution of the 
type of the past pooling incumbents. 
In the empirical analyses several sets of priors have been used to 
calculate different updated beliefs. The first set considers as 
priors the average of the tax difference in the dataset and its 
variability, measured as the standard deviation from the possible 
interval of values of the tax difference. The tax difference is 
measured as the difference between the domestic tax rate and the 
average tax rate in the neighborhood. This set of priors (UPTD) 
is closer to the specification of the model presented in this paper, 
but since the literature on Yardstick Competition focuses 
separately on the domestic and the neighbors’ tax rate, 
alternative sets of priors have been investigated. 
The alternative sets of priors calculate updated beliefs with 
respect to the average and the variation of the domestic tax rate, 
taking as priors the average and the variation from the possible 
interval (UP1) or from the average and the variation from the 
observed values in the neighborhood (UP2). 
Summary statistics for the posterior point estimates for the 
location and the scale are reported in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Posterior beliefs using different sets of priors 
 Priors Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Updated average, μ 227 -0.504 0.372 -1.696 0.159 
Updated variance, s 227 0.497 0.741 0.000 5.768 
ρ 227 0.353 0.022 0.333 0.43 
1-ρ 
UPTD 
227 0.647 0.022 0.573 0.67 
Updated average, μ 227 4.776 0.477 4.000 5.880 
Updated variance, s 227 0.894 0.953 0.000 2.638 
ρ 227 0.364 0.026 0.333 0.4 
1-ρ 
UP1 
227 0.636 0.026 0.595 0.67 
Updated average, μ 222 4.769 0.485 4.000 5.878 
Updated variance, s 222 0.331 0.273 0.020 2.024 
ρ 223 0.351 0.012 0.334 0.41 
1-ρ 
UP2 
223 0.649 0.012 0.594 0.67 
Note: UP1: beliefs on the tax rate updated with domestic priors; UP2: beliefs on the tax 
rate updated with neighborhood priors; UPTD: beliefs on the tax difference updated with 
domestic priors. 
The mean updated domestic tax rate using the sets of priors UP1 
and UP2 is about 4.77 (the tax rates are scaled between 4 and 7), 
but the variation is smaller when using the set of priors 
exploiting the neighbors’ information. These figures suggest that 
benchmarking the domestic performance with the neighboring 
performance provides voters with a more precise expectation of 
the future performance. 
When voters’ belief are updated with the priors on the tax 
difference, μ ranges from -1.696 to 0.159, with a mean negative 
tax difference of -0.504. These figures indicates that in some 
Municipalities voters expect a bad performance (positive tax 
difference) and in other Municipalities they expect a good 
performance (non positive tax difference). 
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From these results we can also see that the contribution of past 
information to the updating process is stable at about 35% 
regardless the specification of the priors. These results for ρ is 
interpreted as if voters form their electoral beliefs taking into 
account both the current incumbents’ performance and the past 
performance. Meseguer (2009) argues that a low value of ρ 
indicates that the learning process has already occurred, while a 
high value tells that new information is still relevant for voters 
and in time they will complete the learning. We can comment 
that a learning process started in the analyzed sample, but we 
cannot say if this is the level of ρ that grants re-election. 
Consequently, to answer the question if a learning process took 
place or not we need to proceed in the analyses. 
 
5.2.2 Second step: comparison of posterior beliefs 
Table 5 reports the posterior beliefs conditional on the voting 
decision. 
The comparison of the updated beliefs on the tax levels does not 
support the learning hypotheses since the level of the posterior 
belief about the performance of the incumbent re-elected in 2004 
is always higher than those associated to the incumbent non re-
elected in 2004. 
The results regarding the variation of the updated beliefs 
disaggregated by the incumbent status indicate as expected that 
the re-elected incumbent is always associated with a smaller or 
equal variation than the non re-elected incumbent. An 
explanation for these results is that voters behave as risk adverse 
agents and prefer fiscal stability than the lowest tax rates. 
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Table 5. Posterior beliefs conditional on voting decision 
re-elected incumbent in 2004 not re-elected incumbent in 2004 
Variable priors Obs Mean Variable priors Obs Mean 
Updated  
average, μ UPTD 194 -0.50 
Updated  
average, μ UPTD 33 -0.53 
Updated  
variance, s   194 0.49 
Updated  
variance, s   33 0.55 
Updated  
average, μ UP1 194 4.79 
Updated  
average, μ UP1 33 4.71 
Updated  
variance, s   194 0.89 
Updated  
variance, s   33 0.89 
Updated  
average, μ UP2 189 4.78 
Updated  
average, μ UP2 33 4.71 
Updated  
variance, s   189 0.33 
Updated  
variance, s   33 0.35 
 
At this stage of the analyses it is interesting to perform a 
comparison based on the history of voting decision. If a learning 
process occurred we expect that the average updated beliefs in 
the jurisdictions switching from re-election in 1995 to not re-
election in 2004 (coded as ´RNR´) should be higher than the 
updated beliefs in the jurisdictions that re-elected the incumbent 
in 2004 (coded as ´NRR´). The summary statistics in Table 6 
support this hypothesis only when the updating process exploits 
the set of priors UP2, (column 8). This figure suggests that a 
learning process have occurred if voters updated their beliefs 
based on the tax rate performance benchmarked with the 
neighborhood. 
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Table 6. Comparison of posterior beliefs with respect to the history of 
voting decisions 
            RNR>NRR 
Variable priors RR NRR NRNR RNR Column 8 
Updated 
average, μ3 UP1 4.792 4.775 4.507 4.769 FALSE 
Updated 
variance, s3   0.895 0.893 1.324 0.748 FALSE 
Updated 
average, μ3 UP2 4.785 4.763 4.506 4.769 TRUE 
Updated 
variance, s3   0.326 0.337 0.634 0.253 FALSE 
Updated  
average, μ3 UPTD -0.493 -0.521 -0.560 -0.525 FALSE 
Updated  
variance, s3   0.467 0.559 0.796 0.473 FALSE 
Observations   150 44 8 25   
Notes: Rr=re-elected in both 1995 and in 2004; Nrr=not re-elected in 1995 and re-
elected in 2004; Rnr=re-elected in 1995 and not re-elected in 2004; Nrnr = not re-
elected in both 1995 and in 2004. 227 total observations. 
 
5.2.3 Third step: regression estimation 
This Section estimates the effect of the voters’ beliefs updated 
according to the incremental learning process on the re-election 
probability of the incumbent33. 
                                                 
33
 The regression estimation of this Section differs from the one of Meseguer 
(2009). Meseguer, in fact, estimates a learning process from the past experience 
of the neighbors, while here we estimate the learning from past own 
experience. Learning from the past experience of the neighbors does not match 
the predictions of the incremental learning from tax rates proposed in this 
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The function estimated is: 
[21] 1 2 3t t t t tj s Xβ µ β β ξ= + + +  
where j=(0,1) is the re-election dummy, μ is the dynamically 
updated beliefs on the average, s is the dynamically updated 
belief on the variance, X is a vector of covariates and ξ is the 
disturbances term. 
The empirical predictions are that β1 and β2 should be 
significantly negative because both a high average and a high 
volatility of the fiscal performance reduce the voters’ utility. A 
large mean of the tax difference is associated with an incumbent 
extracting rent, while a large volatility of the tax difference is 
associated with an ambiguous fiscal outcome. If voters are risk 
averse and they prefer certainty of policy outcomes rather than 
uncertainty, also β2 is expected to be negative. 
When the incremental learning process does not take place, 
updated beliefs on the tax difference do not have a negligible 
influence on the decision to re-elect the incumbent. If this occurs, 
the coefficients in Equation 21 will be not statistically significant. 
Table 7 presents the marginal effects estimated from a probit 
model without covariates (Model 1-3) and with covariates 
(Model 4-9). 
The explanatory variables included consider those factors that 
may explain the variation in the dependent variable. The 
political affiliation of the government (right wing dummy) 
controls for the ideological bias of the voters, while the 
unemployment rate lagged one period (unemp lag) controls for 
the state of the economy (Paldam and Nannestad, 1994). Finally, 
the lagged popularity of the incumbent (popularity lag), measured 
                                                                                                           
Chapter; moreover the structure of the available dataset does not allow to 
conduct that type of analyses. 
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as the share of votes obtained during the previous election, 
controls for an eventual persistent shock or the presence of an 
autoregressive process in the popularity of the elected mayors. 
The variables of interest are the updated belief on the average 
(μ)and the variability (s) of the fiscal performance of the 
incumbent. The set of priors UP1, UP2 and UPTD have been 
alternatively used to investigate the fit of each updating process. 
The fit of the model is very limited, and the coefficients do not 
show a high degree of significance. The coefficients on the 
variables of interest are significant only when using the priors 
UP1, but the signs are unexpectedly positive. In all the other 
specifications, the coefficients are non significant and updated 
variability is negative only in Models 2 and 3. These results 
indicate that a incremental learning process did not occur in the 
dataset analyzed, suggesting a pattern opposite to the one 
predicted by the model. 
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Table 7. Dynamic learning from tax rates, probit regression, marginal effects 
 Model 1 p Model 2 p Model 3 p Model 4 p Model 5 p Model 6 p 
 UP1  UP2  UPTD  UP1  UP2  UPTD  
μ UP1 0.364 **     0.379 ***     
s UP1 0.162 **     0.180 ***     
μ UP2   0.041      0.029    
s UP2   -0.006      0.009    
μ UPTD     0.028      0.035  
s UPTD     -0.001      0.006  
Right wing       -0.052  -0.062  -0.065  
Unempl lag       -0.398  -0.180  -0.135  
Popularity lag       0.075  0.081  0.065  
 Note: dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if incumbent re-elected in 2004 and zero otherwise.
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6. Concluding remarks 
The political economics literature recognized that the re-election 
mechanism is an imperfect device to select good politicians when 
the candidate incumbent exploits information advantages and 
behaves strategically. This chapter investigated the persistency 
of asymmetric information in the Yardstick Competition model 
when information spillovers accumulate over time. 
The model presented suggests that the less competent incumbent 
cannot successfully mimic the most competent incumbent when 
mimicking occurred in the past and voters accumulate 
information over time. 
The predictions of the model are tested empirically on a dataset 
of Italian Municipalities, estimating the effect of the dynamically 
updated beliefs on the probability of re-election of the 
incumbent. The results reject the presence of a voters’ learning 
process in the data because the regression coefficient associated 
to the variable of interest are positive when significant. 
These results may be explained with stringency of the set of 
conditions necessary for an incremental learning to occur, as the 
exogenous conditions on the cost shock realization that may 
have not occurred in the real world. Another limitation of the 
dataset is the length of the legislature, 5 years, that may 
incentivize the dispersion of information from one election to the 
next one. 
This paper represented the first attempt at analyzing the 
consequences of Yardstick Competition on political selection in 
time, therefore its nature and the unsatisfactory empirical results 
call for future research. In particular, it should be useful to 
investigate the effect of different stock of information on 
learning, as the whole term fiscal performance of the candidate 
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incumbent or exploit alternative datasets characterized by 
shorter legislatures. 
Chapter 5. 
Asymmetric information and Political Budget Cycles: the 
effect of the local diffusion of newspapers 
 
1. Introduction 
The economic literature on the Political Budget Cycles associates 
this phenomenon to unobservable policy making decisional 
processes. The state of the art is summed up with the expression 
‘the cycle is where you can’t see it’ (Alt and Lassen, 2006). The 
questions that the present work poses is: does an increased 
diffusion of newspapers reveals the cycle by providing 
information about the fiscal decisional process? Is specific press 
more informative than generalized press? Which items of 
expenditure are more influenced by the diffusion of 
newspapers? 
The relevance of these questions is based on the role of the 
diffusion of information in the generation of electoral cycles. In 
the baseline model of Political Budget Cycles (Rogoff, 1990) the 
incumbent has an informational advantage over voters regarding 
his competence level and the true cost of public provision. Voters 
infer the incumbents’ unobservable competence level by 
observing his fiscal decisions, and based on this information they 
choose whether to re-elect him or not. The fiscal manipulation 
before the election is a signaling device; Aidt el al. (2011) proved 
the existence of a separating equilibrium in which only the good 
incumbent has the opportunity to increase his probability of 
being re-elected by generating a cycle. 
Information is a crucial element in the model because it produces 
the incentive to generate a cycle but it also determines the 
effectiveness of the signal by either increasing the visibility of the 
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fiscal decision or clarifying the process leading to the decision or 
both. In the literature more information leads to more aware 
voters. Political economists found that awareness is positively 
affected by the degree of democracy (Gonzales, 2002), by the 
transparency of fiscal rules (Alt and Lassen, 2006), and finally by 
the diffusion of the mass media (Snyder and Stromberg, 2008). In 
particular, jurisdictions with a larger share of informed voters 
are associated to smaller cycles (Shi and Svensson, 2006). 
According to the theoretical model of Shi and Svensson (2006), it 
is the information on the fiscal decision that determines the 
awareness of voters and the size of the cycle. Most of the mass 
media, however, treat several other issues and contribute to give 
a multidimensional signal. If the theory predicts a clear negative 
relation between the diffusion of fiscal information and the cycle, 
the effect of the diffusion of generic information remains 
ambiguous. 
This work focuses on this issue and analyzes the impact of the 
diffusion of newspaper per capita on the electoral expenditure 
cycle, separating the effect of economic and generic newspapers. 
The dataset used is a panel of Italian Regions during the period 
1984-2009. The fiscal and institutional environment of the Italian 
Regions, in fact, makes the observations suitable for a test of the 
electoral expenditure cycle. The expenditure decisions have 
always been decentralized, and Regions have the competence 
over relevant items of expenditure as health and investments. 
During the 90s the institutional reforms reduces the amount of 
transfers received from the Central Government and introduced 
tax autonomy of the Regions limited to the value added tax and 
the personal income tax surcharge. The electoral system, at the 
same time, moved from a full proportional system with the 
President of the Region elected by the Council to a mixed system 
(1/5 majoritarian) with the President of the Region directly 
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elected by the citizens. This simultaneous variation in the 
institutional and electoral characteristics of the Regions allow to 
observe the possible variation of the expenditure cycles as a 
consequence of a the introduction of a strong accountability 
system. 
Beside these characteristics, the availability of an original dataset 
on the local diffusion of newspapers (Sobbrio, 2011) allows to 
control for the voters’ awareness of the policy decisions. 
The local diffusion of newspapers has never been used in the 
empirical literature on Political Budget Cycles before. We 
included this variable as a proxy for voters’ awareness because 
the higher is the amount of per capita newspapers the higher is 
the probability that voters gather information about the policy 
decisions. According to the theory, an increase of the diffusion of 
newspapers during the electoral year constrains the magnitude 
of the cycle. 
In the empirical analyses of this chapter the newspapers have 
been distinguished between economic newspapers, focusing on 
economic issues only, and generic newspapers covering also 
news stories and current affairs. The electoral cycle is expected to 
be more reactive to a variation of the diffusion of economic 
newspapers because they provide voters with specialized 
comments and insights increasing their awareness. On the 
contrary, non economic newspapers provide surface information 
on a variety of issues and they influence the voting decision 
through information on the private life of the candidates, 
political scandals and ideological debates, news stories referred 
to public expenditure outcomes (as an example health services or 
public transportation). 
The empirical analyses verifies the presence of a ‘Rogoff cycle’ 
(Rogoff, 1990) during the period 1984-2008 by detecting electoral 
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expenditure cycles in total expenditure of about 7.5%. The same 
pattern is found in the capital expenditure but not in current 
expenditure. In particular, the pre-electoral year is associated to 
an increase of capital expenditure of around 19%. The replication 
of the analyses on time subsamples of the dataset reveals that 
these results are driven by the presence of expenditure cycles 
during the first half of the period; the cycle of expenditure size 
disappears after 1995, when the electoral and fiscal reforms have 
been implemented. 
The estimated effect of the diffusion of newspapers has been 
tested on both the full time period and on the two sub-samples 
before 1995 and after 1995. The results on the full dataset indicate 
that the local diffusion of newspapers has the expected negative 
effect on the electoral capital expenditure and a positive average 
effect on current expenditure. This results is consistent with the 
fact that capital expenditure shows a cycling pattern and 
incumbents are concerned about their popularity when voters 
become more informed during the pre-electoral year, thus they 
reduce the fiscal manipulation. Generic newspapers, moreover, 
show a larger coefficient; this result is in line with the existing 
literature stressing the role of newly informed voters (Prat and 
Stromberg, 2006). The positive average effect on current 
expenditure is motivated with the visibility that newspapers give 
to public expenditure and the willingness of the incumbent to be 
associated with a large public expenditure (proxy for large 
public provision) during the whole legislature. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews 
the literature on Political Budget Cycles and the role of voters’ 
awareness. Section 3 introduces the empirical analyses by 
describing the institutional and political characteristics of the 
dataset and the econometric specification applied. Section 4 
presents the results of the analyses and Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Related literature 
There is a general agreement that electoral concerns of the 
incumbent government generate manipulations of fiscal policy in 
presence of asymmetric information. The effect of the electoral 
cycles on political selection is a more debated aspect. If the 
mimicking behavior of incumbents in the Yardstick Competition 
model preserves the possibility of a pooling equilibrium to arise 
(Besley and Case, 1995), the modern theory of Political Budget 
Cycles predicts a separating equilibrium only (Rogoff, 1990). The 
electoral budget cycle, thus, represents a socially efficient signal 
of competence to the voters (Aidt et al., 2009) as it removes 
asymmetric information. 
The existence of budget cycles has been confirmed by the 
empirical literature, finding stronger increases of electoral public 
expenditure in less developed countries (Shi and Svennson, 2003; 
Brander and Drazen, 2005). The scholars motivated this evidence 
with the different level of sophistication of the voters: large 
public deficit in developed countries reduce the re-election 
probability of the incumbent, decreasing the incentive to 
generate a cycle. The fiscal manipulation may occur also when 
the budget is balanced and the resources are redistributed 
among different expenditure items. This type of distortion 
signals the incumbents’ preference towards the spending 
composition preferred by the groups of voters that increase his 
probability of re-election (Drazen and Eslava, 2005). 
Similar results have been obtained in within-country analyses, 
detecting Political Budget Cycles in Turkey, (Krueger and Turan, 
2993), Western Germany (Rossi and Galli, 2002), Mexico 
(Gonzalez, 2002), Sweden (Petterson-Lidbom, 2003), Portugal 
(Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Aidt et al., 2011) and other countries. The 
only exceptions are represented by Israel (Rosenberg, 2002) and 
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Colombia, where the cycles affect the composition of the 
expenditure (‘pork barrel cycles’, Drazen and Eslava, 2010). 
The accountability mechanism between voters and politicians is 
a prerequisite for the cycle, since the political responsibility of 
the fiscal decision must be clear and citizens must express their 
opinion through the vote. Gonzales (2002) analyzed the impact 
of a change in the level of democracy in Mexico during the 
period 1957-1997, finding the emerging of electoral cycles in 
more democratic periods. 
The electoral rule shapes the accountability mechanism 
determining the type of spending that is most favorable before 
elections. A proportional system is usually associated to a larger 
redistribution and a larger share of ‘universal’ expenditure as 
welfare expenditure; in a majoritarian system, on the contrary, 
the candidates compete in a smaller district by targeting 
spending redistribution programs on the local interests of a 
smaller group (Persson and Tabellini, 1999). Santolini (2011) 
finds that a marginal increase of the dis-proportionality of the 
electoral rule is associated to a larger heterogeneity of 
expenditure in the Italian Regions, being expenditure skewed 
towards current spending. Her results suggest the emerging of a 
composition cycle, but she does not investigate the presence of 
cycles in the size of the expenditure. 
Another determinant of the cycle is voters’ information. Cycles 
are signals, therefore they are more prominent where 
incumbents are more able to hide fiscal policy from the public. 
Empirical results confirmed this hypotheses detecting the 
presence of smaller electoral cycles in countries with more 
transparent fiscal rules and larger party polarization (Alt and 
Lassen, 2006). 
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In recent years the scholars turned their attention to the role 
played by the mass media. The mass media have a twofold 
effect: they reduce the voters’ cost of gathering information and 
they increase the visibility of policy decisions and of the 
outcomes of public provision of goods and services. When mass 
media provide news about a politician, his public behavior is 
easily observed. The causal link of popularity suggests that the 
politics covering of media affects public spending. Snyder and 
Stromberg (2008) test this hypotheses on a dataset of US districts, 
finding lower federal spending in areas where there is less press 
coverage of the local members of the Congress. Besley and 
Burgess (2002) verify a larger responsiveness in India for public 
food production and calamity relief expenditure associated to a 
larger diffusion of local newspapers. 
Of course, the informational content of the mass media is not 
always free and unbiased. When freedom of press is granted the 
government has not any influence on the press release as 
censorship right or propaganda campaigning. The mass media 
act as a sounding-board for any kind of news, affecting the 
decisions of both voters and incumbents. Akhmedov and 
Zhuravskaya (2004) analyzed the relationship between the 
development of freedom of press and Political Budget Cycles in 
Russia finding results consistent with the theory. Following this 
line of research, Shi and Svensson (2006) introduced the concept 
of media access, measured by radio ownership multiplied by 
freedom of broadcasting. They find that a greater share of 
informed voters leads to smaller Political Budget Cycles in a 
large cross-country dataset during the period 1975–1995. 
When the mass media is biased, that is news are filtered through 
some partisan point of view, the pandering incentives of the 
incumbent are affected. If the bias is towards the government, 
the pandering incentives are reduced, while if the bias is against 
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the government, the incumbent needs to manipulate fiscal policy 
to increase his electoral popularity. Ashwort and Shotts (2010) 
study the effect of the media on the incumbents’ pandering 
incentives proving that, surprisingly, even an unbiased media 
can aggravate pandering incentives when the challenger is 
strong. The content of the media, moreover, is relevant since 
news providers are differentiated with respect to the 
informational content that they entail. Some media are associated 
to news directly connected to the theoretical model of Political 
Budget Cycles as fiscal indicators, while others are not. As an 
example, Prat and Stromberg (2006) test the detrimental effect of 
the introduction of commercial television in Sweden on voters’ 
political knowledge. They base their hypotheses on the idea that 
‘viewers receive more political information from public service 
broadcasters than from their commercial counterparts’ (Prat and 
Stromberg (2006), page 2). Their results do not confirm the 
predictions, showing that commercial television surprisingly 
increased voters’ knowledge by providing information to ex ante 
uninformed voters. 
 
3. The empirical analyses: methodology and data 
3.1 Italian Regions: expenditure, elections and the diffusion of 
newspapers 
In Italy there are three tiers of sub-national government: Regions, 
Provinces and Municipalities. The Italian Constitution provides 
each Region with statute autonomy (art.123), legislative and 
ruling autonomy (art. 117), administrative autonomy (art. 118) 
and financial autonomy (art. 119). 
The dataset chosen for this work includes the 15 Ordinary 
Statute Regions during the period 1984-2008. The exclusion of 
the five Special Statute Regions is motivated by the 
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heterogeneous institutional and electoral setting of those 
Regions. The time period selected is the longest time series 
available for the observations. 
From the perspective of the present analyses the Italian Regions 
represent an interesting environment for studying electoral 
cycles. When the Regions were established in 1978, expenditure 
was mainly financed through intergovernmental grants and the 
electoral rule was fully proportional. The reforms of the 90s 
aimed at introducing financial autonomy and changed the 
electoral rule to a mixed system and introduced the direct 
election of the Governor, strengthening the link of accountability 
between voters and politicians. The presence of soft budget 
constraint (Bordignon, 2000), moreover, provided incentives to 
distort expenditure without incurring the risk of being punished 
for generating large budget deficit. 
The financial autonomy of the Regions has been implemented in 
the 90s through a reduction of intergovernmental transfers and 
the simultaneous introduction of equalization funds. Own tax 
revenue is limited to the definition of the production tax rate 
(IRAP) introduced in 1997 and the regional PIT surcharge, 
accounting respectively for 55% and 29% of total Regional 
revenues in 200834. Expenditure autonomy is stronger since it 
includes health expenditure (79% of the total health expenditure) 
and investment expenditure, accounting for 40% of Italian 
investment expenditure35. 
Total expenditure is made of a 66% of current expenditure 
(personnel, transfers to Municipalities and local health units), a 
7.1% of capital expenditure, a 4.2% of loans and borrowings and 
a 22% of ‘partite di giro’(third-party payments). Since third-party 
                                                 
34 Source: ISTAT, Bilanci delle Regioni e delle Province Autonome 
35 Source: ISTAT, Bilanci delle Regioni e delle Province Autonome 
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payments are not visible, the analyses will focus on current and 
capital expenditure36. 
The Regions hold exogenous elections every 5 years to elect the 
Regional Council and the Governor. Before 1995 the Council was 
elected with a proportional rule and the President of the Region 
was elected by the Councilors. After 1995 the electoral rule 
turned to a mixed system (1/5 majoritarian) and it has been 
introduced the direct election of the Governor. 
The incentive given by the reform promoting accountability on 
the emerging of an expenditure cycle of size is thus contrasted by 
the mixed electoral rule that gives incentives to generate a cycle 
in the composition rather than in the size of expenditure. The 
evolution of the variation of expenditure depicted in Graph 1 
seems to support this hypotheses. The vertical lines indicate the 
years before an election. The figure shows evident cycles of 
expenditure until 1994 and an unclear pattern after that year. The 
dynamics that this picture suggests, however, must be controlled 
for the determinants of the expenditure and voters’ awareness. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 It is assumed that there is not any pattern of Yardstick Competition among 
the Regions. This assumption cannot be tested given the smallness of the 
dataset, but it is supported by reasonable motivations. First, the economy of the 
Regions is not much integrated because, beyond national shocks, each Region 
has an economic system and a different specialization (manufacturing, public 
services, tourism and so on). Secondly, Regions represent large geographical 
areas and the informational spillovers among Regions are not strong enough to 
stimulate interregional performance comparison. 
 152 
Graph 1. Average expenditure variation in the dataset 
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With respect to the proxy for voters’ awareness used in this 
work, the diffusion of information in Italy is mainly channeled 
through the television news, but survey evidence indicates a 
stronger reliability of the voters on newspapers journalists rather 
than tv journalists37. 
Italian newspapers can be divided into national and local 
newspapers depending on their geographical diffusion. A more 
interesting distinction is between economic and non economic 
newspapers. Most of the newspaper are generic news providers, 
publishing a variety of issues as the private life of the candidates, 
political scandals and ideological debates, news stories referred 
to public expenditure outcomes (as an example health services or 
public transportation). Economic newspapers, on the contrary, 
provide voters with specialized comments and insights that 
directly increase their awareness of the fiscal decision. There is 
one newspaper in Italy, Il Sole - 24 Ore, that is commonly 
classified as economic newspaper. Its editor is the General 
Confederation of Italian Industry (Confindustria), and it is the 
reference point for readers that wish to deepen their knowledge 
on national economic and fiscal issues. Furthermore, it is 
considered a reliable updating tool for practitioners, 
entrepreneur, bureaucrats and financial investors. Regional 
expenditure, as already said, is a relevant issue at the national 
level, therefore voters can find on Il Sole - 24 Ore also detailed 
news on Regional public policies38. 
The empirical analyses uses a dataset on the diffusion of 
newspaper (Sobbrio, 2011) assembled from official data released 
                                                 
37 ACI-CENSIS, 9° Rapporto sulla Comunicazione in Italia, 2011 
38 There is another economic newspaper, ItaliaOggi, that provides even more 
detailed information. Its diffusion, however, is extremely limited and  the 
available time series starts from 1987. For this reason it has been excluded from 
the present analyses. 
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by ADS (Accertamenti Diffusione Stampa). ADS includes the main 
agencies collecting data on the diffusion of newspapers (Utenti 
Pubblicità Associati, Federazione Italiana Editori Giornali, Federazione 
Professionale della Pubblicità, Federazione Italiana Pubblicità). It is a 
source of proved reliability, and it is the only agency providing 
the regional and provincial disaggregation of the data. 
The ADS regulation defines ‘diffusion’ as the number of copies 
of a newspaper diffused in Italy and abroad including sales, 
subscriptions, wholesales and free copies. The definition is quite 
broad, but there is a lack of data on sales and subscriptions only 
that makes this variable the best available proxy. 
The following graphs describe the dynamics of the average 
yearly newspaper diffusion per capita in the fifteen Regions 
analyzed. The list of the newspapers included in the dataset is 
reported in Appendix A.1. 
As Graph 2 shows, the diffusion of economic newspapers is 
much lower than the diffusion of generic newspapers. This 
evidence is motivated with the fact that only one newspaper is 
classified as economic newspaper in the dataset, and that the 
larger specificity of the news requires a larger informational 
background of the readers. The average diffusion of newspapers 
increases in the 80s and remains quite stable during the 
following years. 
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Graph 2. Yearly diffusion of newspapers in the dataset 
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Graph 3 focuses on economic and generic newspapers. Given the 
high variability of the data, the diffusion has been measured 
separately for generic newspapers (on the left y axes) and for 
economic newspapers (on the right y axes). The dynamics of the 
diffusion of economic newspapers, clearer on this graph, shows a 
quasi monotonic increase until 2002, followed by a slow 
decrease. A hypotheses explaining this patters is the gradual 
substitution of the press with other sources of news (internet, for 
example), the so called ‘press divide’. This phenomenon 
represents a gradual substitution of newspapers with non-press 
sources of information. Survey evidence detected this 
phenomenon in Italy starting from the year 2009 (source: UCI-
CENSIS, 8° Rapporto sulla Comunicazione in Italia, 2010). For the 
purpose of the present analyses the press divide reduces the role 
of the diffusion of newspapers as a proxy for voters’ awareness, 
but given that the dataset analyzed ends in the first year in 
which the phenomenon has been detected it is not considered a 
problem affecting the estimates. 
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Graph 3. Average diffusion of newspapers in the dataset 
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The diffusion of the newspapers is not homogeneous among the 
Regions analyzed. Graph 4 depicts the Regional per capita 
average diffusion of newspapers, indicating a clear pattern being 
the highest values associated to the Northern Regions (Liguria, 
Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Lombardia, Veneto and Piemonte) 
and Lazio, the Region where the country capital, centre of 
political and institutional networks, is located. On the contrary, 
the lowest levels are associated to the Southern Regions 
(Abruzzo, Calabria, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata and Molise). 
 
Graph 4. Per capita average diffusion of newspapers in the dataset 
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3.2 Empirical specification and data 
The empirical analyses follows two steps. First, the presence of 
expenditure cycles in the dataset is tested, estimating a dynamic 
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expenditure equation. Then, the effect of information is 
controlled augmenting the empirical specification with the 
variables measuring the diffusion of newspapers. 
The baseline expenditure equation is: 
[1] 
 
The dependent variable Exp measures expenditure per capita in 
thousands of euros, where the index s indicates the type of 
spending (total, current, capital). 
The vector X includes explanatory variables representing 
demographic, socio-economic, political and institutional 
variables determining the expenditure level. 
The demographic variables capture the effect of variations of the 
demand of public services. The density of population (density) is 
a proxy of the demand of public goods and services in a Region. 
The more densely populated is a Region, the higher its internal 
demand. Given that Regional expenditure is highly influenced 
by welfare expenditure as health and education, the dependency 
ratio (depratio) measures the demand from the share of young 
and old population. These two variables are expected to show a 
positive sign, but in case of the achievement of economies of 
scale an increase in the demand decreases the expenditure and 
the coefficient associated to these variables show the negative 
sign. 
One fiscal variable, the received transfers per capita in thousands 
of euros (grants), has been included to control for the amount 
and the nature of available resources of the local government. 
Intergovernmental transfers are one of the main sources of 
Regional resources, although its share has decreased due to the 
reform provisions in the 90s, aiming at increasing the efficiency 
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s s
it it it it it it
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Exp Exp X preelec elec postelec
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β β β β β β
−
= + + + + +
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of the expenditure. Nonetheless, the central government still 
transfers resources to the Regions for equalization purposes. This 
variable has been included with a one period lag to avoid 
simultaneity with the dependent variable. An increase in the 
amount of the received per capita transfers from the central 
government changes the rate of substitution between 
autonomous and non autonomous resources and may generate 
the so called ‘flypaper effect’ (Hines and Thaler, 1995). Although 
previous studies verified an increase of health expenditure 
following a marginal increase in the amount of transfers received 
in the Italian Regions (Levaggi and Zanola, 2003) during a 
shorter time period (1989-1993), there is no prior on the sign of 
this variable. 
The political variables control for the partisanship effect of the 
government on the expenditure (left), and the effect of the 
fragmentation of the Regional Council (frag). A larger 
fragmentation, measured with the Herfindhal index, is 
associated to larger intra-group redistribution and larger 
expenditure. 
An institutional dummy (maj) has been included, , equal to one 
for the years after 1995, when the electoral reform has been 
implemented. The effect of the introduction of the majority rule, 
usually associated to targeted redistribution rather than welfare 
redistribution (Persson and Tabellini, 1999), leads to the 
prediction of a negative sign associated to this coefficient. 
The dummies preelec, elec and postel are the variables of interest 
in Equation 1 as they detect the dynamics of the electoral cycle. 
In particular, elec is equal to one in the year in which the cycle is 
expected to be generated. Given that the Regional budget is 
approved by the end of each fiscal year (December) and the 
exogenous date of election in the dataset is between May and 
June, a cycle is expected to occur during the year previous to the 
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election (as an example, if an election has been held in 2000, the 
cycle is expected in 1999). The theory predicts a negative sign 
associated to the elec dummy. The dummies preelec and postel, on 
the other hand, are equal to one during the year anticipating and 
the year following the cycle (following the example above, preelec 
equal to one in 1998, postel equal to one in 2000). Their 
coefficients, therefore, are expected to be non significant or 
negative. 
Finally, f are region-fixed effects capturing time constant 
characteristics of the observations and u is an error term. 
The second step of the empirical analyses includes the 
newspapers’ diffusion variable in the specification, estimating 
the equation: 
[2]  
 
The variable news is the variables of interest in Equation 2, as it 
measures the Regional per capita diffusion of newspapers. This 
variable is introduced both non interacted and interacted with 
the electoral dummy to estimate its average effect in the dataset 
and its electoral effect compared to the non electoral effect. The 
index j indicates the type of press considered among economic 
(Eco_n), generic (Gen_n) and all the newspapers (News). The 
coefficients of the interacted term are the most relevant, and the 
theory predicts that an increase in the share of informed voters is 
associated to smaller cycles (Shi and Svennson, 2006). If the 
specificity of the information affects the size of the cycle, 
economic newspapers are expected to be associated to a larger 
effect than generic newspapers, and a larger absolute value of its 
coefficient is predicted. If the opposite situation is observed, and 
the larger effect is associated to generic newspapers, the 
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uttermost relevance of newly informed voters suggested by the 
literature (Prat and Stromberg, 2008) is confirmed. 
The coefficient of the non interacted variable, however, has no 
prior. If the coefficient is negative the predicted average 
constraining effect is observed also during non electoral years. If 
the coefficient is positive, on the contrary, an average visibility 
effect is detected. Also this result is consistent with the theory 
because the non interacted term includes years during which 
voters are not called to express their preference for the 
incumbent. Therefore, the incumbent might aim at building a 
‘good reputation’ by increasing the visibility of public 
expenditure. Finally, if the coefficient associated to the non 
interacted term is not significant, the diffusion of the newspapers 
does not show any impact on the expenditure level during the 
whole period, consistent with the fact that the incumbent does 
not consider the degree of voters’ information when he does not 
face re-election concerns. 
Table 1 reports the variables in the dataset, their name, their 
description and the expected signs of the coefficients. Tables A.2 
and A.3 in the Appendix contains the data sources and the 
descriptive statistics. 
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Table 1. The description of the dataset 
 Name Description Calculation Sign 
Dependent  Texp Total expenditure per capita Total expenditure/population  
Variables Cexp Current expenditure per capita Current expenditure/population  
  Kexp Capital expenditure per capita Capital expenditure/population  
Independent  Texp lag Lag of total expenditure per capita Total expenditure(t-1)/population(t-1) + 
Variables Cexp lag Lag of current expenditure per capita Current expenditure(t-
1)/population(t-1) 
+ 
 Kexp lag Lag of capital expenditure per capita Capital expenditure(t-
1)/population(t-1) 
+ 
 Density Density of population Population/surface area in hm2 +/- 
 Depratio Dependency ratio (Population 0-15years + population 
over 65years)/population 16-64years 
+/- 
 Grpc Lag of per capita grants received Grants received(t-1)/population(t-1) + 
 Preel Pre-electoral year 1 if elec(t+1) =1 + 
 Elec Electoral year 1 if a cycle is expected - 
 Postel Post-electoral year 1 if elec(t-1) =1 + 
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Table 1. The description of the dataset (continued) 
  Termcount Legislature counter Values 1to 5 from the year in which 
the election has been held to the pre-
electoral year 
- 
 Left Left dummy 1 if the government is left-winged, 0 
otherwise 
+ 
 Maj Majority dummy 1 after the electoral reform in 1995, 0 
otherwise 
- 
 Frag Fragmentation index Herfindhal index calculated on the 
seats of the Regional Council 
+ 
 News Diffusion of newspaper pc Diffusion of newspaper/population +/- 
 News*elec Diffusion of newspaper pc*elec  - 
 Eco_n Diffusion of economic press pc Diffusion of IlSole24Ore/population +/- 
 Eco_n*elec Diffusion of economic press pc*elec  - 
 Gen_n Diffusion of generic press pc Diffusion of non economic 
newspaper/population 
+/- 
 Gen_elec Diffusion of generic press 
pc*elec 
 - 
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4. Results 
4.1. The expenditure cycle and the effect of the local diffusion of 
newspapers 
This Section presents the results from the estimation of Equation 
1 and Equation 2 on the full dataset. Section 4.2 will replicate the 
analyses separately for the sample 1984-1995 and the sample 
1996-2008. 
Public expenditure is characterized by persistence in time, 
therefore the expenditure equation must be estimated through a 
dynamic model controlling for the endogeneity caused by the 
lagged dependent variable. A popular econometric method to 
account for this type of endogeneity is the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) GMM estimator for dynamic panel data in which the 
dependent variables in differences are instrumented with the 
variables in levels. In particular, the System GMM estimator 
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998), introducing also an 
equation in levels instrumented with the differences, increases 
the efficiency of the estimator. The application of these 
econometric model to small samples is problematic as the 
number of instruments over-fits the endogenous variables and it 
generates the so called ‘instrument proliferation’ (Roodman, 
2008). This problem is usually signaled by a p-value of the 
Hansen test close to 1 (as an example, the GMM estimates of Shi 
and Svennson (2006) are affected by the small sample bias). The 
main implication of ‘instrument proliferation’ is the risk of 
generating false positive results, that is observing significant 
coefficients that are not truly significant. 
In the case of small samples where GMM cannot be applied 
efficiently the Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected 
(LSDVC) has been proposed. This estimator is based on the 
LSDVC estimator of Kiviet (1995 and 1999), further developed by 
 166 
Judson and Owen (1999), Bun and Kiviet (2001 and 2003) and 
extended by Bruno (2005) to unbalanced panels. 
The LSDVC estimator is obtained by wiping out the small 
sample bias from a LSDV estimator computed on the original 
model. Bruno (2005) specifies three bias corrections, 
corresponding to increasing levels of precision. The bias 
correction depends on an unknown parameter whose estimate is 
obtained selecting an initial procedure among the Anderson-
Hsiao, the Arellano-Bond and the Blundell-Bond estimator. In 
particular, the Anderson-Hsiao estimator instruments the 
original model in first differences with the first two lags of the 
dependent variable; the Arellano-Bond and the Blundell-Bond 
estimators apply to the original model respectively the 
Difference GMM and the System GMM with no intercept. 
Finally, the standard errors take into account the small size of the 
sample and they are estimated with a bootstrap procedure, 
whose number of repetitions is selected by the researcher. 
Table 2.1 presents the results from the estimation of Equation 1 
using total expenditure as dependent variable39. 
                                                 
39
 The LSDVC estimator used for the empirical analyses of this Chapter is 
implemented in Stata with the command xtlsdvc (Bruno, 2005). 
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Table 2.1 Total expenditure LSDVC estimation – baseline specification  
Dep. Var. :ln total expenditure pc Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
Lntxppclag 0.644 *** 0.669 *** 0.650 *** 0.644 *** 0.669 *** 0.650 *** 
Lndensity -0.146  -0.199  0.015  -0.146  -0.199  0.015  
Lndepratio 1.726 *** 1.840 *** 1.775 *** 1.726 *** 1.840 *** 1.775 *** 
Lntgrpclag 0.029 *** 0.027 *** 0.030 *** 0.029 *** 0.027 *** 0.030 *** 
Preel 0.035  0.032  0.037  0.035  0.032  0.037  
Elec 0.075 ** 0.074 * 0.075  0.075 ** 0.074 * 0.075  
Elecy -0.021  -0.022  -0.015  -0.021  -0.022  -0.015  
Left 0.022  0.022  0.028  0.022  0.022  0.028  
Maj -0.128 ** -0.144 ** -0.118  -0.128 ** -0.144 ** -0.118  
Frag 0.504 *** 0.482 ** 0.538   0.504 *** 0.482 *** 0.538   
Observations 375  375  375  375  375  375  
Initial estimator AB  BB  AH  AB  BB  AH  
Repetitions 50   50   50   100   100   100   
Note: Time period: 1984-2008. AB: Arellano and Bond; BB: Blundell and Bond; AH: Anderson and Hsiao. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001 
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The six models presented are all LSDVC estimations, but they 
differ among each other with respect to the initial estimator used 
and the number of bootstrap repetitions selected, as specified in 
the lowest rows of the Table. The bias has been corrected 
according to the third level of precision proposed by Bruno 
(2005), that is the most precise. 
The results show a positive and significant coefficient on the 
lagged expenditure, confirming persistency in the pattern of 
expenditure. The dependency ratio shows a positive sign 
indicating the lack of economies of scale in the provision of 
goods and services to the dependent population, and the 
coefficient associated to the transfers per capita reveal a flypaper 
effect of about 3%. The institutional dummy maj is negative, 
indicating a decrease of total expenditure after the electoral 
reform in 1995. These results are robust to the different 
specification of the models, while the coefficient associated to the 
political dummy and the electoral dummies are not that robust. 
The political variable frag is positive and significant indicating 
that more fragmented councils are associated, as expected, to 
Regions with a larger expenditure level. The coefficient 
associated to the elec variable, that represents the year in which a 
cycle is expected to be generated, is positive and signals a cycle 
of a magnitude of about 7.5%. This result, however, is not 
significant when the estimator is initialized with the Anderson-
Hsiao procedure, probably due to the insufficient number of lags 
of the instruments. The preel and postel variables are non 
significant as expected in all the models, verifying the absence of 
expenditure variation before and after an election. 
As the evidence of a cycle in the dimension of total public 
expenditure is not robust, an investigation of the cycle in the two 
main items of expenditure – current and capital expenditure – is 
presented in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.2 Current  expenditure LSDVC estimation – baseline specification  
Dep. Var. : 
ln current expenditure pc Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
Lncxppclag 0.532 *** 0.547 *** 0.543 *** 0.532 *** 0.547 *** 0.543 *** 
Lndensity 0.305  0.287  0.445  0.305  0.287  0.445  
Lndepratio 1.839 *** 1.941 *** 1.844 *** 1.839 *** 1.941 *** 1.844 *** 
Lntgrpclag 0.038 *** 0.038 *** 0.038 *** 0.038 *** 0.038 *** 0.038 *** 
Preel 0.048  0.046  0.048  0.048  0.046  0.048  
Elec 0.046  0.046  0.045  0.046  0.046  0.045  
Postel -0.009  -0.009  -0.005  -0.009  -0.009  -0.005  
Left -0.007  -0.010  0.001  -0.007  -0.010  0.001  
Maj -0.077  -0.089  -0.071  -0.077  -0.089  -0.071  
Frag 0.460 ** 0.448 ** 0.501 * 0.460 *** 0.448 ** 0.501 * 
Observations 375  375  375  375  375  375  
Initial estimator AB  BB  AH  AB  BB  AH  
Repetitions 50   50   50   100   100   100   
Note: Time period: 1984-2008. AB: Arellano and Bond; BB: Blundell and Bond; AH: Anderson and Hsiao. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 2.3 Capital expenditure LSDVC estimation – baseline specification  
Dep. Var. : 
ln capital expenditure pc Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
Lnkxppclag 0.670 *** 0.711 *** 0.665 *** 0.670 *** 0.711 *** 0.665 *** 
Lndensity -1.332  -1.352  -0.421  -1.332  -1.352  -0.421  
Lndepratio 2.202 *** 2.322 *** 2.308 *** 2.202 *** 2.322 *** 2.308 *** 
Lntgrpclag 0.014  0.009  0.012  0.014  0.009  0.012  
Preel 0.048  0.043  0.046  0.048  0.043  0.046  
Elec 0.200 *** 0.193 *** 0.189 ** 0.200 *** 0.193 ** 0.189 ** 
Postel -0.042  -0.047  -0.046  -0.042  -0.047  -0.046  
Left 0.104  0.103  0.107  0.104  0.103  0.107  
Maj -0.161  -0.168  -0.133  -0.161  -0.168  -0.133  
Frag 0.748 ** 0.687 * 0.721 * 0.748 ** 0.687 * 0.721 * 
Observations 375  375  375  375  375  375  
Initial estimator AB  BB  AH  AB  BB  AH  
Repetitions 50   50   50   100   100   100   
Note: Time period: 1984-2008. AB: Arellano and Bond; BB: Blundell and Bond; AH: Anderson and Hsiao. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001
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As the results show, the coefficients of the estimation of Equation 
1 on the two main items of expenditure are robust to all the six 
specifications proposed. 
The coefficients of the lagged dependent variable, the 
dependency ratio and the fragmentation index show their 
positive and significant effect on both current and capital 
expenditure. The flypaper effect has been detected only in 
current expenditure (3.8%), while the electoral cycle of 
expenditure is present only in capital expenditure. The 
magnitude of the cycle is about 19%, much larger than the one of 
the suspected cycle in total expenditure. This results, all in all, 
indicate the presence of a cycle à la Rogoff in the Italian Regions 
during the period 1995-2008, determined by the electoral 
manipulation of capital expenditure, the more visible spending 
item. 
To control the robustness of these results to voters’ awareness we 
introduce in the specification the variable measuring the local 
diffusion of newspapers and we estimate Equation 2 using total 
expenditure as the dependent variable. 
The new variables is introduced both alone and interacted with 
the elec dummy, to estimate both the average effects of the 
diffusion of newspapers and the effect during the electoral year 
compared to the effect during the non electoral years. 
Moreover, tree different variables are alternatively included to 
capture the effects of the local diffusion of all the newspapers 
(model ALL), of the economic newspapers (model ECO) and of 
the non economic newspapers (model GEN). 
As Models ALL1, ECO1 and GEN1 of Table 3.1 show, the 
interacted terms conflict with the electoral dummies. In fact, 
running the regressions without the interacted term we obtain a 
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pattern of cycling during the period 1984-2008 consistent with 
the results obtained so far40. To solve this problem, in models 
ALL2, ECO2 and GEN2 the dummies have been substituted with 
a counter of the legislature (termcount), taking value 5 during the 
year in which the cycle is expected to be generated. As we can 
see the coefficient associated to termcount is positive but never 
significant, as probably the conflict is not completely wiped. 
Finally, in models ALL3, ECO3 and GEN3 the electoral variables 
are omitted. However, the interacted term is included and we 
can estimate the effect of the local diffusion of newspapers on the 
average expenditure and the comparative electoral expenditure. 
 
                                                 
40
 These estimates are presented in Table A.4. Table A.5 and Table A.6 in the 
Appendix. 
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Table 3.1 Total expenditure LSDVC estimation: augmented model, 375 observations 
 ALL1  ECO1  GEN1  ALL2  ECO2  GEN2  ALL3  ECO3  GEN3  
Lntxppclag 0.650 *** 0.622 *** 0.655 *** 0.653 *** 0.628 *** 0.658 *** 0.662 *** 0.636 *** 0.668 *** 
Lndensity -0.131  0.016  -0.147  -0.107  -0.033  -0.122  -0.096  -0.020  -0.112  
Lndepratio 2.129 *** 2.142 *** 2.085 *** 2.154 *** 2.122 *** 2.109 *** 2.161 *** 2.129 *** 2.117 *** 
Lntgrpclag 0.025 *** 0.025 *** 0.026 *** 0.026 *** 0.025 *** 0.026 *** 0.026 *** 0.025 *** 0.026 *** 
Preel 0.025  0.028  0.026              
Elecy -0.067  -0.615 * -0.056              
Postel -0.028  -0.020  -0.028              
Termcount       0.010  0.008  0.010        
Left 0.018  0.008  0.021  0.019  0.008  0.021  0.019  0.008  0.022  
Frag 0.523 *** 0.445 ** 0.520 *** 0.535 *** 0.455 ** 0.531 *** 0.537 *** 0.457 ** 0.533 *** 
Maj -0.140 ** -0.173 ** -0.138 * -0.151 ** -0.185 *** -0.147 ** -0.158 ** -0.192 *** -0.155 ** 
LnNews 0.252 *     0.248 *     0.251 *     
LnNews*elec -0.050      -0.019      -0.028 *     
LnEcon_n   0.185 *     0.187 *     0.189 *   
LnEcon_n*elec   -0.130 *     -0.012      -0.016 **   
LnGen_n     0.217 *     0.212 *     0.215 * 
LnGen_n*elec     -0.045      -0.018      -0.027 * 
Note: Time period: 1984-2008. LSDVC estimation initialized with BB estimator, 50 bootstrap repetitions. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001
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The results of Table 3.1 indicate that a marginal increase in the 
local diffusion of newspapers is associated to a 25% increase of 
the total expenditure. This evidence supports the role of the 
press as a showcase for the policies implemented by the 
government, increasing the visibility of the expenditure when 
voters are not called to the polls and incumbents are not 
concerned with popularity matters. During the year in which the 
cycle is generated, on the contrary, a marginal increase in the 
diffusion of local newspapers is associated to a small but 
significant decrease of total expenditure if compared to the effect 
during the other years (2.8%). This result confirms the role of 
press in increasing the transparency of the incumbents’ decisions 
and the awareness of the voters. The coefficients associated to 
economic newspapers are always smaller than the coefficient 
associated to generic newspapers; this result, although non 
expected, highlights the role of generic press as information 
provider to voters that were not previously informed. It is 
reasonable to assume that economic newspapers are complement 
and not substitutes of generic newspapers, therefore that 
economic readers have already the stock of information that 
generic readers have. These results suggest that the marginal 
utility from information decreases as the news becomes more 
specific.   
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 replicate the estimation using current and 
capital expenditure as dependent variable. 
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Table 3.2 Current expenditure LSDVC estimation: augmented model, 375 observations 
 ALL1  ECO1  GEN1  ALL2  ECO2  GEN2  ALL3  ECO3  GEN3  
Lncxppclag 0.527 *** 0.514 *** 0.531 *** 0.529 *** 0.518 *** 0.533 *** 0.543 *** 0.530 *** 0.547 *** 
Lndensity 0.377  0.463  0.360  0.394  0.438  0.377  0.394  0.446  0.377  
Lndepratio 2.211 *** 2.151 *** 2.168 *** 2.229 *** 2.140 *** 2.185 *** 2.242 *** 2.153 *** 2.198 *** 
Lntgrpclag 0.035 *** 0.033 *** 0.036 *** 0.035 *** 0.032 *** 0.036 *** 0.035 *** 0.032 *** 0.036 *** 
Preel 0.038  0.040  0.040              
Elecy -0.017  -0.274  -0.013              
Postel -0.017  -0.009  -0.016              
Termcount       0.013  0.012  0.013        
Left -0.013  -0.024  -0.010  -0.012  -0.024  -0.009  -0.011  -0.023  -0.008  
Frag 0.499 ** 0.412 * 0.495 ** 0.507 ** 0.415 ** 0.502 ** 0.507 ** 0.417 ** 0.503 ** 
Maj -0.084  -0.119 * -0.081  -0.089  -0.124 * -0.086  -0.099  -0.135 * -0.096  
LnNews 0.262 *     0.265 *     0.268 *     
LnNews*elec -0.021      -0.002      -0.014      
LnEcon_news   0.188 *     0.191 *     0.194 *   
LnEcon_news*elec   -0.060      -0.002      -0.008    
LnGeneric_news     0.221 *     0.223 *     0.226 * 
LnGeneric_news*elec     -0.019      -0.001      -0.013  
Note: Time period: 1984-2008. LSDVC estimation initialized with BB estimator, 50 bootstrap repetitions. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001
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Table 3.3 Capital expenditure LSDVC estimation: augmented model, 375 observations 
 ALL1  ECO1  GEN1  ALL2  ECO2  GEN2  ALL3  ECO3  GEN3  
Lnkxppclag 0.698 *** 0.670 *** 0.702 *** 0.697 *** 0.662 *** 0.701 *** 0.699 *** 0.663 *** 0.703 *** 
Lndensity -1.344  -1.172  -1.340  -1.297  -1.294  -1.295  -1.222  -1.234  -1.217  
Lndepratio 2.690 *** 2.845 *** 2.648 *** 2.738 *** 2.837 *** 2.694 *** 2.794 *** 2.879 *** 2.750 *** 
Lntgrpclag 0.007  0.006  0.007  0.009  0.006  0.009  0.010  0.007  0.010  
Preel 0.034  0.034  0.035              
Elecy -0.140   -1.647 ** -0.104               
Postel -0.053  -0.039  -0.053              
Termcount       0.017   0.012   0.018         
Left 0.096  0.086  0.098  0.097  0.086  0.100  0.097  0.085  0.100  
Frag 0.720 * 0.625 * 0.721 * 0.740 * 0.646 * 0.738 * 0.746 ** 0.649 * 0.744 ** 
Maj -0.167  -0.218 * -0.163  -0.184  -0.245 * -0.178  -0.194 * -0.254 ** -0.189  
LnNews 0.298      0.288      0.301       
LnNews*elec -0.121      -0.059      -0.077 ***     
LnEcon_news   0.245      0.265      0.273     
LnEcon_news*elec   -0.345 **     -0.035 *     -0.042 ***   
LnGeneric_news     0.271      0.260      0.272   
LnGeneric_news*elec     -0.105      -0.056      -0.074 *** 
Note: Time period: 1984-2008. LSDVC estimation initialized with BB estimator, 50 bootstrap repetitions. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001
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The results show that the local diffusion of press influences 
current expenditure and capital expenditure through different 
channels. In Table 3.2 the interacted variables show non 
significant coefficients while the level coefficients are positive 
and significant. This result indicates an average visibility effect 
of information on current expenditure but not any transparency 
effect constraining electoral current spending. This is consistent 
with the fact that we have not found any electoral cycle in 
current expenditure during the period 1984-2008, therefore 
incumbents do not use current expenditure as a signal and they 
are not affected in a different way by the degree of awareness of 
the voters on this item of expenditure before and after an 
election. 
The negative sign associated to the interaction coefficients in 
Table 3.3, on the contrary, tells us the opposite story: as the 
incumbents use capital expenditure as a signal when an election 
is approaching, their decision is affected by the degree of voters’ 
awareness only according to the different timing of the 
legislature. The coefficient of the interacted term in Model GEN3, 
moreover, is always larger than the coefficient of the interacted 
term in Model ECO3, confirming the key role played by newly 
informed voters. 
 
4.2. From the cycle of size to the cycle of composition 
The electoral and fiscal reforms of the mid-90s, as already said, 
changed the Italian mechanism of accountability introducing a 
stronger link of responsibility between incumbents and 
politicians. At the same time, the introduction of the mixed 
electoral rule generated incentives to signal competence 
targeting those groups that are decisive for re-election, reducing 
the amount of universalistic – or ‘welfare’ – expenditure. This 
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Section clarifies the ambiguity of the theory regarding the effect 
of the reforms on the electoral expenditure manipulation by 
estimating Equation 1 and Equation 2 on the time subsamples 
1984-1995 and 1996-2008. Total expenditure and its main 
components – current and capital expenditure – are considered 
separately as dependent variables, and the robustness of the 
results has been tested as in Section 4.1. 
The results of the estimation of Equation 1 are presented in Table 
4.1, Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.1 Total expenditure LSDVC estimation: baseline model on the time subsamples 1984-1995 and 1996-
2008 
Panel a: Dataset 1984-1995              
Dep. Var. : 
ln total expenditure pc 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6  
Lntxppclag 0.5558 *** 0.5665 *** 0.5528 *** 0.5558 *** 0.5665 *** 0.5528 *** 
Lndensity -1.4971  -1.83  -1.629  -1.4971  -1.83  -1.629  
Lndepratio 0.4934  0.4348  0.2559  0.4934  0.4348  0.2559  
Lntgrpclag 0.0431 *** 0.0423 *** 0.0437 *** 0.0431 *** 0.0423 *** 0.0437 *** 
Preel 0.0806 * 0.0802 * 0.0821 * 0.0806 * 0.0802 * 0.0821  
Elec 0.2485 *** 0.2494 *** 0.247 *** 0.2485 *** 0.2494 *** 0.247 *** 
Postel 0.1409 ** 0.1402 ** 0.1462 ** 0.1409 ** 0.1402 ** 0.1462 ** 
Left -0.1671  -0.1754 * -0.1685  -0.1671  -0.1754 * -0.1685  
Maj -0.3005 *** -0.3082 *** -0.2926 *** -0.3005 *** -0.3082 *** -0.2926 *** 
Frag 0.3766  0.419 * 0.3938  0.3766  0.419 * 0.3938  
Observations 180  180  180  180  180  180  
Initial estimator AB  BB  AH  AB  BB  AH  
Repetitions 50  50  50  100  100  100  
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Table 4.1 Total expenditure LSDVC estimation: baseline model on the time subsamples 1984-1995 and 1996-
2008 (continued) 
Panel b: Dataset 1996-2008             
Dep. Var. : 
ln total expenditure pc 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
Lntxppclag 0.525 *** 0.993 *** 1.263 *** 0.525 *** 0.993 *** 1.263 *** 
Lndensity -1.111  -0.855  -3.094  -1.111  -0.855  -3.094  
Lndepratio 1.958 *** 0.114  -1.442  1.958 *** 0.114  -1.442 * 
Lntgrpclag -0.005  0.010  0.026  -0.005  0.010  0.026  
Preel -0.001  -0.014  -0.001  -0.001  -0.014  -0.001  
Elec 0.023  -0.004  0.001  0.023  -0.004  0.001  
Postel -0.062  -0.099 * -0.123 ** -0.062  -0.099 * -0.123 ** 
Left -0.007  -0.021  -0.099 * -0.007  -0.021  -0.099 * 
Frag -0.676  -0.651  -2.235 ** -0.676  -0.651  -2.235 ** 
Observations 196   196   196   196   196   196   
Initial estimator AB  BB  AH  AB  BB  AH  
Repetitions 50   50   50   100   100   100   
Note: AB: Arellano and Bond; BB: Blundell and Bond; AH: Anderson and Hsiao. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001
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Table 4.2 Current expenditure LSDVC estimation: baseline model on the time subsamples 1984-1995 and 1996-
2008 
Panel a: Dataset 1984-1995             
Dep. Var. : 
ln current expenditure pc Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
Lncxppclag 0.335 *** 0.336 *** 0.350 *** 0.335 *** 0.336 *** 0.350 *** 
Lndensity -2.541  -2.725  -2.521  -2.541  -2.725  -2.521  
Lndepratio -0.664  -0.748  -0.695  -0.664  -0.748  -0.695  
Lntgrpclag 0.055 *** 0.055 *** 0.055 *** 0.055 *** 0.055 *** 0.055 *** 
Preel 0.101 ** 0.101 ** 0.100 ** 0.101 ** 0.101 ** 0.100 * 
Elec 0.193 *** 0.193 *** 0.192 *** 0.193 *** 0.193 *** 0.192 *** 
Postel 0.139 ** 0.139 ** 0.143 ** 0.139 ** 0.139 ** 0.143 ** 
Left -0.260 ** -0.261 ** -0.261 ** -0.260 ** -0.261 ** -0.261 ** 
Maj -0.176 ** -0.177 ** -0.178 * -0.176 ** -0.177 ** -0.178 ** 
Frag 0.175  0.188  0.199  0.175  0.188  0.199  
Observations 180   180   180   180   180   180   
Initial estimator AB  BB  AH  AB  BB  AH  
Repetitions 50   50   50   100   100   100   
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Table 4.2 Current expenditure LSDVC estimation: baseline model on the time subsamples 1984-1995 and 1996-
2008 (continued) 
Panel b: Dataset 1996-2008             
Dep. Var. : 
ln current expenditure pc 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
Lncxppclag 0.643 *** 0.974 *** 1.965 *** 0.643 *** 0.974 *** 1.965 *** 
Lndensity -0.115  -0.152  -9.121 *** -0.115  -0.152  -9.121 *** 
Lndepratio 1.296 * 0.181  -2.107 ** 1.296 * 0.181  -2.107 *** 
Lntgrpclag 0.011  0.027  0.116 *** 0.011  0.027  0.116 *** 
Preel -0.006  -0.011  0.026  -0.006  -0.011  0.026  
Elec -0.022  -0.037  -0.018  -0.022  -0.037  -0.018  
Postel -0.029  -0.042  -0.099 ** -0.029  -0.042  -0.099 ** 
Left -0.033  -0.031  -0.112 *** -0.033  -0.031  -0.112 *** 
Frag -0.700  -0.447  -0.828  -0.700  -0.447  -0.828  
Observations 196  196  196  196  196  196  
Initial estimator AB  BB  AH  AB  BB  AH  
Repetitions 50  50  50  100  100  100  
Note: AB: Arellano and Bond; BB: Blundell and Bond; AH: Anderson and Hsiao. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001
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Table 4.3 Capital expenditure LSDVC estimation: baseline model on the time subsamples 1984-1995 and 1996-
2008 
Panel a: dataset 1984-1995             
Dep. Var. : 
ln capital expenditure pc 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
Lnkxppclag 0.707 *** 0.767 *** 0.768 *** 0.707 *** 0.767 *** 0.768 *** 
Lndensity 0.216  -0.033  -2.31  0.216  -0.033  -2.307  
Lndepratio 1.029  1.393  3.190  1.029  1.393  3.190  
Lntgrpclag 0.023  0.019  0.021  0.023  0.019  0.021  
Preel 0.048  0.048  0.059  0.048  0.049  0.059  
Elec 0.458 *** 0.463 *** 0.516 *** 0.458 *** 0.463 *** 0.516 *** 
Postel 0.169 * 0.167 * 0.124  0.169 * 0.167 * 0.124  
Left 0.136  0.099  0.106  0.136  0.099  0.106  
Maj -0.473 *** -0.489 *** -0.590 *** -0.473 *** -0.489 *** -0.590 *** 
Frag 0.976 ** 1.059 ** 1.910 *** 0.976 ** 1.059 ** 1.910 *** 
Observations 180  180  180  180  180  180  
Initial estimator AB  BB  AH  AB  BB  AH  
Repetitions 50  50  50  100  100  100  
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Table 4.3 Capital expenditure LSDVC estimation: baseline model on the time subsamples 1984-1995 and 1996-
2008 (continued) 
Panel b: dataset 1996-2008             
Dep. Var. : 
ln capital expenditure pc 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
Lnkxppclag 0.393 *** 0.614 *** 0.426 *** 0.393 *** 0.614 *** 0.426 *** 
Lndensity -4.270  -4.362  -4.603  -4.270  -4.362  -4.603  
Lndepratio 1.977  1.332  2.012  1.977  1.332  2.012  
Lntgrpclag -0.094  -0.096  -0.097  -0.094  -0.096  -0.097  
Preel 0.083  0.070  0.074  0.083  0.070  0.074  
Elec 0.185 ** 0.151  0.175 * 0.185 ** 0.151  0.175 * 
Postel -0.164  -0.205  -0.160  -0.164  -0.205  -0.160  
Left 0.036  0.049  0.042  0.036  0.049  0.042  
Frag -1.218  -1.562  -1.027  -1.218  -1.562  -1.027  
Observations 196   196   196   196   196   196   
Initial estimator AB  BB  AH  AB  BB  AH  
Repetitions 50   50   50   100   100   100   
Note: AB: Arellano and Bond; BB: Blundell and Bond; AH: Anderson and Hsiao. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.00
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As the tables show, before 1995 evident cycles of expenditure are 
present in total expenditure and also in current and capital 
expenditure, as the positive and significant coefficients on the 
elec variable indicates. Although also the preel  and the postel 
variables are often positive and significant, the largest 
coefficients are associated to the year in which the cycle is 
expected to be observed. From 1996 onwards, however, the 
coefficients do not detect an expenditure cycle anymore in total 
and current expenditure. Capital expenditure is the only item 
showing a persistent cycling pattern, smaller than in the pre-95 
period and not robust to alternative initial estimators. 
This time investigation suggest that in time the cycles in the size 
of public expenditure have decreased up to the point that they 
have disappeared. This evidence is consistent with a shift 
towards a ‘pork barrel cycle’ (Drazen and Eslava, 2005) affecting 
the composition of the expenditure. Pork barrel cycles in the 
dataset, however, should not imply a modification of the 
composition between current expenditure and capital 
expenditure as expected, as the analyses detected weak cycles in 
capital expenditure without finding a significant anti-cyclical 
pattern in current expenditure. Given these facts, we suppose 
that pork barrel affects the internal composition of current and 
capital expenditure and not their reciprocal substitution41. 
Finally, the pork barrel cycles have been motivated in the 
literature by the sophistication of the voters and their increased 
monitoring powers in time. The final step of the empirical 
analyses tests the effect of the local diffusion of press on public 
expenditure separately for the two time sub-samples.
                                                 
41
 As the budget data disaggregated by function are not available for a 
sufficient time period, this hypotheses cannot be tested. 
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Table 5.1 Total expenditure LSDVC estimation: augmented model (180 observations) 
Panel a:        
1984-1995 
ALL1  ECO1  GEN1  ALL2  ECO2  GEN2  ALL3  ECO3  GEN3  
Lntxppclag 0.495 *** 0.527 *** 0.500 *** 0.531 *** 0.582 *** 0.537 *** 0.537 *** 0.586 *** 0.544 *** 
Lndensity -2.229  -2.300  -2.196  -2.522  -2.369  -2.491  -2.045  -1.959  -2.023  
Lndepratio 0.272  0.720  0.226  0.320  0.852  0.264  0.575  1.070  0.518  
Lntgrpclag 0.041 *** 0.040 *** 0.042 *** 0.034 *** 0.032 *** 0.034 *** 0.032 *** 0.030 *** 0.033 *** 
Preel 0.057  0.073 * 0.059              
Elec 0.118  -0.385  0.125              
Postel 0.124 ** 0.136 ** 0.125 **             
Termcount       -0.024  -0.025  -0.023        
Left -0.188 * -0.206 * -0.183 * -0.183 * -0.191 * -0.175  -0.176  -0.182  -0.169  
Frag 0.392  0.362  0.388  0.427  0.448 * 0.424  0.478 * 0.499 * 0.474 * 
Maj -0.271 *** -0.297 *** -0.271 *** -0.225 ** -0.277 *** -0.223 ** -0.204 ** -0.250 *** -0.202 ** 
LnNews 0.313 **     0.387 ***     0.361 **     
LnNews*elec -0.038      -0.076 ***     -0.050 *     
LnEco_n   0.146      0.166      0.155    
LnEco_n*elec   -0.113      -0.042 ***     -0.028 **   
LnGen_n     0.286 **     0.358 ***     0.333 ** 
LnGen_n*elec     -0.035      -0.074 ***     -0.049 * 
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Table 5.1 Total expenditure LSDVC estimation: augmented model (continued) (196 observations) 
Panel b:                           
1996-2008 
ALL1  ECO1  GEN1  ALL2  ECO2  GEN2  ALL3  ECO3  GEN3  
Lntxppclag 0.992 *** 1.021 *** 0.995 *** 0.917 *** 0.948 *** 0.919 *** 0.891 *** 0.896 *** 0.893 *** 
Lndensity -0.789  -0.683  -0.811  -0.952  -1.005  -0.976  -0.837  -0.960  -0.852  
Lndepratio 0.255  0.073  0.233  0.399  0.240  0.403  0.431  0.333  0.451  
Lntgrpclag 0.011  0.010  0.011  0.001  0.004  0.001  -0.010  -0.008  -0.010  
Preel -0.013  -0.012  -0.013              
Elec -0.113  -0.323  -0.110              
Postel -0.099 * -0.106 * -0.098 *             
Termcount       0.018  0.021  0.018        
Left -0.020  -0.022  -0.020  -0.012  -0.014  -0.011  -0.001  0.000  0.000  
Frag -0.623  -0.662  -0.623  -0.609  -0.640  -0.601  -0.506  -0.498  -0.496  
LnNews 0.088      0.100      0.093      
LnNews*elec -0.041      0.002      -0.013      
LnEco_n   0.064      -0.008      -0.067    
LnEco_n*elec   -0.062      0.003      -0.006    
LnGen_n     0.067      0.092      0.098  
LnGen_n*elec     -0.038      0.002      -0.012  
Note: LSDVC estimation initialized with BB estimator, 50 bootstrap repetitions. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001
 188 
The comparison between the coefficients presented in panel ‘a’ 
and panel ‘b’ of Table 5.1 show that the effect of the press 
diffusion on total expenditure is significant only before 1995. 
There are two channels of influence: the average visibility effect 
during all the years and the transparency effect during the year 
in which the cycle is generated. The average effect is determined 
by generic newspapers as the economic newspapers don’t show 
any significant effect on total expenditure. 
If we estimate Equation 2 on current and capital expenditure 
separately for the two time subsamples, we obtain the results in 
Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. 
Table 5.2 shows that current expenditure is influenced by the 
diffusion of the newspapers only before 1995 and only through 
the average effect from generic newspapers. This results matches 
the previous results in Table 4.2 of a cycle in current expenditure 
before 1995: if the incumbent manipulates current expenditure to 
signal competence, his decision is affected by the degree of 
awareness of the population. However, the effect is an average 
effect and not an electoral effect; this result is explained with the 
rigidity of current expenditure, mainly made of personnel wages 
and transfers to Municipalities (Comuni) and Local Health Units 
(ASL). As the personnel expenditure is rigid over the legislature 
and the transfers to lower levels of government are subject to 
political determinants (partisan alignment, as an example) and 
reputational concerns (because the local government observes 
the transfer received every year and prefers an average more 
generous regional government to an average opportunistic one), 
it is reasonable that current expenditure finances targeted 
programs spread during the whole legislature. 
On the contrary, capital expenditure shows a different pattern. 
Table 5.3 shows in fact that expenditure is influenced by the 
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diffusion of newspapers only when we compare the electoral 
and the non electoral years through the interactive term. The 
negative coefficients indicate a transparency effect associated 
with all the types of newspapers either before and after 1995. 
This is an expected result as the cycle in capital expenditure is 
observed in the full dataset 1984-2008; the magnitude of the 
effect, however, has almost halved through time from 13% to 
7.3%.
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Table 5.2 Current expenditure LSDVC estimation: augmented model on the period 1984-1995 (180 observations) 
Panel a:                                           
1984-1995 
ALL1 ECO1  GEN1  ALL2  ECO2  GEN2  ALL3  ECO3  GEN3  
Lncxppclag 0.266 *** 0.322 *** 0.265 *** 0.283 *** 0.357 *** 0.282 *** 0.276 *** 0.35 *** 0.276 *** 
Lndensity -2.91  -2.97  -2.91  -3.26  -3.22  -3.25  -3.05  -3.03  -3.04  
Lndepratio -0.91  -0.43  -1  -0.94  -0.38  -1.06  -0.87  -0.31  -0.99  
Lntgrpclag 0.051 *** 0.052 *** 0.052 *** 0.044 *** 0.044 *** 0.045 *** 0.044 *** 0.043 *** 0.044 *** 
Preel 0.07 * 0.094 ** 0.071 *             
Elec 0.155  0.033  0.153              
Postel 0.109 * 0.135 ** 0.109 *             
Termcount       -0.01  -0.01  -0.01        
Left -0.28 ** -0.29 ** -0.28 ** -0.28 ** -0.27 ** -0.27 ** -0.27 ** -0.27 ** -0.26 ** 
Frag 0.193  0.181  0.183  0.219  0.233  0.208  0.244  0.259  0.232  
Maj -0.12  -0.18 ** -0.12  -0.07  -0.14 * -0.07  -0.06  -0.12 * -0.05  
LnNews 0.414 ***     0.502 ***     0.497 ***     
LnNews*elec 0.004      -0.04      -0.02      
LnEco_n   0.118      0.147      0.144    
LnEco_n*elec   -0.03      -0.02 *     -0.02    
LnGen_n     0.398 ***     0.483 ***     0.478 *** 
LnGen_n*elec     0.003      -0.04      -0.02  
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Table 5.2 Current expenditure LSDVC estimation: augmented model on the period 1984-1995 (continued) (196 
observations) 
Panel b: 1996-2008 ALL1  ECO1  GEN1  ALL2  ECO2  GEN2  ALL3  ECO3  GEN3  
Lncxppclag 0.961 *** 1.010 *** 0.966 *** 0.918 *** 0.968 *** 0.924 *** 0.935 *** 0.955 *** 0.940 *** 
Lndensity -0.157  0.159  -0.174  -0.285  -0.106  -0.303  -0.215  -0.015  -0.228  
Lndepratio 0.216  0.062  0.167  0.239  0.161  0.199  0.206  0.171  0.171  
Lntgrpclag 0.027  0.028  0.027  0.021  0.025  0.022  0.019  0.018  0.019  
Preel -0.012  -0.006  -0.012              
Elec -0.047  -0.183  -0.044              
Postel -0.042  -0.053  -0.043              
Termcount       0.002  0.009  0.002        
Left -0.032  -0.035  -0.033  -0.026  -0.030  -0.027  -0.026  -0.024  -0.026  
Frag -0.465  -0.499  -0.477  -0.454  -0.498  -0.463  -0.434  -0.428  -0.441  
LnNews -0.050      -0.049      -0.047      
LnNews*elec -0.003      0.007      0.008      
LnEco_n   0.112      0.093      0.045    
LnEco_n*elec   -0.029      0.006      0.003    
LnGen_n     -0.075      -0.067      -0.061  
LnGen_n*elec     -0.002      0.007      0.008  
Note: LSDVC estimation initialized with BB estimator, 50 bootstrap repetitions. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001
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Table 5.3 Capital expenditure LSDVC estimation: augmented model on the period 1984-1995 (180 observations) 
Panel a:                             
1984-1995 
ALL1  ECO1  GEN1  ALL2  ECO2  GEN2  ALL3  ECO3  GEN3  
Lnkxppclag 0.737 *** 0.721 *** 0.744 *** 0.752 *** 0.719 *** 0.76 *** 0.784 *** 0.757 *** 0.791 *** 
Lndensity -0.41  -1.07  -0.3  -0.76  -1.24  -0.68  0.359  0.011  0.394  
Lndepratio 1.483  1.999  1.472  1.351  1.78  1.34  1.926  2.374  1.903  
Lntgrpclag 0.019  0.014  0.02  0.012  0.009  0.013  0.008  0.004  0.009  
Preel 0.029  0.03  0.034              
Elec 0.109  -1.8 ** 0.149              
Postel 0.161  0.152  0.163              
Termcount       -0.05  -0.06 * -0.04        
Left 0.104  0.044  0.108  0.109  0.079  0.114  0.121  0.099  0.124  
Frag 0.987 ** 0.875 * 0.995 ** 0.998 ** 0.976 ** 1.006 ** 1.118 ** 1.126 ** 1.121 ** 
Maj -0.48 *** -0.44 *** -0.48 *** -0.41 *** -0.48 *** -0.41 *** -0.37 ** -0.41 *** -0.37 ** 
LnNews 0.215      0.297      0.218      
LnNews*elec -0.13      -0.18 ***     -0.13 ***     
LnEco_n   0.259      0.321 *     0.268    
LnEco_n*elec   -0.4 ***     -0.1 ***     -0.07 ***   
LnGen_n     0.169      0.25      0.177  
LnGen_n*elec     -0.11      -0.17 ***     -0.13 *** 
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Table 5.3 Capital expenditure LSDVC estimation: augmented model on the period 1984-1995 (cont.) (196 obs.) 
Panel b:                 
1996-2008 
ALL1  ECO1  GEN1  ALL2  ECO2  GEN2  ALL3  ECO3  GEN3  
Lnkxppclag 0.611 *** 0.600 *** 0.612 *** 0.582 *** 0.586 *** 0.583 *** 0.582 *** 0.584 *** 0.585 *** 
Lndensity -4.297  -5.044  -4.296  -4.317  -5.291  -4.302  -4.118  -5.355  -4.083  
Lndepratio 1.678  1.513  1.765  1.661  1.482  1.787  1.299  1.201  1.461  
Lntgrpclag -0.095  -0.096  -0.095  -0.102  -0.100  -0.102  -0.137 * -0.125  -0.137 * 
Preel 0.072  0.067  0.074              
Elec -0.110  -0.559  -0.098              
Postel -0.206  -0.161  -0.202              
Termcount       0.067  0.051  0.066        
Left 0.051  0.066  0.054  0.055  0.074  0.058  0.097  0.111  0.101  
Frag -1.481  -1.233  -1.445  -1.420  -1.161  -1.373  -0.985  -0.777  -0.935  
LnNews 0.239      0.217      0.160      
LnNews*elec -0.097      -0.012      -0.073 **     
LnEco_n   -0.349      -0.479      -0.532    
LnEco_n*elec   -0.134      -0.008      -0.034 *   
LnGen_n     0.297      0.301      0.285  
LnGen_n*elec     -0.090      -0.011      -0.071 ** 
Note: LSDVC estimation initialized with BB estimator, 50 bootstrap repetitions. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001
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All in all, this Section presented the empirical evidence of the 
weakening of a cycle in the size of expenditure after 1995. At the 
same time the analyses shows that effect of the diffusion of press 
information decreased when the considered item of expenditure 
was not the object of cycles in size anymore. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This chapter investigated the impact of the diffusion of 
newspapers on the expenditure cycles in Italian Regions, 
separating the effect of economic and generic newspapers, and 
analyzing the time pattern of cycling. The small sample bias due 
in the dynamic estimation has been corrected applying the 
LSDVC estimator (Bruno, 2005), testing the robustness of the 
coefficients to different specifications of the initial estimator and 
of the number of bootstrap repetitions to estimate the standard 
errors. 
The empirical results verify the presence of a weak cycle in the 
size of expenditure (Rogoff, 1990) during the period 1984-2008, 
by detecting electoral expenditure cycles in capital expenditure 
of about 19% and weak electoral cycles in total expenditure of 
about 7.5%. The replication of the analyses on time subsamples 
of the dataset reveals that these results are motivated by the 
presence of evident expenditure cycles before 1995; the cycle of 
expenditure size disappears during the second half of the period, 
when the electoral and fiscal reforms have been implemented. 
The voters’ awareness, proxied by the local diffusion of 
newspapers, has an average positive effect on current 
expenditure and a negative electoral effect on capital 
expenditure in the full dataset. This pattern is explained with the 
role of capital expenditure as the most visible item of spending, 
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the ‘signal’ to send to the voters, that is more influential as the 
legislature turns to its end. The time disaggregated analyses, 
however, shows that the variation of the diffusion of press is 
halved with respect to capital expenditure and it is not 
significant with respect to current expenditure. This result could 
be explained with a shift towards a pork barrel cycle in which 
information on the amount and the direction of targeted electoral 
expenditure is unobservable to voters and cannot be revealed 
with newspapers. 
Finally, an interesting result of the analyses shows that a more 
specific information does not constrain the cycle more strongly, 
as generic newspapers are associated to larger coefficients than 
economic newspapers. This result was unexpected but it is in 
line with the existing literature stressing the role of newly 
informed voters (Prat and Stromberg, 2006). The relevant issue is 
thus spreading information, not increasing the specificity of 
information. 
This paper contributes to the literature in two main directions. 
First, it illustrates a pattern of cycling from the size to the 
composition of expenditure. Future research should search for 
the same pattern in other countries and exploit the available 
datasets to conduct a proper test of different types of cycles in 
time. 
Secondly, although the link between the diffusion of newspapers 
and the expenditure decision necessarily passes by popularity 
concerns, further research should investigate the impact of 
specific and generic information on the voting decision. The 
classification of newspaper could also be modified to control for 
local and national newspapers, or the partisan bias associated to 
the journals. Finally, as the ‘press divide’ becomes larger in the 
very recent years and digital media tend to be considered much 
more transparent and reliable than other sources of information, 
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future studies should address the role of these innovative news 
providers. 
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6. Appendix 
 
A.1 List of newspapers classified as ‘generic’ 
1. Adige 24. Gazzettino 47. Tribuna di Treviso 
2. Arena 25. Lavoro 48. Leggo 
3. Avvenire 26. Mattino 49. Libero 
4. Corriere Mercantile 27. Messaggero 50. Libertà 
5. Corriere di Rieti 28. Messaggero Veneto 51. Manifesto 
6. Corriere della Sera 29. Piccolo 52. Mattino di Padova 
7. Corriere dell'Umbria 30. Quotidiano 53. Nuova Venezia 
8. Corriere di Viterbo 31. Resto del Carlino 54. Nuovo Quotidiano di Puglia 
9. Dolomiten 32. Tempo 55. Occhio 
10. Eco di Bergamo 33. Tirreno 56. Padania 
11. Epolis 34. Indipendente 57. Provincia pavese 
12. 
Gazzetta del 
 Mezzogiorno 35. Gazzetta di Parma 58. Paese sera 
13. Gazzetta del Sud 36. Gazzetta di Reggio 59. Quotidiano della Calabria 
14. Gazzetta di Mantova 37. Altoadige 60. Quotidiano di Sicilia 
15. Giornale 38. Nazione 61. Repubblica 
16. Giornale di Brescia 39. Notte 62. Sannio 
17. Giornale di Vicenza 40. Nuova Basilicata 63. Secolo d'Italia 
18. Giornale Italia 41. Nuova Ferrara 64. Secolo XIX 
19. Giornale dell'Umbria 42. 
Nuova gazzetta 
di Modena 65. Stampa 
20. Giorno 43. Nuova Sardegna 66. Taranto news sera 
21. Centro 44. 
Provincia di Como-
Lecco 67. Unione sarda 
22. Corriere Adriatico 45. Provincia di Cremona 68. Unità 
23. Giornale di Sicilia 46. Sicilia   
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A.2 Data sources of the dataset 
Total exp, 
Current exp, 
Capital exp, 
Grants 
Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT),  
Finanza locale: entrate e spese dei bilanci consuntivi  
(Comuni, Province e Regioni), paper yearbooks from 1980 to 2004, 
online publications from 2005 to 2009. Link: http://www.istat.it/ 
Density, 
Depratio 
Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), Sistema di Indicatori 
Territoriali 
Link: http://sitis.istat.it/sitis/html/ 
Preel, 
Elec, 
Postel, 
Left, 
Frag 
Italian Ministry of Interiors, Archivio storico delle elezioni 
Link: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/ 
News, Eco_n, Gen_n Sobbrio (2011) and ADS (Accertamenti Diffusione Stampa) 
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A.3 Descriptive statistics of the dataset 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total exp 1.473 0.816 0.050 4.364 
Current exp 1.176 0.639 0.027 3.429 
Capital exp 0.297 0.311 0.017 2.274 
Density 200.280 105.052 59.130 427.680 
Depratio 49.636 4.115 39.190 61.470 
Grants 0.525 0.476 0 2.946 
Preel 0.200 0.400 0 1 
Elec 0.200 0.400 0 1 
Postel 0.202 0.402 0 1 
Left 0.458 0.499 0 1 
Maj 0.567 0.496 0 1 
Frag 0.691 0.134 0.128 0.880 
News 0.074 0.039 0.016 0.247 
Eco_n 0.005 0.002 0 0.012 
Gen_n 0.069 0.037 0.015 0.240 
Termcount 2.918 1.433 1 5 
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A.4. Total expenditure LSDVC estimation: augmented model without interacted term 
 1984-2008  1984-1995 1996-2008 
  ALL1   ECO1   GEN1   ALL1   ECO1   GEN1   ALL1   ECO1   GEN1   
Lntxppclag 0.651 *** 0.626 *** 0.656 *** 0.493 *** 0.526 *** 0.499 *** 0.985 *** 1.013 *** 0.989 *** 
Lndensity -0.115  -0.053  -0.130  -2.129  -2.224  -2.099  -0.832  -0.756  -0.852  
Lndepratio 2.113 *** 2.075 *** 2.070 *** 0.238  0.727  0.192  0.241  0.091  0.217  
Lntgrpclag 0.025 *** 0.024 *** 0.026 *** 0.041 *** 0.040 *** 0.042 *** 0.010  0.010  0.010  
Preel 0.025  0.027  0.026  0.057  0.072 * 0.059  -0.013  -0.011  -0.013  
Elecy 0.067 * 0.077 * 0.067 * 0.216 *** 0.242 *** 0.218 *** -0.002   -0.001   -0.003   
Postel -0.029  -0.022  -0.028  0.124 ** 0.141 ** 0.125 ** -0.098 * -0.103 * -0.098 * 
Left 0.019  0.007  0.021  -0.190 * -0.200 * -0.184 * -0.019  -0.022  -0.019  
Frag 0.527 *** 0.443 ** 0.523 *** 0.393  0.395  0.389  -0.637  -0.680  -0.635  
Maj -0.140 ** -0.174 ** -0.138 * -0.271 *** -0.320 *** -0.270 ***       
Lnallpc 0.249 *     0.317 **     0.076      
Lnsolepc   0.183 *     0.156      0.043    
Lnaltripc         0.212           0.288 **         0.056   
Note: LSDVC estimation initialized with BB estimator, 50 bootstrap repetitions. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001 
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A.5. Current expenditure LSDVC estimation: augmented model without interacted term 
  1984-2008 1984-1995 1996-2008 
  ALL1   ECO1   GEN1   ALL1   ECO1   GEN1   ALL1   ECO1   GEN1   
Lncxppclag 0.528 *** 0.517 *** 0.532 *** 0.266 *** 0.324 *** 0.266 *** 0.972 *** 1.007 *** 0.978 *** 
Lndensity 0.384  0.426  0.367   -2.92  -2.946  -2.913   -0.156  0.112  -0.169  
Lndepratio 2.205 *** 2.119 *** 2.163 *** -0.902  -0.426  -1   0.13  0.064  0.078  
Lntgrpclag 0.035 *** 0.033 *** 0.036 *** 0.051 *** 0.052 *** 0.051 *** 0.027  0.028  0.027  
Preel 0.038  0.04  0.04   0.07 * 0.094 ** 0.071 * -0.011  -0.006  -0.012  
Elecy 0.039   0.047   0.039   0.144 ** 0.185 *** 0.145 ** -0.037   -0.031   -0.038   
Postel 0.017  -0.01  -0.016   0.109 * 0.136 ** 0.109 * -0.042  -0.052  -0.043  
Left 0.013  -0.024  -0.01   -0.282 ** -0.284 ** -0.275 ** -0.032  -0.035  -0.033  
Frag 0.501 ** 0.41 * 0.496 ** 0.194  0.19  0.183   -0.471  -0.51  -0.482  
Maj 0.084  -0.12 * -0.082   -0.125  -0.188 ** -0.12         
Lnallpc 0.261 *      0.414 ***      -0.056      
Lnsolepc   0.187 *      0.12       0.1    
Lnaltripc         0.219 *         0.398 ***         -0.079   
Note: LSDVC estimation initialized with BB estimator, 50 bootstrap repetitions. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001 
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A.6. Capital expenditure LSDVC estimation: augmented model without interacted term 
 1984-2008 1984-1995 1996-2008 
 ALL1  ECO1  GEN1  ALL1  ECO1  GEN1  ALL1  ECO1  GEN1  
Lnkxppclag 0.700 *** 0.664 *** 0.703 *** 0.733 *** 0.696 *** 0.741 *** 0.610 *** 0.604 *** 0.611 *** 
Lndensity -1.289  -1.327  -1.286  -0.080  -1.043  -0.002  -4.444  -5.283  -4.436  
Lndepratio 2.654 *** 2.724 *** 2.614 *** 1.375  1.878  1.373  1.579  1.436  1.672  
Lntgrpclag 0.006  0.004  0.007  0.019  0.014  0.019  -0.097  -0.096  -0.097  
Preel 0.034  0.035  0.035  0.028  0.025  0.033  0.072  0.068  0.074  
Elecy 0.184 ** 0.196 *** 0.184 ** 0.438 *** 0.443 *** 0.443 *** 0.154   0.143   0.155   
Postel -0.054  -0.043  -0.053  0.161  0.176 * 0.163  -0.205  -0.155  -0.201  
Left 0.097  0.085  0.100  0.100  0.065  0.104  0.053  0.066  0.056  
Frag 0.726 * 0.619 * 0.726 * 0.986 ** 0.942 * 0.991 ** -1.497  -1.280  -1.457  
Maj -0.166  -0.221 * -0.162  -0.475 *** -0.529 *** -0.477 ***       
Lnallpc 0.291      0.225      0.202      
Lnsolepc   0.255      0.317 *     -0.405    
Lnaltripc         0.261           0.173           0.263   
Note: LSDVC estimation initialized with BB estimator, 50 bootstrap repetitions. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001 
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